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Abstract                                                                    
  As global economic integration deepens and enterprises scale up their business, the 
enterprise groups have become the mainstream of the company's development form. 
Subsidiaries of the Company have grown in size and increasingly diversified. Thus how does 
the parent Company control its subsidiaries effectively has become an urgent challenge, 
especially for the state-owned enterprises in China. This thesis studies the management and 
control of state-owned enterprises in China, carrying certain theoretical and practical 
significance. 
  The research examined the theory and mechanism of management of SOEs, and evaluation 
on employee performance. It also analyzed performance evaluation, coordination and risk 
control strategies of SOEs' subsidiaries. The same studies were repeated on state-owned 
enterprise groups and extended to the strategies of risk management and risk control. 
  The thesis first examined the conundrum of effective cooperation between subsidiaries of 
different departments and the parent company for efficient allocation of resources. To tackle 
this headache, the IAHP and DEA model were adopted to help group decision makers better 
measure the performance of employees and organizations. The thesis used the Balanced 
Scorecard (BSC) tool as the main principle and the combination of fuzzy mathematics and 
Delphi and entropy weight methods as the main methodology to assess the performance. In 
addition, a novel method of using multi-reasoning, multi-dimensional and dynamic factors 
was developed to assess the performance of SOE employees, and this method was proven to 
be effective. Moreover, the super-efficiency DEA model which takes into account work 
performance, work ability, work attitude, job potential and other factors in the evaluation on 
employee performance was developed and tested. Finally, risk map for SOEs was proposed 
and evaluated. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Background 
As global economic integration deepens and enterprises scale up their business, the 
enterprise groups have become the mainstream of the company's development form. 
Increasingly growing and diversified parent-subsidiary companies of the Group have made 
company’s strategy-making and implementation ever more systemic and complicated. 
Against such backdrop, how large-scale patent company efficiently manages its subsidies has 
become a pressing issue in the group management.    
 
Since the reform and opening-up policy, China’s market economy system has been 
improved, with the quality and performance of the national economy constantly enhancing. 
Among the basic and key industries related to people’s livelihood and national defense 
security, large-scale state-owned enterprises still dominate the national economy. In addition, 
state-owned assets have always been the vital material basis as well as the social security 
guarantee for the socialist market economy. However, with the development of the society 
and the further reform of state-owned enterprises, China's state-owned enterprise groups are 
overwhelmed with many problems in their management and control. The problems mainly 
exist in three major areas [1]: 
(1) Deep-rooted problem-fragmented group  
Some long-established state-owned enterprise groups were initially built by administrative 
power, or restructured by certain administrative bureaus, or organized by ways of 
administrative appropriation. Most of them “established subsidiary companies before 
building their parent company”. As such, the enterprise group was formed by stocking 
companies, rather than bounding them together through mutual investment. This approach in 
which the enterprise group was established dictates that the group can only be passively 
controlled and the group headquarters is somewhat like an "asset management company" 
rather than an operating entity with state-owned assets. Moreover, various departments at 
different levels in the group stand in the way of efficient asset allocation, making the group 
as a feeble giant. The situation gets worse when poor capital management and out-of-control 
investment drive some subsidies to duck their responsibilities, with the mindset of “ask 
money from the group, have debts to be repaid by the group, and the insufficient fund can be 
complemented by the group”, leaving the overall management at high-stakes. 
(2) A striking departure from main business due to ambiguous positioning  
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Some state-owned groups are formed as a result of diversified business development, with 
many subordinate enterprises in different industries and fields, and even in fields that have 
no correlations with the group business. As a result, groups are embedded with ambiguous 
development positioning, undistinguished core business, fragmented business system, and 
weak management. Faced with the chaotic business development, many state-owned 
enterprise groups who had the intention to strengthen their control unexpectedly landed 
themselves in an area that marks a striking departure from its main business. They gradually 
became an asset management company that keeps profitable enterprises in the group but 
kicks loss-making ones out. The inconvenient truth is that some profitable business is not 
group’s core business, nor is the core capabilities of the group, and even don’t deserve further 
investment. 
(3) Dilemma in control and power delegation, imbalance between centralization and 
decentralization  
Some groups which are striving to strengthen management and control have also done 
many explorations. Yet many groups are confused with clear responsibilities in terms of the 
management of subsidies, for example, what matters should be subject to the group 
management and how to balance the strict and laid-back management, with the fear that strict 
management would strangle business growth whereas the laid-back style would risk losing 
control over subsidies.  
From this point of view, management and control of state-owned enterprise groups over 
their subsidiaries is the primary task of the reform of state-owned enterprises. The state also 
attaches great importance to this issue and has gradually introduced relevant policies. To 
figure out effective models of corporate governance, some domestic and foreign companies 
have conducted studies and some scholars have also worked on this issue. However, there is 
no consensus on the classification of the group management model between the academic 
and the business community. Moreover, many domestic and foreign researches focus on the 
selection of specific management models, and there is no universally applicable theoretical 
method on how to choose the appropriate management model.  
In general, despite the fact that problems of the group have become a research hotspot in 
the theoretical circle, the research on group management and control theory is still in its 
infancy, especially the shortage of empirical research . In addition, there is still much work 
to be done on the management and control of state-owned group given its characteristics. 
Considering that state-owned groups dominate China’s existing enterprise groups, especially 
large-scale enterprise groups, therefore, the research on group management and control based 
on the characteristics of state-owned groups carries important theoretical and practical 
significance, and it is worthy of in-depth discussion and research. This topic is based on the 
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above background, and the author tries to offer some new ideas and methods for the 
management and control of state-owned enterprise groups.  
 
1.2 Research Approaches and Routes 
This topic analyzed the background and existing problems of the current state-owned 
enterprise groups, and proposed the necessity of management and control of state-owned 
enterprise groups. In terms of control, it is more important to use scientific and reasonable 
mathematical methods and models to evaluate, coordinate and optimize sub-companies. The 
management and control of state-owned enterprise groups include the selection of 
management and control modes, the selection of management control mechanisms, the 
application of management and evaluation methods, and risk control in the process of 
management and control. This thesis mainly proposes: Performance evaluation methods for 
employees from state-owned group ——super-efficiency DEA evaluation model; evaluation 
and optimization methods among holding subsidiaries of state-owned enterprise group——
DEA method evaluation model; performance evaluation method for holding subsidiaries of 
state-owned enterprise group—fuzzy synthetic evaluation model; coordination decision-
making and evaluation methods for holding subsidiaries of state-owned enterprise group—
interval AHP method evaluation model; and risk control strategies under the management 
and control of state-owned group. The thesis also carried out empirical studies on these 
mentioned strategies, providing ideas and models for the management and control, and 
performance evaluation of state-owned enterprises.( Figure 1-1 Studying Route of this Thesis) 
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Figure 1-2 Studying Route of this Thesis 
 
1.3 Aim and Objective 
Evaluating the investment risks and performance of state-owned companies in China has 
always been a challenge, especially the management and allocation of capital for subsidiaries 
annually. There are some other tricky matters, for example, whether there is a method or to 
balance and manage the group and subsidiaries, and how to manage and control group 
companies.  
Aim –to understand and develop a tool which will enable state-owned enterprises in China 
make management and risk control more effective as well as to create a model which can 
evaluate employee and company’s performance in state-owned enterprises . 
Objectives- this work main objectives is in development of management and control model, 
including its empirical application as DEA and IHAP to evaluate the performance of state-
owned group in China. In doing this work will analyse the challenges and conditions faced 
by the state-owned enterprises and offered suggestions how evaluation of control and 
performance can be improved. 
External Environment Background Historical Development 
Management and Control Theory of the State-owned Enterprise Group 
Risk Control Strategy Management and Control Mode Management and Control Mechanism Management and Control Evaluation 
Problems Existing in the 
Risk Control of State-
owned Enterprise 
Groups in China 
Measures That 
Should be Taken for 
the Risk Control of 
State-owned 
Enterprise Groups in 
China 
Empirical Research 
Performance Evaluation 
for Employees and 
subsidiaries of State-
owned Enterprise Group 
Performance Evaluation 
for Subsidiaries of State-
owned Enterprise Group 
Coordinated Decision-
making and Evaluation 
among Subsidiaries of State-
owned Enterprise Group 
Fuzzy Synthetic 
Evaluation Model 
Super Efficiency DEA 
Evaluation Model  
 
 
 
Evaluation Model of 
Interval AHP Method 
Empirical Research Empirical Research Empirical Research 
Conclusion and Prospect 
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1.4 Research Significance 
(1) Facilitate the reform of state-owned enterprises  
Decades of reform for the state-owned enterprises in China have shown initial success, but 
some deep-seated problems that restrict the development of enterprises have gradually 
emerged. The first is fragmented group; the second is SOEs’ striking departure from main 
business due to ambiguous positioning; the third is dilemma in control and power delegation, 
and imbalance between centralization and decentralization. If these problems fail to be solved 
properly, the state-owned enterprises could not be improved fundamentally, and enterprise 
could not step into a virtuous circle. Therefore, the effective management and control of 
subsidiaries of state-owned enterprises, the establishment of scientific coordination and 
optimization models, and the construction of performance evaluation system have played an 
important role in the rational allocation of resources, the rational guidance of enterprise asset 
operation, the mobilization of enterprise enthusiasm and creativity, the establishment of 
evaluation incentive systems for organizations and employees, the improvement of national 
macro-control and the formulation of scientific and reasonable economic policies.  
(2) Adapt to the global trend of enterprise development  
Currently, market competition is increasingly fierce, the strategic goal of enterprises in 
developed countries has changed from the pursuit of profit maximization to the pursuit of 
enterprise value maximization. As Chinese enterprises constantly compete with others 
globally, they’re presented with both opportunities and risks, thus competitive enterprises 
and competent operators are needed. This requires evaluation of the operating benefits for 
subsidiaries of the state-owned enterprises to reasonably determine their advantages in 
business development, so that the head office can allocate resources to subsidiaries in a more 
targeted way. At the same time, it also requires a scientific and comprehensive evaluation of 
the business performance of enterprises to improve efficiency and sharpen core 
competitiveness, giving Chinese enterprises an edge in global competition. 
(3) Enhance the internal management of state-owned enterprises  
In recent years, modern science and technology have been greatly applied in enterprise 
management. In order to better allocate resources, coordinate the development of various 
subsidiaries, and scientifically and fairly evaluate enterprise performance, state-owned 
enterprises need to use corresponding quantitative models and methods for analysis, which 
holds key to enhancing their internal management.  
(4) Contribute to the change of enterprise management concept and development strategy  
On the whole, state-owned enterprises in China are still adopting extensive development 
model. The business operators have focused their business and development on some single 
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indicators, which objectively encourages some enterprises to pursue one-sided short-term 
benefits such as scale, output value and profit, and they have neglected the long-term 
development benefit targets such as resource utilization efficiency, reserve of talents, 
technological innovation, and environmental improvement. The use of corresponding 
quantitative models and methods, optimization and coordination of the development among 
subsidiaries of state-owned enterprise, and reasonable evaluation of the enterprise's operating 
performance are conducive to correctly guiding and standardizing the enterprise's operating 
behavior and pursuing the path of enterprise value maximization.  
 
1.5 The Main Work and Chapter Arrangement of This Thesis  
This thesis analyzed the state-owned group's control mode and management mechanism 
for its subsidiaries, with the purpose of solving main problems occurred in the process of 
control, such as how to coordinate the cooperative relationship among the subsidiaries, how 
to evaluate the operating efficiency of subsidiaries and optimize the allocation of resources, 
how to evaluate the organizational performance and employee performance of subsidiaries 
so as to effectively motivate employees. For these challenges, the author put forward the 
corresponding evaluation system and methods.  
Based on the above research contents, the chapters are arranged as follows:  
Chapter 1 describes the research background, research approach, and significance of this 
thesis; it also describes the aim and objective, then summarizes the current situation of the 
related theories of state-owned enterprises groups' control over the subsidiaries, and it has 
gained a deep understanding of the process and significance of enterprise group control 
through analyzing the characteristics and limitations of various theoretical concepts.  
Chapter 2 describes literature review related to the risk management and control of 
enterprise groups for the other researchers.  
Chapter 3 mainly studies the control mode of the enterprise group. It considers and selects 
the control mode suitable for the enterprise's own development by combining several factors 
such as the state-owned enterprise group's own industry characteristics, development stage, 
organization scale, leader's style, human resources, enterprise culture and so on, this theory 
also applied in LH enterprise group.  
Chapter 4 proposes a method for evaluating the performance of state-owned enterprise 
employees.  
And this method combines the multi-factor, multi-dimensionality, and dynamic 
characteristics of the performance of state-owned enterprise employees to construct 
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performance evaluation index system for employees of state-owned enterprises with 6 input 
indicators and 6 output indicators which comprehensively covers all aspects of employee 
performance: Work performance, work ability, work potential, and work attitude. The 
established DEA basic model and super-efficiency DEA model of employee performance 
evaluation reflect that there is no need to set the weight of evaluation indicators, it can make 
a clear evaluation on the advantages and disadvantages of employee performance and provide 
the direction and degree of performance improvement. Then, an empirical analysis was 
conducted to evaluate the performance of 16 employees in LH energy group's wholly owned 
subsidiary A.  
Also, it puts forward the importance of studying the efficiency evaluation and optimization 
among the various sector departments within the enterprise, proposes the application of data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) in the efficiency evaluation and optimization of various sector 
in subsidiaries of state-owned enterprises groups, and provides a new idea for control of 
decision makers in subsidiaries of enterprise groups 
Chapter 5 first proposes the performance evaluation for the subsidiaries of state-owned 
group. On the basis of performance evaluation system with the balanced scorecard, a 
performance evaluation index system with abundant indicators for state-owned enterprises 
was established, and then performance evaluation was conducted on the basis of the fuzzy 
mathematics theory combined with the index weight determined by Delphi method and 
entropy weight method; Finally, an empirical analysis of the evaluation method from these 
two aspects was completed.  
Chapter 6 firstly analyzes the importance of strengthening coordination and decision-
making among various departments within the organization system of enterprise group; 
Second, on the basis of considering the cooperation among various functional departments, 
cooperation among sectors, the optimization of interoperability, and the availability of 
indicator data, the internal collaborative optimization system for the ownership of the state-
owned group-owned enterprises was designed and optimized. On the basis of IAHP theory, 
a collaborative optimization decision-making model for the subsidiaries of state-owned 
groups was established, and with the combination of the general process of coordinated 
decision-making and the interval-level analysis method, the system structure and the 
decision-making system for the subsidiaries of state-owned group was optimized. Finally, on 
the basis of IAHP method, an empirical study of decision-making methods for the inter-
departmental coordination among subsidiaries of state-owned groups was conducted.  
Chapter 7 analyzes the problems existing in the risk control of state-owned enterprise 
groups in China through investigations. In response to these problems, the author tries to put 
forward strategies and suggestions for countermeasures from the internal and external 
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perspectives. Then by taking the LH state-owned group as an example, it conducted an 
empirical study on the strategies of risk control of state-owned enterprise groups and offered 
suggestions and strategies for the problems in risk control of LH enterprise groups.  
Chapter 8 is the conclusion and future outlook respectively. The author summarized the 
research results and discussed the direction of future research on this topic 
 
1.6 The Main Innovations of This Thesis 
(1) Due to the relative independence of the various subsidiaries of state-owned enterprises 
groups and the differences in policy formulation, decision-making, market differentiation, 
and nature of work, the development and efficiency of each company vary and the overall 
development is imbalanced. The thesis works on solving the problem of the evaluation of the 
efficiency among the various sectors within the subsidiaries of state-owned enterprise group 
and has provided suggestions on efficiency optimization. Theoretically realizing the 
optimization of the overall development model of state-owned enterprise groups is a problem 
encountered by the Group. Based on the detailed analysis of data envelopment analysis, this 
thesis attempts to perform a series of work on the efficiency evaluation and future 
development model of the subsidiaries of state-owned enterprise, plans overall development 
model due regard to the corresponding indicators affecting the development of each 
department in practical work, expounds how to optimize weak DEA or non-DEA efficient 
enterprises, makes DEA decision for various sectors of enterprises, determines relative 
validity, and carries out overall quantitative optimization through the "projection principle" 
for the weak DEA and non-DEA effective sectors of enterprises. It has offered new ideas for 
corporate decision makers to understand, evaluate, improve, and optimize the efficiency of 
various departments.  
(2) As a large system, the state-owned enterprise group must coordinate the relations 
among subsidiaries and its relationship with the group so that it can contribute better to the 
group's overall strategic goals, and stimulate the enthusiasm of each subsidiary. The main 
idea of this decision method proposed in this thesis is that each department of the company 
makes its own decisions independently, carries out multiple exchanges of information and 
adjusts its own decision-making scheme, and finally achieves a satisfactory solution and 
forms the overall optimization of the system, which means to establish an internal 
collaborative optimization decision model of the enterprise system for the subsidiaries of 
state-owned enterprise group based on the IAHP(interval analytic hierarchy process) theory. 
This method firstly recognizes that the autonomy of the departments is objective, and it 
provides a set of inter-departmental coordination mechanisms on this basis. In this 
mechanism, coordination was conducted with limited information exchange and strong 
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maneuverability, thus it provides a theoretical basis for the establishment of enterprise 
decision support system and enterprise decision making on the management level. This 
decision-making method has more practical significance in the increasingly decentralized 
corporate organizational structure. On the one hand, it fully mobilizes the enthusiasm of the 
relevant functional departments, and in the decision-making process, more factors can be 
considered and the effectiveness of decision-making results can be improved. On the other 
hand, difficulties in collecting information caused by the decentralization of the 
organizational structure have also been resolved, and substantial information can be 
processed locally and only a small amount of coordination information is transmitted 
between departments.  
(3) This thesis tries to establish a performance evaluation system for subsidiaries of state-
owned enterprise group that integrates the overall balance, comprehensive connection, and 
the combination of qualitative analysis and quantitative calculation. It uses the idea of fuzzy 
mathematics to combine the Delphi method and entropy weight method, this evaluation 
system and evaluation model provide managers of state-owned enterprise groups with a way 
to understand and improve the management of subsidiaries.  
(4) This thesis analyzes the characteristics of the multi-cause, multi-dimensional, and 
dynamic characteristics of the performance of employees in state-owned enterprise, at the 
same time, based on the four aspects including employees' work performance, work ability, 
work potential and work attitude, a performance evaluation index system for state-owned 
enterprise employees was designed, and DEA basic model and super-efficient DEA model 
for the performance evaluation of employees from state-owned enterprise were established. 
The performance evaluation model of employees in state-owned enterprises should take 
benefits of enterprises into account, which means that the enterprise should evaluate whether 
the employee’s performance matches the enterprise’s investment. Different evaluation results 
can not only reflect aspects needed to be improved, but also the improvements made by the 
employee as a subject that accepts input. The research results can not only provide ideas for 
state-owned enterprises to formulate measures to improve their performance management 
status, but also provide basis for them to design a more reasonable salary system. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Research Status of State-owned Enterprise Group Management and Control  
In recent years, there are innumerable domestic and foreign researches on management of 
group companies. Despite that, most studies still focus on“management”, and the “control” 
of enterprises is often neglected. In the view of traditional management theory, "control" is 
only considered as one of the five functions of "management" (planning, organization, 
command, coordination, and control).  
However, the importance of "control" in reality has become increasingly prominent [2]. With 
the increasing size of the parent organization, the issue of how parent company can 
effectively control the subsidiary has become a real problem that needs to be solved in the 
company's business management, while the problem of "control" has also become a hot topic 
in the theoretical circle.  
 
2.1.1 Western Research of Group Management and Control  
The term "management and control" first appeared in the American business community 
in conjunction with budget control, cost analysis, and profitability research [3]. Early 
management and control emerged as a function of accounting management [4]. Later scholars 
studied issues related to management and control from the perspective of accounting and 
financial management, and they measured the effectiveness of enterprise management and 
control with the criteria of profit maximization or cost minimization [5].  
Scholars abroad began to study the model of group control in the 1920s [6]. The initial 
research focused on corporate governance and organizational structure [7]. There was no 
systematic study of the group's control model [8]. In the 1930s, the famous American 
economist Means[9] discovered that there is an agency problem after the separation of 
management rights and ownership, that is, the hired senior management personnel may have 
motives and behaviors that infringe the interests of the owners[10], This will increase cost of 
company’s control over management, leading to lower profits[11]. 
In the 1980s, many well-known companies in the United Kingdom collapsed, which 
sparked a series of discussion on corporate governance and the birth of several corporate 
governance committees and governance guidelines [12]. International economic and financial 
organizations actively promoted corporate governance. The Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) formulated corporate governance guidelines. The 
International Securities Regulatory Commission has also established the Emerging Markets 
Committee and drafted a report on Corporate Governance in Emerging Market Countries. 
Since the beginning of the 21st century, the research on the Group's management and control 
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model abroad has grown more mature, the researchers are more systematic and broader. 
Topic such as corporate governance, organizational structure and internal control have been 
systematically studied, meanwhile some research results with important reference value have 
been obtained [13].  
In 1972, Harold Koontz proposed a future-oriented enterprise feed forward control method 
for the problem of time delay in the management and control process [14]. The systematic 
approach to management and control complied with the management needs of large U.S. 
companies and consortiums after the Second World War. Especially after strategic planning 
and forecasting became the focus of management in the 1970s, management and control 
system was widely used as an important tool for strategic implementation [15]. Management 
and control system focuses on the consistency of goals and the availability of information, 
which deepen people's understanding of the nature of management and control [16]. 
After entering the 1990s, research on management and control began to pay attention to 
the environment and the uncertainties of the organization. Robert proposed that interactive 
management and control system can focus the organization's attention on the uncertainty of 
strategy [17]. With the rapid changes in the management and control environment, feedback 
from the management and control system have enabled the senior management of the 
organization to pay attention to solving issues encountered during organization 
development[18], and through timely adjustment, a new strategy for organizational 
development has been formed. The interactive control system can be seen as a strategic 
feedback system that attaches importance to the future and changes. The control referred in 
interactive control system is not only the control of strategy implementation, but also the 
control of strategy adjustment, and that is, "today's control" affects the "tomorrow's strategy", 
which still has important implication on daily enterprise management. Fisher combined the 
contingency theory with the management and control system to identify the contingencies 
affecting the management system and analyzed their impact on the control system and 
organizational performance [19].  
Martinez and Jarillo systematically studied the literature on multinational corporations' 
control mechanisms from 1953 to 1988, they divided the organizational types of 
multinational corporation groups into decentralized federalism, centralized authority, and 
integrated networks, and at the same time, control mechanism was divided into two aspects, 
which are formally structured mechanisms and informally unstructured mechanisms. 
Different aspects have made useful contributions to the study of enterprise management and 
control mechanisms [20].  
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Goold and Campbell called centralized and decentralized management between parent 
companies and subsidiaries as the “Parenting Styles” and divided them into three types: 
financial control, strategic planning, and strategic control [21].  
 
2.2 Research of Group Management and Control in China  
Research of Group's management and control in China began relatively late. It actually 
started in the 1980s. However, the achievements and progress are impressive, especially 
during recent years, as the large scale enterprise groups in China continuously rising, 
researches on group management and control are generating more practical significance.  
Ge Chen divided the group management model into four types: capital control type, 
administrative control type, participation control type, platform control type, and constructed 
three-stage model for parent-subsidiary company and which includes the feed forward 
control, core control, and feedback control [22].  
Yuan Dongan focused on the analysis of the American model, the Japanese model and the 
Korean model of enterprise groups according to the different characteristics of management 
and control of enterprise groups in different countries; Zhang Wenkui who works in the 
Development Research Center of the State Council, took the large-scale enterprise group that 
has both the business department and the linear function management unit as the research 
object based on the parent-subsidiary company system, studied the relationship among the 
organizational structure design, organization structure, and management and control of the 
large-scale enterprise group, but there is no detailed classification of the group's control 
model.  
Wu Shengzhu proposed that the group financial control system is an organic integrity 
formed by financial personnel control system, financial system control system, financial 
target control system, and financial information control system. The financial objective 
control is based on the financial goals of the group company, and it is a method of controlling 
the subsidiary companies through the development of a financial evaluation system [23].  
Ye Sheng divided the group management model into capital control, strategic control, 
personnel control, culture-oriented control and other major control modes from the 
perspective of differences in control methods.  
Wang Ruo and Zhang Yunfeng divided group's control model into three types: financial 
control, strategic control, and business control. Based on this, some scholars further classified 
the strategic control model in a relatively uniform centralized and decentralized management 
into "strategic implementation" and "strategic guidance". The former focuses on centralized 
management while the latter emphasizes decentralized management [24].  
  
 
13 
 
Zhang Yan believed that with the rapid development of the national economy and the 
inherent needs of companies that are stronger and bigger, cross-industry and cross-regional 
operation and management have become a distinctive feature of large-scale state-owned 
enterprise groups in the implementation of cross-industry, cross-regional. In the process of 
business management, group companies often need to control the human resources of their 
subordinate companies, which brings forward three types of human resources management 
and control models including direct management, supervision, and consultant, he also 
suggested the transformation of human resource management after analyzing the factors of 
each model in detail [25].  
Wang Jipeng systematically and detailed described and elaborated on the research results 
of the group's management and control theory in the book Group Management. Wang Jipeng 
believed that the core issues of the group's management and control are model selection, 
organizational structure design, power and responsibility system and core management 
processes, performance evaluation, and so on[26].  
Wang Ruiling conducted a research on the management and control model of Huarui 
Holdings Group's parent and subsidiary companies. He believed that the parent and 
subsidiary company's management control system of Huarui Holdings is an integrated 
management and control system consisting of strategic management control system, financial 
management and control system, and human resources management and control system [27].  
Bai Wangang summarized the four basic types of management and control methods for 
enterprise groups: The simulated legal person management and control and boundary-
spanning parent-subsidiary company management and control including licit parent-
subsidiary company management and control, implicit parent-subsidiary company 
management and control, and office; and the in-depth research on management and control 
mechanisms and environment was also conducted. In addition, Bai Wangang also proposed 
that in operation process of group companies, the principle of “Systematic Perspective” and 
“Organizational Intelligence Quotient” should be introduced, and it is believed that the 
effective operation of the entire collectivized enterprise system should be realized through 
management and control, and finally “the external complexity should be dealt with through 
internal simplification and order” [28].  
 
2.3 Conclusion 
The description of the overall characteristics of the management and control system is 
relatively rare. The research achievements are mainly from the aspects of control execution 
procedure, control variables, or control method. Literature reports on the systematic study 
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of management and control problems at the enterprise group level are even rarer, with most 
existing studies being carried out only from the perspective of group management and 
control (such as connotation, organization, pattern, means, etc.), and systematic and 
comprehensive researches are insufficient. 
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Chapter 3 Theoretical Research and Study on Management and 
Control of State-owned Enterprise Groups 
3.1 Theoretical Study of Enterprise Groups  
3.1.1 Connotation of Enterprise Groups  
3.1.1.1 Definition of Enterprise Groups  
Enterprise groups can be defined in broad and narrow terms. In a broad term, enterprise 
groups refer to simple enterprise aggregation, which is the product of horizontal and vertical 
integration amongst enterprises and the combination of several enterprises in the same region, 
same department or cross-region, and trans-department. In a narrow term, enterprise groups 
refer to the enterprise consortium formed by the combination of property rights between 
enterprises. Nowadays, generally involved enterprise groups refer to the concept of 
enterprise groups in a narrow term. The most fundamental difference between broad and 
narrow terms of enterprise groups is whether the enterprise is based on property rights or not.  
Generally speaking, an enterprise group is a group of wholly-owned, controlled or share-
holding subsidiaries established with the continuous growth of a single enterprise, or a form 
of economic organization produced by an associated company. 
  
3.1.1.2 Characteristics of Enterprise Groups  
According to the view of traditional economics, typical economic organizations can be 
divided into two types: hierarchical organizations represented by enterprises and market 
organizations with price mechanism as its core. Allocation of social resources, the division 
of labor in social production, and transactions are completed in these two organizations. In 
addition to these two typical economic organizations, there are many intermediate forms of 
economic organizations in reality, one among which is enterprise group.[29] 
Enterprise group can be seen as an interest aggregate established on the basis of modern 
enterprise system with capital as its linkage, shares interests and risks. Most of its members 
are joint stock limited companies and limited liability companies. The parent company 
usually carries out effective capital operation by means of flow, separation, combination, 
and optimal allocation to maximize the interests of the group.  
As an intermediate economic organization, enterprise group aims to make use of the 
relative advantages of the market and the enterprise as much as possible. To achieve this 
goal, business groups have different characteristics from other economic organizations.  
(1) Diversity  
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Business groups have diversity. The diversity of enterprise groups is represented by the 
diversity of core, connected to the diversity of organization and organizational structure.  
(2) Regard property rights as the main link  
Enterprise groups regard the property right as the main link, that is, taking the capital as 
the tie, and it belongs to the joint enterprise consortium of equity and property right formed 
by investment capital. The relationships among group members are holding and being 
controlled, participating and being owned.  
(3) Multi-level  
As indicated in Table 3-1, corporate groups can be divided into four levels, namely the 
core layer, fixed layer, half-fixed layer, and loose layer. The core layer is one or a few key 
enterprises with the core position of the group, and it can be a group company that has both 
the characteristics of the head office and the parent company. The fixed layer is a subsidiary 
that can be controlled by a group company, generally, the parent company of which owns 
more than 50% of shares; The half-fixed layer is composed of affiliated companies with the 
participation of others. The parent company holds a certain percentage of shares, but it has 
not yet been controlled. The group can only influence other party's operating activities to a 
certain extent: The loose layer is composed of enterprises with no fixed relationship, and 
while there is no controlling share relationship with the parent company, there may exist 
capital lending relationship. 
 
Table 3-1 Four Layers of Enterprise Groups (Lin hao, 2015) 
 Core layer Fixed layer 
Half-fixed 
layer 
Loose layer 
General 
management 
coordination of 
enterprise groups 
Administrative 
management 
It is mainly in 
property management 
and supplemented by 
financial management 
Property 
management 
Network 
relationships 
based on long-
term contracts 
Boundary 
definition of 
enterprise groups 
Inner boundary 
of parent 
company 
Outer boundary of 
parent company 
Inner boundary 
of enterprise 
group 
Outer boundary 
of enterprise 
groups 
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Although there are many terms and classifications for enterprise groups, they have 
common characteristics which mainly manifest as an economic organization with 
hierarchical enterprises. The companies that make up an enterprise group have an intrinsic 
and close economic and technological relationship which requires coordinated actions; 
Capital is the main link between the parent company and its subsidiaries [30].  
 
3.1.2 Analysis of the Organizational Structure of Enterprise Groups 
3.1.2.1 The Organizational Structure of the Enterprise Group  
There are several typical forms of organizational structure: linear system, linear function 
system, business department system, matrix system and parent-subsidiary system, etc. [31]. 
In practice, the organizational structure of the enterprise is not pure, it is in a mixture of 
concentrated structural forms and thus we call it mixed organizational structure [32]. From 
the view of historical evolution, the structure of the linear system and the linear function 
system has no longer adapted to the actual situation of the enterprise. Therefore, this thesis 
only explains the division system, matrix system, parent-subsidiary system, and the mixed 
structure [33].  
(1) Business division system 
The so-called business division structure is an organizational form in which decentralized 
management is carried out within a company for departments with independent products and 
markets, independent responsibilities and interests. Division system is also called 
responsibility center system [34].  
The division structure is not organized by functions or tasks, but organized by product, 
region or customer type. Each division has built its own U-shaped structure [35]. The business 
division is a collection of interconnected units with three characteristics: a unit responsible 
for products and market and has independent products and markets; a unit responsible for 
interests and has independent interests and accounting; a decentralized unit with sufficient 
power to operate independently [36].  
The advantage of the divisional system is that it allows the top management to get rid of 
the specific daily management affairs, and it is beneficial to concentrate on making strategic 
decisions and long-term planning, as well as improving the flexibility and adaptability of the 
organization[37]; At the same time, the business division system also helps to cultivate and 
train comprehensive management talents; The defect of the business division system is due 
to the duplicated organization, which has caused a waste of management personnel: Due to 
the independent management of each business division, the exchange of personnel between 
business divisions is more difficult when the mutual support is poorer; The executives of 
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each business division tend to consider interests of their own departments and ignoring the 
entire organization.  
(2) Matrix organization structure  
The matrix organization structure is formed based on the vertical leadership system of the 
linear-functional organizational structure [38].  
The advantage of the matrix system lies in the fact that it combines the division system 
and the linear system to a certain extent. In the matrix structure, working group is 
characterized by flexibility, and it can be organized or disbanded according to the project 
needs and its progress, which improves the efficiency of personnel utilization; However, in 
the matrix structure, the members of the working group have two bosses at the same time, 
and the chaos and conflict of power relations may lead to the disorder of management order. 
Therefore, the matrix system is more suitable for companies or fields which have relatively 
unclear boundaries with customers, and the responsibility and motivation don't need to be 
clearly defined, but more cooperative and coordinated enterprises will be needed, such as 
those focusing on research and development.  
(3) The parent-subsidiary company system  
The parent-subsidiary company system refers to the separation of certain business of a 
company to form a subsidiary with status of a legal person [39]. Under the parent-subsidiary 
organizational structure, core enterprises form a capital-linked enterprise group through sole 
proprietorship, holding, equity participation, or business collaboration, and these enterprise 
groups usually include core enterprises such as wholly-owned subsidiaries, controlling 
subsidiaries and participating subsidiaries, as well as loose external organizations such as 
business cooperation enterprises. Subsidiaries can also establish economic entities such as 
sub-subsidiary alone or with other subsidiaries or even with the parent company. Strictly 
speaking, though the parent-subsidiary company system is not an internal organizational 
model, it is still closely related to the internal organizational structure of the company, for 
example, a divisional enterprise can be easily separated into independent subsidiaries, and 
subsidiaries can also be incorporated into the parent company.  
From the perspective of the parent company, the advantages of the parent-subsidiary 
company system are conducive to fully meeting the needs of the company's diversified 
strategy, producing the leverage effect, and reducing the risk of the parent company. From 
the standpoint of the subsidiary company, the advantages of the parent-subsidiary company 
system lie in the fact that the decision-making power of the subsidiary company corresponds 
to the decision-making responsibility, and it independently assumes the civil responsibility 
and operational risk, meanwhile, it responds quickly to the changes in the market. The 
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disadvantage of the parent-subsidiary system is that there is a certain degree of conflict 
between management and control and corporate governance. The parent company's 
management and control over the subsidiary generally needs to be realized through corporate 
governance, which has totally different mechanism and procedures from that of management 
and control. In addition, corporate governance also imposes many restrictions on transactions 
and management services between parent and subsidiary companies, thus it may result in 
higher management costs for the entire group company. At the same time, the subsidiary 
company may compete with the parent company for business and it is difficult to coordinate. 
If the subsidiary or parent company and subsidiary company are listed companies, the 
situation will be more complicated.  
In conclusion, the comparison of the business division system, matrix system, and parent-
subsidiary company system is shown in Table 3-2.  
Table 3-2 Comparison of Three Organization Structures (Wang Pu, 2014) 
Organization 
structure 
type 
Characteristics Advantage Disadvantage 
Scope of 
application 
Business 
division 
system 
Organized according to 
product, region or customer 
type 
1. 1. The management team can 
focus on strategic decisions 
and long-term planning. 
2. 2. Improve organizational 
flexibility and adaptability 
1. Repeated organizations, 
waste of management staff; 
2. It is difficult for the 
personnel of the business 
division to change jobs and 
they could not provide good 
support to each other; 
3. Ignore the overall interest 
Scaled and 
diversified 
company 
Matrix system 
The business division shall 
organize the business of the 
company as a unit,however, 
business division  will accept 
the guidance, supervision, and 
even the authorized direct 
command of the company's 
functional department. 
1. 1. Personnel utilization rate; 
2.The working group is 
flexible 
May cause the confused 
management 
Need more 
companies to 
have 
cooperation and 
coordination 
The parent-
subsidiary 
company 
system 
Subsidiaries have legal status 
1. 1.Produce leverage effect 
2. 2. Reduce the risks of parent 
company; 
3. 3. Subsidiary companies 
have the same powers and 
responsibilities 
1. 1. It is different for the 
parent company to control 
the subsidiary company; 
2. 2. It may result in higher 
management costs; 
3. 3. The relationship between 
parent and subsidiary 
companies is difficult to 
coordinate 
Multinational 
enterprise 
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(4) Mixed organizational structure  
In reality, most enterprise groups are mixed organizations, that is, they are based on the 
parent-subsidiary company system, and at the same time, they have business divisions and 
linear functional units. The organization structure can be divided into two types [40]:  
The first is that the parent company sets up a business division to manage all business, all 
or some of which may exist as a subsidiary as necessary. In this way, the top management 
of the parent company does not need to directly manage the subsidiaries, and it only needs 
to manage, coordinate and evaluate the business units.  
Another type of the mixed organization structure is that part of the business exists in the 
form of business division of the parent company or the linear function management unit, 
while the other part of the business is in the form of a subsidiary with the status of a legal 
person. The parent company generally owns a subsidiary or has absolute or relative control 
over a subsidiary.  
 
3.1.2.2 Factors that Affect the Organization Structure of Enterprise Groups 
As indicated in Figure 3-1, there are four major factors that affect the organization 
structure of enterprise groups.  
 
Strategy of Enterprise Group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-1 Organization Structure and Marketing Factors of Group Companies 
① Strategy of enterprise group 
The strategy of the enterprise group determines the organization structure and acts as a 
main influencer. The group strategy influences the organization structure by standardizing 
the organization structure of group through managers’ strategic choices; Matching between 
organizational structure and strategy is a necessity for achieving enterprise goals; 
organization structures that are incompatible with the strategy will hinder the strategy from 
Strategy of enterprise group 
Scale of enterprise groups 
The organizational environment of the enterprise 
group 
Technological progress and competitive 
environment 
Business division system 
Matrix system  
The parent-subsidiary 
company system 
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being fully implemented; if the essence of the strategy changes, then organization structure 
will inevitably be greatly affected.  
② Scale of enterprise groups  
Generally speaking, the scale of the enterprise has a strong impact on organization 
structure. Smaller enterprises with a single business structure generally adopt the straight-
line function. Compared to the enterprise with larger scale and more complicated business 
structure, linear function system is relatively rigid, and the business unit lacks sufficient 
decision power and response capability, thus business division system and parent-subsidiary 
company system are used more frequently.  
③The organizational environment of the enterprise group  
To a large extent, the organization structure of an enterprise group is affected by many 
factors from its internal and external environment. From different perspectives, corporate 
environment of the group companies can be classified differently. This thesis divides it into 
two major categories: external organizational environment and internal organizational 
environment. External organizational environment includes political and economic 
environment, social environment, industry environment, suppliers, and customers; the 
internal organizational environment includes level of group’s head office and the level of 
subordinate companies. The head office level includes group strategy, holding level, group 
type, type of responsibility center, leadership style, etc., while the subsidiary level includes 
geographical distribution, importance and growth cycle, etc.   
④ Technological progress and competitive environment  
Advances in related technologies and changes in the competitive environment will also 
affect the organization structure of enterprise group. Technological progress, especially 
information technology, has been widely used in business management and it has impacted 
the organizational structure in a profound way. Flattening the organizational structure has 
become the goal pursued by many large companies. With fiercer competition, international 
competition in particular, the company’s quick response and innovation ability have become 
the key to its long-term development. And quick response and the innovation ability demand 
enterprises to have a relatively decentralized organizational structure.  
In addition, business characteristics, management tradition, and entrepreneurial style that 
enterprise group exhibit also influence its organization structure. What needs to be explained 
is that we have pointed out some of the factors affecting the organization structure, but it 
does not mean that each of these factors corresponds to a fixed organization structure. Hence, 
enterprise group's choice of organization structure is a result of the comprehensive analysis 
of these factors. The organization structure design concept of the contingency theory 
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believes that it is impossible to establish a universal management model, and there is no 
"best" management model, but only the "optimum" management model. The organization 
structure of the enterprise needs to be selected and designed according to different conditions.  
3.1.3 Operational Mechanism of Enterprise Group  
The objective of building an enterprise group is to uniformly manage and control the 
assets within the group through the capital ties in ways that the patent company gives full 
play of the overall advantages and obtains the best benefits. The advantage of an enterprise 
group lies in the parent-subsidiary company system which combines centralization and 
decentralization, extracts the benefit of single large enterprises and general enterprise 
consortium, avoiding the drawbacks of excessive centralization and excessive 
decentralization, coordinates actions according to the unified development strategy, as well 
as achieving the overall strategic objectives. Under this premise, each member enterprise has 
considerable autonomy and flexibility.  
Enterprise group is an interactional and interconnected enterprise system formed by 
several sub-systems through the link of property rights. On the whole, it is the operation of 
the system of enterprise group. Ensuring the efficient operation and growth of this system is 
the core of enterprise group management and control. Research on the operating mechanism 
of the group company system helps deepen the internal management and manipulate rules 
between the parent company and the subsidiary company, so as to have better group 
management and control. Therefore, the first step to study the operation mechanism of group 
companies is to understand the motive behind formation.  
 
3.1.3.1 Reasons behind the Establishment of Enterprise Groups  
The formation of enterprise groups generally follows this path: The parent company of 
the group is established first, then the parent will invest in other newly established enterprise, 
purchased subsidiaries or related companies and equity companies to form an enterprise 
group.  
The foundation of an enterprise group is the integration of its core companies. In essence, 
enterprise groups contain both the nature of an integrated organization and the nature of 
strategic alliances with member companies. Many scholars at home and abroad have 
researched the formation motivation of enterprise groups from different perspectives.  
Liang Liang believed that the fundamental impetus for the integration of enterprise groups 
and strategic alliances is to pursue the maximization of the overall interests of the enterprise 
groups, especially the maximization of core enterprise interests while the maximization of 
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member enterprises' interests is the game result of long-term and short-term interests, as well 
as local interests and overall interests [41]. 
At present, the reason behind the establishment of enterprise groups is generally explained 
by the theory of transaction costs of economics. The analysis of transaction costs is actually 
only a static method, which cannot reveal the core reasons behind enterprise groups under 
dynamic conditions. Yuan Dongan introduced monopoly and competition factors as well as 
specialization factors into the motivation analysis of the enterprise group, and discussed the 
reason for the formation of enterprise groups from a dynamic perspective [42]. Tao Xiangjing 
and Sheng Zhaoyi believe that the study of the motives of enterprise groups is an important 
way to understand enterprise groups and an important theoretical basis for other related 
research, while externalities are the driving forces behind the formation of some types of 
enterprise groups in China [43]. The establishment of two economic game models will result 
in the formation of vertical enterprise groups, while externalities in horizontal industrial 
relations will lead to the formation of horizontal enterprise groups.  
 
3.1.3.2 Analysis of the Links within Enterprise Group  
The link of enterprise group is only a visualized expression. In fact, it refers to the law 
used in the enterprise group to establish the relationship between the group company and its 
member companies and the relationship among the member companies [44]. From the practice 
of foreign enterprise groups, the management and control links of enterprise groups are 
mainly divided into four types: The capital management and control link, contract 
management and control link, governance and control link, and business management and 
technology link that is the core for the management and control links, and they form a 
network of management and control links which connects and supports each other. Absence 
of each control link will have an important impact on the overall control and control 
effectiveness of the enterprise group.  
In the management and control activities of enterprise groups, the parent companies 
should be based on capital link and integrate the configuration of contractual link, 
governance link, and business link to comprehensively design and develop the framework 
of the management and control systems between parent and subsidiary companies.  
① Capital link  
Among the links of enterprise group, the link of capital is the most important link, and it 
forms the basis of other links. The link of enterprise group reflects all the relationships 
among all member companies of the enterprise group. Many scholars believe that the equity 
link is the link of capital. Actually, capital link, not only in the form of equity link, has two 
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forms: the first is to establish property rights relationship by the financial participation of the 
core enterprise in another enterprise, and that is, linked by equity; the second is to form links 
through the core enterprises with solid strength to provide capital for the subordinate 
enterprises, and that is financing link. The relationship of property rights of the two is the 
most important [45].  
Using equity as the link between a group company and its member companies or among 
member companies actually indicates the relationship of control or participation of a group 
company or a member enterprise based on its capital participation in another enterprise. The 
equity link is characterized by the fact that the enterprise group (parent company) is 
established through its ownership over the group member enterprises (subsidiaries).  
The forms of financing links are various and they are in two main forms: First, the group's 
head office has an internal bank to conduct unified management and centralized operation 
of the funds of its subordinate companies, so as to maximize the effectiveness of funds, and 
sometimes to provide savings and loan preferences for the subordinate enterprises; Second, 
when the member company needs to apply for a loan from the bank, the group company can 
guarantee with its good financial reputation. For example, Erdos Group established internal 
bank and regarded it as the necessary place and control center for the capital flow of the 
group's wholly-owned and controlled enterprises, and the bank accounts of the wholly 
owned companies and holding companies are under the control of the internal bank who uses 
the overall financial budget leverage to monitor the cash flow, adjust the balance of funds, 
and maximize capital efficiency.  
② Contractual link  
The contractual linkage model is characterized by the use of contracts or agreements as a 
link between Group Company and its member companies. The establishment of enterprise 
group is achieved through contracts or agreements between Group Company and its 
members [46]. 
The form of contractual bond is very common among production enterprises, which allow 
the spreading of products within the group or enables large enterprises to provide component 
parts for small and medium-sized enterprises. The link is established by signing contract for 
the product variety, quantity, quality, price, time and place of delivery, etc. Contractual link 
is conducive to the specialized division of labor and collaboration of enterprise group.   
However, enterprise group with binding contracts as the link usually has poor cohesion and 
stability, and the group's head office has limited control over its subordinate enterprises. 
Thus, binding contract cannot well implement the group's overall strategy, make unified 
planning or carry out investment transformation for the group's overall development.  
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③ Business link  
Business link refers to the group's head office’s  improvement of the control system from 
the perspective of business strategy, implementation, monitoring, unified planning and its 
guidance of each subsidiary’s business operation.  
Business relationship among the members of the enterprise group can be divided into 
industrial relationship and capital relationship. The former refers to the relationship where 
each member of the enterprise group focuses on the production and sales within one industry 
or multiple industries, achieves unity and connection, realizes the group's business expansion 
and growth by relying on the up-and-down or horizontal extension of the industrial chain. 
The latter refers to the relationship where each member of the enterprise group uses a 
common investment entity—the parent company—as its core, and mainly relies on capital 
links to have equity transactions, capital loans, and other business relationships [47].  
Through business links, enterprise group can achieve integration of multiple corporate 
subsidiaries on the basis of socialized production and specialized division of labor, which 
generates an industrial portfolio effect. A single enterprise will not be able to enjoy portfolio 
effect, disperse operational risk, and obtain scale economy. 
④ Technology links  
Nie Zhengan believes that for industrial enterprises, technical relations are the 
fundamental linkage between them. As industrial enterprises are organizations of technology 
production, their structures are subject to inherent requirements of production technology. 
And technical relationship plays a key role [48]. 
The role of technological link is indicated in two aspects: First, the “expansion” of 
production technology will “proactively” promote the development of companies toward the 
enterprise group; Second, technical link will play a restrictive role in the formation of 
enterprise groups "afterward". For example, when enterprise establishes an enterprise group 
through mergers and acquisitions, it must consider its own technical structure and 
characteristics, and fully consider whether the technology of the target company can be 
incorporated into its own technical system. Generally, companies that have their own 
upstream and downstream product technologies may consider establishing a complete 
organic industrial chain through mergers and acquisitions.  
The advantage of using technology as the link is that group companies have a high degree 
of technical dependence and will form a benefit-sharing mechanism and cohesion of the 
enterprise group accordingly.  
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3.2 Theoretical Analysis of Enterprise Group Management and Control  
3.2.1 The Theoretical Connotation of Enterprise Group Management and Control  
The operation and development of enterprise group is rooted in the operation of individual 
companies. However, complexity of internal structure of the enterprise group means that the 
management and control of enterprise group is more complicated than that of an individual 
enterprise, like the subject or the modes of management and control. In order to better 
understand contents of enterprise group management and control, this thesis will further 
study them by analyzing those of the individual enterprises.  
 
3.2.1.1 Management and Control Contents of Individual Enterprises  
Enterprise group is an economic organization composed of several enterprises with 
independent legal person status. Incorporated enterprise is the basic unit that constitutes an 
enterprise group, and it is also a basic component of the management and control of 
enterprise group.  
Enterprise management and control is a process in which managers positively influence 
other members of the organization to implement organizational strategy according to 
organizational goals. According to the separation of ownership and management, the 
company formed an authorization mechanism under multi-level delegation agent. It also 
involves "general meeting of shareholders - the board of directors - senior managers - middle 
managers - lower-level managers, basic level employees" as the organization structure.  
The functional subjects of enterprise management and control mainly refers to the board 
of directors and managers at all levels (high-level managers, middle-level managers, and 
low-level managers). The management and control entities are at different levels of corporate 
governance and control, they have the dual characteristics of control subjects and control 
objects. The board of directors is the permanent representative body of the shareholders' 
meeting of an enterprise, it is also the top management and control body of an enterprise, 
responsible for setting the management and control objectives of the enterprise and 
monitoring the implementation of the goals. Senior managers mainly refer to corporate 
managers who are responsible for the development of enterprise management and control 
systems and formulating specific control programs to regulate various control activities.  
Under the unified framework specification of enterprise management and control, 
management and control entities work to ensure the normal operation and healthy growth of 
the enterprise through complicated interactions among entities at different levels. The 
management and control subjects at all levels focus on the implementation of the strategic 
goals of the enterprise, which enables the organization to maintain coordination and 
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consistency, so as to promote the coordinated operation and evolutionary growth of the 
system as a whole, and ultimately ensure the realization of the overall development goals of 
the enterprise.  
An enterprise is a dynamic and complex system. The operation and growth of a single 
incorporated enterprise can be viewed as a process of system and evolution. The overall 
development strategy formulated by the enterprise is the fundamental goal of guiding the 
operation of the enterprise system. The enterprise management and control activities should 
be centered on the decomposition and implementation of the company's strategic objectives.  
The main body of each level of the enterprise is around the decomposition of strategic 
goals, carrying out corresponding organizational setup, division of functions, task 
arrangements, and action plans to further form several functional subsystems (including 
strategic functional subsystems, financial functional subsystems, and human resource 
management, and the production of subsystems etc.). Each subsystem mainly relies on 
capital, business and other links to interact closely, so as to form a complex system with 
distinct levels, clear division of labor and orderly operation.  
The highest goal of the enterprise system is the goal at the strategic level. Each subsystem 
has a sub-objective decomposed from the overall objective and realizes its own optimal 
control according to this objective. The control of the whole large system is realized by 
means of coordinating the subsystem. The operating mode is: Each level only controls – not 
directly – the activities at the next level, but only the control subsystem at the lowest level 
directly controls the operation of the system, thus system at the higher level mainly plays the 
role of planning and coordination. In this way, each member organization within the 
enterprise system becomes a benefit community with strategic consistency, resource sharing, 
business complementarity, and organizational coordination.  
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3.2.1.2 Characteristics of Enterprise Group Management and Control  
( 1 )  Strategic 
The development of enterprise group mainly includes the development of business units 
and the improvement of the overall synergies of the group, which are the strategic issues for 
the group. But the development of a business unit depends on the appropriate authorization 
or decentralization of the parent company's investment-linked company, and improvement 
of the overall synergy effect of the group depends on the integration effect of the 
headquarters. These are closely related to the construction of the group's management and 
control system. Therefore, the establishment of a suitable group management and control 
system is a strategic issue in the development of enterprise groups.  
( 2 )  Systematic  
The construction of the group's management and control system is a systematic project 
which requires consideration of many components and their interrelationships. These 
elements include the selection of the overall management and control model of the group, 
the positioning of the group's headquarters functions, the design of the group's overall 
organization structure, and the design of various functional control mechanisms. As a system, 
the management and control system is a cohesive entity that has the elements of dynamic 
connection. It has the openness and dynamic adaptability to external influence factors, and 
the correlation and integration of internal components. Therefore, the construction of the 
enterprise group's control system is a process that needs to be adapted to local conditions, 
system planning, and time adjustment.  
 
3.2.1.3 Synergy Effects of Enterprise Group Management and Control  
Synergy refers to the overall effect of “1+1 >2” resulting from close coordination and 
cooperation under the guidance of common interest objectives within each component of a 
system. Synergy is a leading factor in the collaboration of several members of the enterprise 
group. It enables each member company to form a benefit community centered on the parent 
company and realizes the growth and development of the entire enterprise group based on 
the benefit of each member company. Synergistic effect of enterprise group management 
and control mainly includes the following aspects:  
(1) Strategic synergy  
This refers to that each member of the company takes consistent action plans to achieve 
the established target under the guidance of the unified strategy formulated by the parent 
company and based on a high level of division of labor and cooperation. For example, the 
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parent company can break down the overall strategic goal into a number of detailed 
objectives which are completed by each subsidiary, and this can improve the operating 
efficiency of the enterprise on the basis of maintaining a high degree of consistency.  
(2) Benefit synergy  
This means that all members of the company have common development goals, that is, 
the ultimate goal of pursuing the maximization of group benefits. The parent company relies 
on the close ownership ties to closely unite all interest subjects, in addition, it carries out a 
high degree of unity and coordination on the strategic objectives and interests orientation, so 
as to achieve a high degree of fitting between the interests of all parties.  
(3) Resource synergy  
This means that under the unified management and coordination of the parent company, 
the internal resources of the group have been optimized and allocated in a way of sharing, 
which has produced the best utilization efficiency of resources. The parent company needs 
to scientifically plan and uniformly allocate resources such as funds, human resources and 
material resources for the entire enterprise group according to the strategic goals and the 
business needs of each enterprise member, so as to maximize resource allocation efficiency 
and utilization efficiency.  
(4) Organization Synergy  
This refers to that enterprise group arrange and organize portfolio operations through the 
unified organizational structure design and organizational management system as well as 
actively improve the efficiency of organization operation and reduce the cost of internal 
organization operation, so as to realize the close coordination and collaboration among 
members of the internal organization.  
The synergy of enterprise group is to create more value for unit entity assets through the 
utilization of intangible asset within the group. Based on strategic synergy, benefit synergy, 
and organization synergy, enterprise group will have overall synergy effect and a synergy 
for the system that promotes its own growth and development.  
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3.2.2 Framework Analysis of Enterprise Group Management and Control System 
3.2.2.1 System Perspective of Enterprise Group Management and Control  
Enterprise group is an economic association composed of several legal persons, which is 
centered on the parent company-enterprise group, with the property right relationship as the 
main link.. It’s a dynamic evolution and growth system by connecting each enterprise 
member through a variety of forms, such as wholly-owned, holding and equity participation. 
Each company member conducts business activities in multiple business areas under the 
guidance of a unified group strategy.  
From the perspective of system composition, the enterprise group system is composed of 
several enterprise subsystems, and each sub-system mainly forms an interactive and 
interrelated parent-subsidiary system through the property right link. The operation and 
development of the enterprise group system are indicated in the development of the parent 
company system.  
The parent company is the core system of the enterprise group system. It mainly relies on 
capital link to exert necessary influence on other enterprise subsystems, so as to ensure that 
each subsidiary company can become a system with a consistent strategy, reasonable 
structure, interest correlation and orderly operation, and this is how an enterprise group 
manages and controls. From the perspective of system operation, the management and 
control activities of the enterprise group are mainly represented by those of the parent 
company system. The growth of the enterprise group system is mainly reflected in the 
comprehensive evolution and growth of the parent-subsidiary company system in terms of 
the number of members, assets, operating income, market space, operational efficiency, and 
management capabilities.  
The management and control of the enterprise group system is more complicated than that 
of a single enterprise. There are many characteristics of enterprise groups such as large scale, 
complicated organization structure, diversified operations, and cross-regional operations. 
Each enterprise member has many differences in terms of asset size, management level, and 
product production, which diversifies its organization, method, depth, and the path of 
management and control etc.  
In order to effectively manage and control the operation and development of enterprise 
group, parent company must coordinate from the overall perspective of the parent company 
system, establish a unified system frame from the level of synergy, and conduct an overall 
study and construction on the objectives, contents, forms, mechanisms, organizations, 
models, systems and plans of group management and control, thereby making enterprise 
group management and control more systemic and comprehensive. 
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3.2.2.2. Analysis on the System Framework of Enterprise Group Management and 
Control  
The overall characteristics of the management and control system is rarely described, 
whose main achievements came from the aspects of control execution procedure, control 
variables, or control method. The literature reports on the systematic study of management 
and control problems at the enterprise group level are even rarer, most of the existing 
documents have been studied from certain perspectives of group management and control 
(such as connotation, organization, pattern, means, etc.), and there is a lack of systematic 
and comprehensive research results. This thesis tries to find out some key elements that 
reflect the overall characteristics of the management and control system.  
In terms of content composition, the enterprise group management and control system 
mainly includes the following subsystem modules:  
(1) Enterprise group management and control elements  
From the perspective of system study, it is found that the management and control system 
is ultimately composed of various management and control elements, and these elements 
and their forms determine the system and structure of control.  
According to theoretical basis and connotation of management and control system, the 
elements of management and control system can be summarized as ten generic types, as 
indicated in Figure 3-2:  
① Control environment  
Control environment refers to the environment that an organization faces when 
conducting management and control, which includes the organization's external and internal 
environment. The external environment includes the international environment, national 
politics, economy, social development environment, industry environment, regional 
environment, etc.; The internal environment includes the principles of integrity and moral 
values followed by the organization, the strategic choice of the organization, the division of 
organizational structure and authority, the establishment of a responsibility center, and 
human resource policies and practices.  
② Control variables  
Control variables are the key risk factors that affect the strategic goals of an organization. 
The realization of organizational goals mainly depends on the control of risk factors, value 
drivers and other key factors that influence organizational goals. Therefore, it is of utmost 
importance to improve internal management and control and identify key control variables, 
especially the risk control variables.  
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③ Control standards 
Control standards refer to the basis for management and control of an organization, and it 
is the quantification of control variables. Control standards plan what the organization should 
do and to what extent. Control standards are the decomposition of strategic control objectives 
of an organization. Whether the control standards are correct or not will directly affect the 
effectiveness of management and control.  
④ Information report  
Information report refers to the measurement, recording, and reporting of information 
about activities in an organization. The information report reflects what the organization is 
doing. The relevance of information report in management and control is mainly reflected 
in the aspects related to control variables and control standards. The reliability of information 
report in management and control relies on its authentic reflection of organizational activities. 
Information report mainly includes accounting report, statistical  report and business report.  
⑤ Implement evaluation  
Implement evaluation refers to the assessment and evaluation of organizational operations. 
In fact, the implementation of evaluation is a process of comparing and analyzing 
information reports with control standards. Therefore, the status of the implementation of 
the evaluation depends on the quality of the control standards and the information report, 
and it also determines the effect of correcting the deviation. In the implementation of 
evaluation, it is essential to distinguish the subjective factors and objective factors, 
controllable factors and uncontrollable factors that cause the difference between practice and 
standard, so as to ensure the timeliness of performance evaluation.  
⑥ Correction of deviation  
Correction of deviation refers to the timely correction of the unfavorable differences 
between the implementation and the control standards during the assessment. The quality of 
control depends on correction of deviation, which is the key to ensuring control standards 
and management and control objectives. Meanwhile, it is also the fundamental factor that 
determines the quality of management and control.  
⑦ Performance evaluation  
Performance evaluation refers to the evaluation on the control results or performance of 
an organization's managers. The evaluation on business performance in management and 
control focuses more on managers or controllers. The principles of performance evaluation 
mainly include: combination of management achievement index evaluation and driving 
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factor index evaluation; combination of internal evaluation and external evaluation; 
combination of financial index evaluation and non-financial index evaluation.  
⑧ Incentive mechanism  
The incentive mechanism is to reward or punish the controlled objects according to the 
results of performance evaluation. Only when the effectiveness of management and control 
matches the remuneration of managers can the long-term and effective operation of 
management and control be guaranteed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-2 Schematic Diagram for the Ten Elements of Management and Control 
⑨ Communication  
Communication refers to the timely transmission or exchange of the above-mentioned 
management control elements, which is the basis and guarantee of management and control. 
Without determining the environment and the control variables, the control standard cannot 
be determined; without the communication of control standards and reports, it is impossible 
to perform evaluation and correct deviations.  
⑩ Supervision control  
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Supervision control refers to supervising the implementation of management and control, 
an essential process of a complete control system. The absence of supervision and evaluation 
for the management and control, or the controller’s neglect of control quality, will inevitably 
affect the performance and effectiveness of management and control. For example, the 
function of internal audit in internal control system is to supervise and control the control 
process of management and controller.  
(2) Management and control mechanism of enterprise group  
The management and control mechanism of enterprise group is the explanation of the 
inherent rules of group control. With the studies of the dynamic mechanism and power 
allocation mechanism of the parent-subsidiary control, the mechanism conducts the systemic 
analysis of the control mechanism of parent-subsidiary system based on the operation 
mechanism of parent-subsidiary system.  
(3) Management control system of enterprise group  
The management and control system of enterprise groups mainly studies the management 
and control methods of the group from the aspects of organizational control, functional 
control and system control of parent-subsidiary companies, and the operational 
characteristics of each control mode are analyzed from the perspective of practical operation.  
(4) Management and control mode of enterprise group  
The management model of the enterprise group is mainly based on the concept of 
management and control of parent-subsidiary companies’ management and control, 
management control methods, management control depth, and operation mechanism, etc. to 
carry out comprehensive analysis, so as to systematically study the operation rules of group 
management and control.  
(5) Management and control program of enterprise group  
The management and control programs of enterprise group are mainly formulated from 
the perspective of the practice and application of enterprise group, and how the research and 
development of enterprise group can carry out practical program development and design 
from the management and control procedures and implementation content to guide the 
management and practice activities of the enterprise group.  
(6) Management performance evaluation of enterprise group  
The performance evaluation of the enterprise group management is mainly intended to 
evaluate the actual management and control performance of the enterprise group, and guide 
the formulation of the parent company's control plan based on the evaluation results. 
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3.2.3 Management and Control Mechanism of Enterprise Group 
3.2.3.1 Understanding of the Management and Control Mechanisms of Enterprise 
Groups 
The management and control mechanism of the enterprise group regards management and 
control as a complete system. It forms a complete enterprise group management and control 
system together with management and control organization, management and control mode, 
and the management and control including direction, motivation and restriction, which makes 
the management and control of enterprise group become an organic integrity [49].  
The management and control system of the enterprise group consists of a management 
control mechanism, a management control system, a management control model, and 
management and control method. The four concepts are closely related but also different. In 
the literature on management and control of the parent-subsidiary company, there are many 
cases in which concepts are used interchangeably in order to avoid the mix of concepts. In 
this thesis, control forms which reflect the state of set decentralization including behavior 
control, output control, administrative management and market control are defined as control 
mode. From a corporate strategic perspective, strategies such as personnel, finance, and 
information are at the functional layer, and personnel, finance, and information are the 
operating elements of the company. Therefore, the form of control that reflects the status of 
the decentralized power from the perspective of functional elements is defined as a control 
measure. Strategic and cultural control can be attributed to both the management control 
model and the means from different perspectives.  
The management and control mechanism is the hemimorphic adjustment that allows the 
management and control system to adjust by themselves. It’s an adjustment mechanism that 
keeps the data within the specified limits. The management and control system is divided 
into two subsystems:  
(1) The controlled object that is the controlled system which is mainly refers to the 
parent company of the group in the management and control of the enterprise group;  
(2) The subject of control refers to the subsidiaries of the controlling group. The main 
body of management and control consists of three parts: deviation measurement agencies, 
decision-making agencies, and executive agencies. The management and control process is 
to connect the management and control subjects with the management and control objects 
through the information flow, that is, the management and control subjects convert the 
external role into a form that can directly act as the management and control object, so as to 
correct the deviations of the management control objects from the standard to realize the 
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control process of maintaining the stable state of the system, and the core of this process is a 
hemimorphic adjustment mechanism.  
 
3.2.3.2 Relationship between Management and Control Mechanism and Mode 
Management and control mode can be understood as the standard form of management 
and control, because the management objective is always a complex system, and it is difficult 
to find a universally applicable standard form. No matter how successful the management 
mode cannot be completely and mechanically copied, all reference expressions may be more 
accurate. Therefore, the management and control mode can be understood as a reference 
pattern.  
There are both differences and connections between the control mechanism and the control 
mode. Specifically speaking, the management and control mode is the external performance 
of the management and control mechanism whereas the management and control mechanism 
is the specific content of the management and control mode. They are, in essence, two aspects 
of the same issue, or the correlation between the content and form.  
The management and control mode reflects the management and control mechanism. The 
management and control mechanism is the summation and abstraction of the power 
distribution between the parent company and the subsidiary companies. The management 
control mode gives concrete content to this generalization and abstraction. Management 
control mechanisms can generally be classified into relative centralization, relative 
decentralization, and a combination of centralization and decentralization (or called relative 
equilibrium). The management and control model also reflects various types of power 
distribution.  
 
3.2.4 Management and Control Method of Enterprise Group 
The management and control measures of the enterprise group are the methods adopted by 
the head office to manage and control the subsidiaries of the group in order to realize the 
strategy of the group company. Different management and control modes are realized 
through specific management and control measures of the group company. From different 
perspectives, there are different classifications of enterprise group management and control 
methods. It can be divided into research and development, supply, production, sales and other 
management and control methods according to the production process of the enterprise; From 
the perspective of enterprise resources, it can be divided into financial affairs, strategy, 
human resources, performance, culture and other control measures. This chapter discusses 
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the management and control measures of enterprise group from the perspective of enterprise 
resources.  
 
3.2.4.1 Financial Management and Control Methods  
(1) The meaning of financial management and control  
As a special form of economic organization, the financial management and control of 
enterprise groups has been paid great attention by scholars, and it is a hot issue in the study 
of enterprise management and control [50]. According to relevant scholars' researches on 
financial management and control of enterprise groups, the financial management and control 
of enterprise groups is defined as: The financial control of enterprise groups is based on the 
group head office as the main body of financial control, which is a management and control 
method to maximize the financial value of the group's subsidiaries by means of certain 
incentives and constraints under certain conditions.  
Financial control of enterprise group includes budget control, capital control, internal audit, 
etc., and this indicates that the goal of financial management and control in the enterprise 
group is to maximize its value, rather than merely to control its compliance and effectiveness 
of financial activities in the traditional sense. It can be said that the management and control 
of the enterprise group is one of the key factors to achieve the group's strategic goals.  
From the perspective of financial management and control, the financial management of 
enterprise group headquarters should establish the concept of "big finance" to give full play 
to the financing center, management center, investment decision center, profit settlement 
center and other basic functions of the financial department of the group company, so that 
the group's capital - controls - profit can obtain a virtuous circle of management system. In 
system, it should design a unified and efficient information system for control.  
(2) The method of financial management and control  
The financial management and control methods of enterprise group include budget control, 
capital control, and internal audit, etc.  
① Budget control  
Budget control is an internal management activity or process that quantifies and realizes 
the decision-making goals and resource allocation plans of enterprise groups. Budget control 
mainly includes the formulation of plans, establishment of budget standards, budget analysis 
reports, assessment and evaluation, etc. Budget control is a comprehensive control of 
enterprise's value flow, including the income, cost, profit and loss, capital, and cash flow of 
the enterprise. Budget control is not only a simple management method, but also a 
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management mechanism. The fundamental point of budget control is to replace daily 
management with budget and make budget an automatic management mechanism, as 
indicated in Figure 3-3.  
② Fund management and control  
Balanced and effective capital flow is the basis for the survival and development of 
enterprise groups. The so-called balanced flow of funds, refers to the inflow and outflow of 
funds through the appropriate coordination. For their long-term existence, enterprise must 
balance the flow of funds, and that is, the inflow is equal to the outflow. In fact, the enterprise 
capital is often in an unbalanced state, so it is necessary for the enterprise to strengthen the 
monetary fund control and make efforts to achieve a relative equilibrium in the imbalance.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-3 Implementation Process of Budget Control (Mangus Kald, 2015) 
In the final analysis, the capital control mode of enterprise group is related to the right 
division of financial control, that is, whether each subsidiary has the decision-making right 
and management right of cash use or not. Specifically, capital management and control 
modes of enterprise groups include the unified income and expenditure mode, the allocated 
reserve fund mode, the settlement center mode and the financial company mode. The 
comparison of these four modes is shown in Table 3-3:  
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Table 3-3 Comparison of Monitoring Mode of Clearing 
Mode Type 
Arrangements 
rights for 
subsidiaries 
Function of 
settlement center 
Relationship 
with the group 
Use Condition 
Unified 
income and 
expenditure 
Highly Centralized Cash deposit 
Group Internal 
Management 
Preliminary 
stage of 
enterprise 
group 
Allocation of 
reserve funds 
Flexibility to 
a certain extent 
Reimbursement 
centre 
Group internal 
management 
Preliminary 
stage of 
enterprise 
group 
Settlement 
center 
Combination of 
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③ Internal audit  
Internal audit plays an extremely important and special role in the operation and 
management of enterprise groups. The business objective of a group company is the common 
effort of all its constituent parts, and the composition of internal audit and other financial 
control links is the necessary condition for achieving the goal. Internal auditing is not only 
an important part of the internal control of an enterprise, but also a major force in the 
supervision and evaluation of other parts of internal control. Therefore, it must play an 
irreplaceable and positive role in strengthening internal control. In addition, in modern 
enterprise management, as the external environment changes, various risks increase, 
corporate governance strengthens internal reorganization, and the internal audit should also 
play a role in improving risk management and governance structure, which has given internal 
auditors more responsibility and mission.  
Internal audit of enterprise group has two characteristics: First, it is the second line of 
defense for the control of the group over subsidiaries. Enterprise group budget control, 
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financial system control, financial director appointment system, financial process control, etc. 
are the first line of defense of the enterprise group. The internal audit of the enterprise group 
can evaluate the above control methods, and propose improvement measures and feedback 
to the controller. Second, internal audits of enterprise groups have also been added to the first 
line of defense, including pre-event, concurrent, and post-event internal audits.  
 
3.2.4.2  Strategic Management and Control Measures  
The strategic management and control of the enterprise group includes the strategic plan, 
strategic implementation plan, budget formulation, implementation and execution, and 
analysis and evaluation. The implementation process of enterprise group's strategic control 
is shown in Figure 3-4. The strategic plan includes planning and selection of strategy, which 
are two issues that must be addressed in strategic management and control.  
The parent company of the group continuously adjusts its own strategy and then adjusts 
the company’s strategy. The operation of the subsidiary companies may affect the strategy 
of the group's head office and the parent company will adjust its strategy, thus enterprise 
groups can form an effective cycle in strategic management.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-4 Implementation Process of Strategic Control 
 
3.2.4.3 Management and Control Measures of Human Resources  
Human resources management and control refers to the management and control of various 
activities such as recruitment, employment, training, and incentives for all types of personnel 
required by the enterprise group. The management and control mode of human resources of 
modern group companies mainly includes the following three ways from the perspective of 
centralization and decentralization [51]:  
Strategic 
Plan 
Implementation 
Plan of Strategy 
Analysis and 
Evaluation 
Implementa
tion 
Budgeting 
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(1) Direct management and control model of human resources  
The direct human resources management and control model refers to the head office of the 
enterprise group as a comprehensive management center for human resources. It is 
responsible for the unified formulation of human resource development strategies, 
management systems, rules and regulations, and management processes, and monitors the 
implementation of subordinate enterprises while the subordinate enterprises are only 
responsible for specific implementation, with little or no differential improvement. Direct 
human resources management and control model belongs to highly centralized management 
and control model.  
(2) Regulatory management and control model of human resources  
The supervisory human resources management and control model refers to the human 
resources department of the group's head office as the human resources policy monitoring 
center. It is responsible for supervising and guiding the development of human resources 
development strategies, management systems, rules and regulations, and management 
processes of subordinate enterprises, and providing policy and professional advice and 
suggestions. While subordinate enterprises independently implement human resource 
management practices, important management issues are subject to approval by the group 
company. Regulatory human resources management and control modes belong to the 
combination of the centralized and decentralized management mode.  
(3) Consultant-based management and control model of human resources 
The consultant-based human resources management and control model refers to the human 
resources department of the group as the human resources consulting service center, which 
is responsible for providing the shared human resources service platform and professional 
human resource consulting consultants when subordinate enterprises independently 
formulate and implement human resource development strategies, management systems, 
rules and regulations, and management procedures. Consultant-based human resources 
management and control model belong to highly centralized management and control model.  
 
3.2.4.4 Performance Management and Control Measures  
Performance, also known as achievements and outcomes, it reflects the achievements or 
results of people engaging in an activity. Performance is one of the cores of management and 
control of an enterprise group [52]. An important criteria for measuring the success of 
enterprise group control is the performance of its subsidiaries. In the management and control 
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process of an enterprise group, performance control is both the means and purpose, and has 
always been a widely adopted management and control method.  
In a narrow sense, performance management and control only includes performance 
evaluation; however, in a broad sense, the performance management control includes not 
only performance evaluation, but also the establishment of the performance evaluation 
system, the implementation of performance evaluation, and the application of performance 
evaluation results. The performance management and control of the head office over its 
subsidiaries refers to performance management and control in a broad sense, including the 
establishment of the performance evaluation system of the subsidiaries, performance 
evaluation implementation, and application of performance evaluation results (supervision, 
incentives, etc.). Performance control is not only an important means of enterprise group 
management and control, but also an ultimate goal.  
This article uses the theory of Chen Zhijun’s performance control of parent-subsidiary 
companies as reference, and divides the performance management and control of enterprise 
group into three types based on the management and control process [53]: Investment 
management and control, internal process performance management and control, and output 
performance control, as indicated in Figure 3-5. These three performance management 
methods interact and complement each other, and jointly form a complete performance 
control chain of the enterprise group.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-5 Enterprise Group's Performance Management and Control System Based 
on Control Process  (Chen Zhijun, 2016)) 
 
3.2.4.5 Cultural Management and Control Measures 
Cultural management and control measures are very important. However, they are 
difficult to grasp, so for a long time, most enterprises have insufficient understanding of the 
functional meaning of cultural management and control measures. Currently, with the 
advancement of management science, the importance of cultural management and control 
methods has been increasingly recognized by corporate managers and scholars. In the future, 
The overall process of enterprise group's performance 
management and control 
Input performance 
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the management and control of enterprise groups should highly emphasize the use of 
cultural management and control measures [54].  
There are two kinds of cultures within the enterprise group: First, the culture shared by 
enterprise groups; Second, the culture (culture of subsystem) of the subsidiaries within the 
group. The latter is the subculture of the former. In general, each enterprise group has its 
own unique business culture. However, the group's head office is the controller and its 
corporate culture is in an advantageous position, while the culture of the subsidiary is 
subject to the basic culture of the group's head office.  
Cultural control refers to the head office’s management of subsidiary companies based 
on company's vision and common belief. The characteristic of cultural control is the 
informal and restrained authority and power of control. The instructions given by the head 
office to its subsidiaries are not specific [55].  
Cultural management and control can also become the main management and control 
measures of the group's head office under certain circumstances. The core of management 
and control is monitoring and evaluation. There are two phenomena that can be monitored 
and evaluated, which are behavior and results. When the results are easy to be measured 
and used effectively, the results can be used as a means of supervision and control. However, 
when the results are not easily measured and the behavior is not easily monitored, cultural 
control becomes a substitute for behavior and result control [56].  
In the final analysis, the problem of centralization and decentralization is the problem of 
group management and control. The intensity of group cultural control is also closely 
related to the degree of centralization and decentralization that the enterprise group controls. 
The research of Chen Zhijun shows that under relative centralization, the parent company 
exerts the strongest cultural control over its subsidiaries, and under the independent 
management mode of relative decentralization, the intensity of cultural control is low[57]. 
When the head office of the group controls over its subsidiary companies more strictly, the 
corresponding cultural control process is also higher.  
 
3.2.5 Risk Control Theory under Enterprise Group Management and Control 
As enterprise group faces risks everywhere, risk control is another task that deserves 
attention in enterprise group management and control. In business management practices, 
corporate management and control include the control of risks, which is a higher-level and 
more comprehensive control activity. Risk control is an integral part of enterprise 
management and control. Enterprise management and control expands and refines risk 
control. Risk control is an integral part and the basis of enterprise management and control, 
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meanwhile, it also belongs to an important method for carrying out comprehensive enterprise 
management and control.  
 
3.2.5.1 Connotation and Classification of Risks in Enterprise Groups  
(1) The connotation of risks in enterprise group  
At present, many scholars have studied the connotation of “risks”, so according to their 
viewpoints as reference and defines the risk as: "The negative impact of future uncertainty 
on enterprise group." 
(2) Characteristics of risks in enterprise group  
The risk of enterprise group is objective and not based on the will of a person, so companies 
can't avoid it or even eliminate it on the basis of likes and dislikes. The risk of an enterprise 
group is relative and variable. The relativity of risk is that different entities have different 
understanding and affordability for risk events, and the same risk events have different effects 
on different entities. The risk of the enterprise group is controllable. Although the occurrence 
and degree of risk of the enterprise group are uncertain, the occurrence and result of the risk 
are always related to certain factors, and that is to predict and identify the probability of risk 
occurrence by scientific method for avoiding risks, or controlling the occurrence of risks and 
reducing the adverse effects.  
(3) Classification of risks in enterprise group  
There are many classifications of risks in enterprise group. Yet the author prefers the 
classification based on the types of risks, such as strategic risk, financial risk, market risk, 
operational risk, and legal risk.  
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3.2.5.2 Enterprise Group's Risk Control Theory  
The risk control originated from the American economic crisis of 1929 when enterprise 
groups began to attach importance to the issues of risk control. At present, risk control has 
developed into a relatively independent area in the control of enterprise groups, which is of 
great significance to their survival and development.  
(1) The relationship between management and risk control of enterprise group  
In business management practices, corporate management and control includes the control 
of risks that is a higher-level and more comprehensive control activity. With risk control as 
its integral part, corporate management and control expands and refines it.. Apart from being 
the integral part and basis of corporate management and control, risk control also serves as 
an important method for carrying out comprehensive corporate management and control.  
(2) The goals of risk control  
In the risk control framework, it is necessary to analyze the corresponding risks according 
to different objectives such that the establishment of objectives has naturally become the first 
step of the risk control process, and has been determined as part of the risk control framework. 
The COSO Enterprise Risk Management - Integration Framework pointed out that basic 
premise of enterprise group risk management is that each entity exists to provide value to its 
stakeholders. Risk management of enterprise groups enables managers to effectively deal 
with uncertainty, the risks and the opportunities brought by it, and to enhance their ability to 
create value. When enterprise group managers strive to achieve the optimal balance between 
growth, remuneration goals, and associated risks through the formulation of strategies and 
goals, and maximize the value of resources in the process of pursuing the objectives of the 
main body, the value can be maximized. .  
(3) The subject of risk control  
Regardless of theory or practice, risk control organizations do not have a fixed model. 
Larger enterprise groups, such as global multinational corporations, generally set up 
specialized risk control departments, whereas small business groups may have only one 
person to work for risks control in full-time or part-time.  
(4) Risk control content  
Successful enterprise group can break a comprehensive risk management project down 
into seven major components, including: Company governance - establish top-down risk 
management; hierarchical (department) management - business policy adjustments; portfolio 
management - think and act like a "fund manager"; risk transfer - transfer concentrated or 
ineffective risk out; risk analysis - develop the advanced analysis tools; data and technical 
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resources - ability to integrate data and systems; stakeholder management - improve risk 
transparency for key stakeholders .  
(5) Risk control methods  
The COSO Enterprise Risk Management-Integration Framework pointed out that 
management authorities choose risk response—avoid, bear, reduce, or share risk—a series 
of actions to control the risk within the risk tolerance and risk capacity of the subject.  
 
3.3 Study on the Management and Control Mode of State-owned Enterprise Groups 
3.3.1 Categories of Group Management and Control Modes  
The management and control mode is a standard form and a reference style of management 
and control. According to strength and breadth of the control over its subsidiaries, 
management and control mode of the group company can be roughly divided into three 
categories: financial control mode, operation control mode, and strategic control mode.  
3.3.1.1 Financial Control Mode 
The financial control mode is largely characterized as a mode of decentralized control, 
where member companies are mainly managed and evaluated through financial indicators. 
The group company generally does not interfere with the specific business process of the 
subsidiaries, who determine their own development strategies while the parent company only 
increases or decreases the number of stocks according to the development status of the 
subsidiaries. Under this mode, the group’s head office sets asset management as the core 
method for member companies, compares the operating results of the company’s own 
published budgets and plans with those of its peer companies, and evaluates the financial 
performance of their operating performance. The financial management and control mode 
focuses only on the results. The main methods of control are generally financial control, 
corporate governance, and corporate mergers and acquisitions. This mode can be vividly 
described as "with concept but without practice"[58].  
Hutchison Whampoa Limited is a classic example of financial control mode, employs 
more than 180,000 people, and operates a number of businesses in 45 countries, from ports 
and related services, real estate and hotels, retail and manufacturing, energy and 
infrastructure, to Internet and telecommunications services. The headquarters is mainly 
responsible for the operation of assets, as a result, not many functional officials at 
headquarters are primarily financial managers.  
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3.3.1.2 Operation Control Mode  
Business running control mode is also called the operation control mode, the most 
centralized one among the three control modes, whose greatest feature is the emphasis on 
process control [59]. The parent company adopting this model has a business management 
department for it to manage the daily operation of the subordinate enterprises, and the 
department focuses on the unity and optimization of the management behaviors of member 
enterprises, the coordinated growth of the company as a whole, and the centralized control 
and management of the success factors of the industry. This type of control mode is mostly 
used by companies that engage in natural monopoly operations or large-scale commodity 
production. The control measures adopted include financial control, marketing or sales 
control, network or technical control, new business development control, and human resource 
management control.  
In order to ensure that the headquarters can make decisions correctly and solve various 
problems smoothly, the group adopting the operation control mode will have a large number 
of staff in a large-scale headquarters. For example, GE adopted this control mode in 1984, as 
a result, there were more than 2,000 staffs in the headquarters. Until Jack Welch served as 
CEO, the mode was turned into a strategic control mode, which greatly reduced the number 
of staff officers at the headquarters. IBM can be said to be a typical example in this respect. 
In order to ensure the implementation of its global "on demand" strategy, all divisions are 
centralized by the headquarters and the plan is developed by the headquarters, while the 
subordinate units are responsible for ensuring implementation. This mode can be vividly 
described as "the combination of concept and practice".  
 
3.3.1.3 Strategic Control Mode 
The strategic control mode falls between the centralized mode and the decentralized mode, 
and emphasizes program control as its outstanding feature [60]. Under the strategic control 
mode, in order to ensure the group's overall interests and the maximization of the interests of 
the subordinate enterprises, the group’s headquarters is responsible for the overall strategic 
planning, financial and asset operations, while all subordinate enterprises must formulate 
their own strategic plans and propose the corresponding business plans and budget plans 
which match with the strategic plan. In addition, the headquarters shall be responsible for 
approving the strategic operation plans of the subordinate enterprises and giving them 
additional valuable constructive proposals. Meanwhile, the budget approval shall be 
delivered to the subordinate enterprises for implementation.[61] 
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In order to ensure the realization of the objectives of the subordinate enterprises and the 
maximization of the group's overall interests, scale of the group’s headquarters is not large, 
but it mainly focuses on comprehensive balance and comprehensive benefits of the group [62]. 
Such as balancing resource needs of various companies, coordinating the contradictions 
among subordinate enterprises, and promoting the “Borderless Corporate Culture”, 
cultivation of senior executives, brand management, and sharing of best exemplary 
experiences. This mode can be vividly described as "the combination of concept and practice". 
Typical companies that use this regulatory mode include British Petroleum, Shell Oil, and 
Philips. At present, most of the world's group companies have adopted or will adopt this 
control mode.  
 
3.4 The Principles and Environmental Factors that Influence the Selection and Control 
Mode of the Group  
The group's management and control mode is a complex system that includes determining 
the company’s governance structure, dividing the role of the head office and its subsidiaries, 
ranking the company’s employees, selecting the company’s organizational structure, 
determining the group’s important resource management and control methods, and 
establishing a performance management system. The three types of group control modes have 
their own characteristics. There is no "best governance mode", and there is only a "suitable 
management mode" for an enterprise group at a certain period of time. When selecting 
management and control mode, it is necessary for the enterprise group to start from the 
specific conditions and take comprehensive consideration to determine the most suitable 
management and control mode. After all, the choice of management and control mode is the 
balance of "centralization" and "decentralization". 
 
3.4.1 Selection Principle  
① Maximize resource sharing and synergies between headquarters and subordinate 
business units;  
② Maintain the balance of interests on the premise of ensuring the maximization of the 
common interests between the parent company and subordinate business unit;  
③ Ensure the smooth and efficient operation of the business process between the 
headquarters of the group and its subsidiaries;  
④ Keep the risk of the group company under control.  
 
  
 
49 
 
3.4.2 Influence Factors  
3.4.2.1 External Environmental Factors 
The external environment is the soil on which enterprises depend for their survival and 
development in society, where enterprise is ultimately a subsystem of the whole social system. 
Therefore, the management and control mode of enterprises is bound to be affected by the 
external environment. The so-called external environment refers to the external macro 
variables that an organization faces, such as politics, economy, society, technology, culture 
and so on. The external environment has a great influence on the selection of the management 
and control mode of parent-subsidiary Company. One of the important tasks for the selection 
is to enable enterprises to adapt to the needs of external environment. In general, the external 
environment can be analyzed from four aspects: politics, economy, society, and technology. 
For example, different countries have different legal provisions on the establishment and 
operation of enterprises while different cultural backgrounds lead to different corporate 
governance structures and business models, and technological progress constantly affects the 
organizational structure of enterprises and so on.  
The uncertainty of the external environment is the most widely concerned when studying 
the external control of environmental variables. Duncan proposed two dimensions of external 
environment complexity and dynamics, which comprehensively summarized the overall 
characteristics of the external environment uncertainty[63]. Based on these two dimensions, 
the uncertainty of the environment can be divided into four types, see Table 3-4. The 
complexity of the environment refers to the number of environmental factors associated with 
the operation of the business and the interaction between these factors. If the external 
environmental factors that affect the enterprise are many, and each factor has an impact on 
each other, then the environment is complex; if the external environmental factors that affect 
the enterprise are less, and relatively independent of each other, then such an environment is 
relatively simple.  
Environmental stability refers to the change of environmental factors in time. If 
environmental factors do not change or change slowly over a longer period of time, the 
environment is stable; if environmental factors change rapidly and are unpredictable, then 
the environment is unstable.  
When choosing the control mode of the enterprise group, the external environment of the 
enterprise under its management must be taken into account. Due to the differences in 
industry, suppliers, customers and production technologies, the group is in a complex 
environment with high degree of uncertainty; Some groups are relatively stable, simple and 
less uncertain. Under the environment with high degree of uncertainty, the group often has 
opportunities to look for new products and market, at the same time, the organizational 
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structure of the group needs a higher degree of flexibility, so the group management and 
control system is suitable to adopt the decentralized management model.  
 
Table 3-4 Categorization of External Factors (Duncan, 1972) 
Stability  Simple + Stable = Low uncertainty  
1. Low number of external factors  
2. Factors remain constant or slow to 
change  
Complex+Stable=Moderate uncertainty  
1. A large number of external factors  
2. Factors remain constant or slow to 
change  
Uncertainty  
Simple + Unstable  = Moderate 
uncertainty  
1. Low number of external factors  
2.The factors change frequently, 
unpredictably, and produce reaction 
Complex+Unstable = High uncertainty  
1. A large number of external factors  
2. The factors change frequently, 
unpredictably, and produce reaction 
 
 Simple  Complex  
 
3.4.2.2 Internal Environmental Factors 
The primary task for an enterprise in effective management control is to achieve it through 
the design and reform of its governance structure, which must be adopted on the basis of a 
clear understanding of the internal environment of enterprises. Generally speaking, the 
internal factors affecting corporate governance structure are as follows:  
(1) The position of a subsidiary in an enterprise group  
For the core business subsidiary with high impact in term of operation condition on the 
performance of the parent company, relatively centralized management and control mode 
can be chosen in order to guarantee the parent company to have the power control; For the 
subsidiary of non-core business, the parent company can relatively weakened its control, so 
as to give full play to its operational activity and enhance the market reaction capacity.  
(2) The stage of enterprise development  
In the initial and growing period of the enterprise, the coordination and integration ability 
of the parent-subsidiary companies are not strong due to imperfect operation mechanism and 
unsound management system, therefore the use of relatively centralized management and 
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control can improve the management efficiency of enterprises and the control ability of 
subsidiaries. As the enterprise scales up and its management ability improves in a stable stage 
of development, it can adjust to adopt a relative decentralized approach to enhance the 
operating autonomy of the subsidiary.  
(3) Dependence between parent and subsidiary companies  
In terms of legal status, the parent-subsidiary companies are independent legal entities, 
and they are not a relationship of the higher and lower levels of administration. The parent 
company cannot directly interfere in the daily production and business activities of the 
subsidiary companies. Regardless of adoption of centralized or decentralized control mode, 
the parent company should exercise its controls over subsidiary companies through their 
governance structure, by delegating shares rights on behalf of the intention to carry out the 
parent company decisions. Therefore, the impact of parent-subsidiary dependencies should 
be taken into account when determining the control mode for it.  
 
3.4.2.3 Strategic Factors  
A.D.Chandler, a famous American management scholar, once put forward the view that 
"Strategy determines structure, and structure follows strategy". The organizational structure 
serves the organizational goals, because the establishment of control is ultimately intended 
to achieve the strategic goals of the group, the basis for establishing the management and 
control mode is to consider the strategic importance of subsidiaries, and understanding and 
implementing the strategic intention of the group is the cornerstone of group management 
and control. In order to achieve effective control, we must first identify the strategic 
objectives of the group and determine the objectives and direction of the development of the 
company. The impact of strategy on governance and organizational structures is analyzed as 
follows:  
(1) Select the appropriate governance body according to the strategic planning 
requirements  
The key influence of strategy on governance structure is the determination of appropriate 
governance body according to the requirements of strategic planning. The quality, ability, 
character and behavior pattern of the main body of governance should be adapted to the 
strategy of the group. It is necessary to determine the requirements for the governance body 
according to the strategic planning, including the concept, ability and behavior of the 
governance body, which are also the criteria for evaluating governance bodies.  
(2) Strategy plays a decisive role in organization structure  
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Different strategic stages, management strategies, competitive strategies and competitive 
styles all affect the organizational structure of the group. Research shows that many large 
companies have gone through four stages of strategic development: Quantitative expansion, 
under-proliferation, vertical integration, and diversifying operation. Each stage has an 
appropriate organizational structure. In the strategic stage of quantitative expansion, 
enterprises expand the number of products or services in a region, corresponding to which, 
the organizational structure of enterprises is relatively simple, even only one office, 
performing simple production or sales functions. Enterprises at geographical proliferation 
strategy stage require the distribution of products or services to other regions for further 
development. When it comes to the organization structure, it is necessary to organize the 
offices distributed in different areas in a unified way, and then the problems of coordination, 
standardization, and specialization occur, which has resulted in a new organizational 
structure.  
(3) Strategic importance of subsidiaries  
Strategy determines the organization while organization influences the strategy. The 
organization structure serves the organizational goals, because the establishment of control 
is ultimately intended to achieve the strategic goals of the group, the basis for establishing 
the management and control mode is to consider the strategic importance of subsidiaries, and 
understanding and implementing the strategic intention of the group is the cornerstone of 
group management and control. In order to achieve effective control, we must first identify 
the strategic objectives of the group and determine the objectives and direction of the 
development of the company.  
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3.5 Selection and Design of Management and Control Modes 
There is no best model for enterprise group management, but only the one that is most 
appropriate for its development at a specific stage. The essence of management and control 
is the art of centralization and decentralization. The key is how to balance the relationship 
between centralization and decentralization. In particular, state-owned groups should avoid 
falling into a situation of death and chaos. After the introduction to the control mode of the 
group, its selection principle, and the influencing factors, this thesis considers that the 
appropriate management and control mode are mainly selected from the following aspects.  
 
3.5.1 Industry Characteristics  
The requirements of management control vary with industries of different characteristics. 
In general, if the business operation is simple, there is no need for member enterprises to 
make too many customized business decisions or have the basic condition to realize the mode 
of centralized power control, however, for those industries that require member enterprises 
to make a large number of customized management decisions, the decentralized control mode 
should be emphasized.  
 
3.5.2 Development Phase  
As enterprises group develop, their needs for the management and control mode evolve. 
At the initial stage, enterprise groups are often simple manufacturers or sellers, all member 
companies are in the same business, and the management and control over each member 
enterprise can be copied to other member enterprises to varying degrees, thus the enterprise 
groups may consider implementing centralized management and control mode for member 
enterprises. As they expand, their development is characterized with diversified businesses. 
Each business has its own characteristics requiring different management and control modes 
to adapt, therefore, the group cannot implement a closer management and control model for 
the member enterprises, and decentralization control becomes inevitable. In the same way, 
relevant diversified groups can find a balance between centralization and decentralization.  
 
3.5.3 Organization Size  
The organization size determines the managerial extent and scope of the headquarters. In 
the initial development stage of the enterprise group, the member enterprises are relatively 
few, or basically distributed in the same area, in this case, if the enterprise group has enough 
personnel and ability, it can implement closer centralized control over the member enterprises. 
  
 
54 
 
As the enterprise group scales up, more and more affairs need to be managed and coordinated. 
It will affect the decision-making speed and quality if all decisions are made by the group 
headquarters, which requires the group headquarters to gradually delegate power and to shift 
to decentralized control mode. Take Vanke as an example, in initial development stage, 
Vanke implemented a centralized management and control model, where the investment 
management and decision-making power were separated, limited expert resources were 
concentrated at headquarters, and investment, personnel, capital and professional control of 
subsidiaries were reported to the enterprise group for decision making. However, with its 
rapid expansion, the sizes of regional subsidiaries were increasing. At the same time, more 
than 40 projects in more than 20 cities across the country need rapid response. Its reliance on 
the enterprise group to make decisions could not adapt to the increasingly competitive 
industry development, thus in 2005, Vanke made a major change in the mode of management 
and control, from the centralized mode to a decentralized mode. 
 
3.6 Other Factors  
In addition to the above three influencing factors, the selection of control mode will also 
be affected by such factors as leadership style, human resources, corporate culture, etc. As 
long as we grasp these factors through in-depth analysis, we can find the management and 
control mode suitable for their own actual situation, and realize the effective management 
and control of enterprise groups over member enterprises.  
While taking into account the various factors mentioned above, we can also consider which 
group management and control mode is more suitable for our own enterprise from the 
following aspects: in term of the strategic importance of subordinate enterprises, it is 
necessary to centralize the management of subordinate enterprises; in term of the group 
headquarters’ control of resources, the group headquarters has the ability to centralize the 
management of subordinate enterprises; in term of the development stage of subordinate 
enterprises, the group headquarters should not centralize the management of subordinate 
enterprises. After careful consideration of these three problems, the group management can 
also determine the selection of the group management mode.  
To sum up, there are many factors that affect the selection of group management and 
control mode. Usually, these factors do not work alone, but infiltrate and influence each other, 
so there is not a standard model. Of course, it is possible to learn from the successful 
enterprise management mode, but we must combine their own actual situation with the 
external environment, so as to find out the most appropriate management mode.  
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The design and selection of group management and control mode should not stay at the 
theoretical level, but form an operable system that can put the management and control mode 
into practice. Effective selection and implementation of the control model take specific ways 
and measures as well as a series of supporting organizations, business process optimization, 
and technical means.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter mainly introduced three management modes of enterprise groups: financial 
management and control mode, operation control mode, and strategic control mode. It also 
analyzed the main factors affecting the selection and control mode of the enterprise group, 
including internal environmental factors, external environmental factors, and strategic factors; 
it is also suggested that the enterprise group should select the most suitable management and 
control model in accordance with the industrial characteristics, the corporate development 
stage, the organizational scale, and other factors.  
The research on relevant theories and enterprise groups in this chapter lays the foundation 
for the study of the full text. 
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Chapter 4 The Performance Evaluation of State-owned 
Enterprises' Employees Based on Super-efficiency DEA Model 
In the 21st century, human resources are regarded as the most important driving force for 
economic development. Tan Shu et al. proved that a very important factor in economic 
growth is the improvement of human quality. The research results of the World Bank also 
show that besides advanced equipment and technology, a country or enterprise must also pay 
attention to the coordination and matching of human resources.[64] 
In order to attract, cultivate, and retain the needed talent, a company must establish a 
complete compensation system and a competition mechanism that stimulate the enthusiasm 
and creativity of employees, and create a work environment conducive to personal 
development [65]. After more than 10 years of development, China’s state-owned enterprises 
have gradually established a compensation system that meets their own situations, but there 
are still many problems, which Zhang Yirong thought mainly are [66]:  
(1) The mechanism for market-determined remuneration has not yet been formed, and 
the inconsistence between the remuneration of employees and the market price still exists. A 
survey of Ministry of Labor and Social Security in China indicates that most state-owned 
enterprises have the phenomenon of "one is excessively high, the other is excessively low" 
in terms of wage level at present, in other words, the salary of employees in general positions 
is higher than that of the labor market, but wages of employees in key positions such as 
professional and technical posts and management posts are generally lower than those in the 
labor market. On the one hand, it is difficult for the company to retain and introduce the talent 
needed. On the other hand, the “exit” of enterprises is blocked, and they cannot lay off the 
employees as they want to. The survival of the fittest and the market selection mechanism 
for the enterprise staff cannot be actually established.  
(2) Remuneration cannot fully reflect the relative value of employees within the 
company. In the state-owned enterprises, the ranks of administrative posts, the levels of 
educational qualifications and titles, and the length of service play a decisive role in 
determining wages. However, insufficient understanding of the value and importance of 
different positions leads to the serious phenomenon of equalitarian "Communal Pot" or 
promotion according to status, and this has compromised the internal equity of enterprises 
and the working enthusiasm of employees in important positions.  
(3) The salary system is still relatively simple, if employees cannot be promoted to 
management positions, their wages and bonuses will generally stagnate at a fixed level. The 
conflict is outstanding especially for enterprises with relatively concentrated professional and 
technical personnel, and the lack of incentives for professional and technical personnel over 
a long time has resulted in the loss of the professional and technical backbone after many 
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years of training, and swayed the stability of the company's professional and technical 
personnel.  
(4) Salary is not fully linked with performance appraisal. Most companies fail to widen 
the income differences entirely based on the performance of their employees, thus the 
phenomenon of equalitarian salary is exists. Some companies lack a clear assessment target, 
or have assessment goals but do not attach importance to the collection of daily assessment 
information. Performance appraisal is based on the subjective impression of the appraisers, 
so that the performance appraisal results often deviate greatly from the actual performance 
of the employees. In the form, the basis for bonus distribution lacks credibility, which affects 
the incentive effect and reduces employee satisfaction.  
In order to solve these problems, enterprises should establish a fair, equitable, and effective 
evaluation system. As an effective management tool, performance evaluation plays an 
important role in evaluating and motivating employees, enhancing the vitality and 
competitiveness of state-owned enterprises, promoting the development of state-owned 
enterprises, and improving their market position. It is the core of human resource 
management in state-owned enterprises [67].  
The accuracy and rationality of employee performance evaluation depend on whether the 
designed evaluation index system is scientific and whether the evaluation method is 
appropriate. Lai Ruixing et al. established a performance evaluation system including 15 
items for the workshops and department heads from the four aspects including the annual 
work experience, work attitude, work ability, and peer and subordinate evaluation[68]; Wang 
Xiaoshuo established a performance evaluation index system with 13 indicators including 
understanding ability, coordination ability and team cooperation spirit, and established a 
fuzzy comprehensive evaluation model for management staff performance[69]. Nie Jingtao et 
al established an index system that includes salary, research and development ability, work 
ability, and leadership, and they also established a multi-criteria decision model for employee 
performance evaluation based on satisfaction[70]; Yang Shaomei established a performance 
evaluation index system consisting of 11 indicators including work quality, work 
responsibility, and knowledge application from the aspects of work ability, morality, and 
knowledge, at the same time, used the analytic hierarchy process to construct a 
comprehensive evaluation model, and carried out empirical study on the performance of 
employees in state-owned enterprise[71].  
The research of the above scholars has made some contributions to employee performance 
evaluation. However, some problems in the evaluation of employee performance in state-
owned enterprises have not yet been well resolved, such as the lack of clear evaluation criteria 
and objective metrics, the design of evaluation index is detached from the job responsibilities, 
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the content of evaluation lacks clear pertinence, and the evaluation results lack guidance to 
performance improvement. In addition, few evaluation results have been put in application.  
Based on the relevant literature, this thesis combines the multi-factor, multi-dimensional, 
and dynamic characteristics of employee performance in state-owned enterprises and 
constructs for state-owned enterprise employees a performance evaluation index system with 
six input indicators and six output indicators. And these indicators comprehensively cover 
all aspects of employee performance: work performance, work ability, work potential, and 
work attitude. The system reflects not only work performance of employees, but also the 
overall quality of employees, and combines long-term incentives with short-term incentives. 
And the designed evaluation indicators have reflected the idea of combining quantitative 
analysis and qualitative analysis. In addition, the DEA method, which has been widely used 
in various fields to solve the relative efficiency evaluation problem, is applied to employee 
performance evaluation. The established basic DEA model and super-efficiency DEA model 
for employee performance evaluation can make definite evaluation on the merits of the 
employee performance without setting weights to evaluation indicators, and provide the 
direction and extent for performance improvement.  
This thesis evaluated the performance of employees in state-owned enterprises from the 
perspective of enterprises, that is to say, it analyzed whether the output of employees in 
various aspects matches the input of enterprises after the necessary investment. The 
evaluation results reflect not only the aspect that the enterprise needs to adjust as an investor, 
but also the aspect of improvements made by the employee as a subject that accepts input. 
This research method can not only provide ideas for state-owned enterprises to formulate 
measures to improve performance management, but also provide a basis for companies to 
design more reasonable compensation systems. 
  
4.1 Performance Management Process  
4.1.1 Concepts of Performance Management  
Performance management begins with performance assessment. As early as the 19th 
century, Robert Owen introduced performance evaluation into Scotland, hence he was 
regarded as the Father of Personnel Management. Since the 1980s, many scholars have put 
forward many different viewpoints on the connotation of performance management. 
Performance management connects individuals with the purpose of the organization for 
supporting the process of the organization's overall goals. Performance management 
improves the performance of individuals by tapping into their potential, and improves 
corporate performance by combining individual goals with enterprise strategy. Michael 
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Armstrong (1994) argued that performance management is an agreement between an 
individual and management on goals, standards, and competencies required, a management 
process based on mutual understanding that enables organizations, groups and individuals to 
achieve better work outcomes. Performance management is a step-by-step approach to 
identify, measure and assess the information about the performance level of an individual's 
work so that the organizational goals can be realized. Since organizations and individuals are 
inherently inseparable under an established premise, the performance management system 
can only position the individual behaviors of the organization members on the premise of 
positioning the organization. Wu Xin believes that performance management refers to 
achieving the goals of the organization through the continuous open communication process 
to form the expected benefits and output of the organization's goals and promoting the team 
and individuals to make actions that are conducive to achieving goals [72].  
Based on the above points of view, this thesis argues that performance management is the 
management of the various elements of the performance realization process, and a 
management activity based on the corporate strategy. Performance management is a kind of 
management activity through the establishment of enterprise strategy, goal resolution, 
performance evaluation, and the use of performance results in daily business management 
activities to motivate employees to continuously improve their performance and eventually 
achieve organizational goals and strategies. In the process of performance management, 
special emphasis should be placed on two-way and continuous communication between 
managers and employees.  
 
4.1.2 Performance Management Process  
Performance management is a complete system, where all aspects of management are not 
only closely linked, but also in a cyclical process, thus it is a continuous and constantly 
correcting process. As shown in Figure 4-1.  
① Performance plan  
The starting point of the performance management process is to determine the target plan 
and establish the performance standard. The performance target plan is mainly based on the 
realization of the strategic target.  
Performance planning is a two-way communication process in which managers and 
employees need to reach a consensus on the objectives of employee performance. On the 
basis of consensus, employees need to make corresponding commitments to their work goals. 
The common input and participation of managers and employees is the basis for performance 
management. 
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Figure 4-1 Flow Chart of Performance Management  
（Armstrong, 1994） 
 
② Performance appraisal  
Performance appraisal is usually conducted at the end of a certain period when according 
to the prepared plan, the manager evaluates the achievement of the employee's performance 
goals. Performance appraisal is based on the agreed performance indicators at the beginning 
of the performance period.  
③ Performance feedback  
After employee performance evaluation, managers should have conversations with 
employees. Feedback information about employee performance during the assessment 
process will be provided through conversations, so that employees could understand their 
current performance and what managers expect of them, and recognize the areas to be 
improved; at the same time, employees can also present their difficulties in achieving 
performance goals and request guidance and assistance from higher management.  
④ Performance improvement  
In the communication process for performance feedback, both employees and managers 
often reach a consensus on the results of the evaluation and the areas that need improvement, 
and select an area to start the improvement. This means the beginning of a new performance 
management cycle.  
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4.1.3 The Practical Significance of Performance Management  
(1) Promote management and business process optimization  
In performance management, managers at all levels will try to improve the efficiency of 
handling matters from the perspective of the whole company or a department, and through 
continuous adjustment of the above four aspects, gradually improve the operational 
efficiency of the organization so that the management and business processes have been 
gradually optimized while improving the organizational performance.  
(2) Ensure the realization of the organization's strategic goals  
The business manager of a well-developed company usually breaks down the company's 
annual business objectives, assigns to each department and forms the annual performance 
targets of each department, while the breaking-down of core indicators for each department 
to each post has become the key performance indicators of each post, thus managers and staff 
at all levels will fully express their opinions during the formulation of annual business goals. 
In this way, the overall goals of the company can be broken down, at the same time, 
employees at all levels participate in the formulation of goals, therefore, it lays a good mass 
foundation for the realization of the target at all levels and helps the final realization of the 
organizational goal.  
 
4.2 Construction of the Employee Performance Evaluation System  
4.2.1 Purpose of Employee Performance Evaluation 
The performance evaluation of employees has always been associated with salary and 
closely related to the immediate interests of employees while performance evaluation has 
become the most direct and effective means to arouse the enthusiasm of employees. 
Performance evaluation shoulders the important mission of reflecting the employees’ work 
performance and determining their salaries. Its rationality directly affects the stability of the 
company. The most direct purpose of evaluating employee performance is to provide an 
objective and fair picture of employee performance during the evaluated period.  
 
4.2.2 Content of Employee Performance Evaluation 
The content of employee performance evaluation is usually divided into: work 
performance evaluation, work ability evaluation, and work attitude evaluation. In addition, 
in order to achieve a certain goal of human resource management, job potential evaluation is 
also included in the daily performance evaluation system. The above four aspects do not exist 
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in isolation, they are linked with each other to achieve a specific management purpose and 
form an overall performance evaluation system. As shown in Figure 4-2.  
(1) Work performance evaluation  
Work performance is the result of an employee's actual work during a specific period of 
time. The process of performance evaluation is the process of using pre-established target 
levels to measure employee job performance results. With such evaluation process, it can not 
only evaluate the performance of employees at all levels, but also prompt employees at all 
levels to improve their work in a planned way in order to meet the target requirements.  
If isolated from the employees’ work, work performance evaluation would be impossible, 
because the evaluation is based on results of the employee's work or performance. In general, 
employees' performance is evaluated in terms of quantity, quality, efficiency, and innovation, 
see Table 4-1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-2 Content of Employee Performance 
 
 
 
 
 
Work Performance Evaluation 
Work Ability Evaluation Work Attitude Evaluation 
Job potential evaluation 
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Table 4-1 Dimension Table for Employee's Performance Evaluation 
Evaluation 
Dimension 
Definition 
Quality  
Whether the result of work completion is correct and timely, and whether it 
is consistent with the planned goal.  
Quantity  The workload and progress of the completed task.  
Efficiency  The time and expense involved in completing the work.  
Innovation  Apply new methods to improve the results of the work undertaken.  
Whether for managers or employees, work performance evaluation is very necessary. 
Corporate managers want to control the business process through performance evaluation 
and promote employees’ efficiency; Employees hope that their work performance can be 
objectively reflected through evaluation, so that they can improve the work and personal 
ability constantly.  
(2) Work Ability Evaluation  
The work ability evaluation refers to the evaluation of the evaluated employee's ability 
reflected in the work. For example, when an emergency occurs during work, whether the 
employee has a high capacity to make an accurate judgment; whether the employee has the 
ability to coordinate various relationships or not; whether the employee could clearly express 
the information needed by customers.  
Because in some cases, employees may successfully complete their work due to accidental 
factors. On this occasion, if you only evaluate the work performance of employees, you may 
make a higher evaluation. The purpose of performance management is to achieve the long-
term development goals of the company. Therefore, merely evaluating work performance 
cannot play an effective role in guiding employees' behaviors for a long time. This requires 
that performance evaluation should also evaluate the staff’s work abilities. In general, 
employees’ work abilities include the following three aspects: first, common sense and 
professional knowledge; second, the skills; third, work experience.  
Compared with work performance evaluation, work ability evaluation is more difficult. 
Since performance is relatively easy to measure while ability is internalized in employees, it 
is difficult to quantify and compare so that the evaluation of employees' working ability can 
be carried out by direct ability assessment, or by some intermediary indicators, see Table 4-
2.  
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Table 4-2 Dimension Table for Employee's Work Ability Evaluation 
 
Evaluation 
Dimension 
Definition 
Common sense, 
professional 
knowledge 
Employees should have the knowledge needed to handle the tasks they 
undertake, and this dimension is usually measured by the level of academic 
qualifications.  
Skills 
Employees have the skills needed to deal with the tasks they undertake. This 
dimension usually uses the time and content of the training they receive.  
Work experience. The number of years that employees engage in related work.  
 
(3) Job potential evaluation  
The potential mentioned here refers to the ability that employees have but have not yet 
exerted in their work. The job potential evaluation is intended to understand the potential of 
employees through various means and to find out the reasons for hindering their development 
so as to better develop the potential of employees and encourage them to transform their 
potential into practical work capabilities.  
The under-performance of employees' working ability may be caused by the following 
reasons: on the one hand, employees in the enterprise have not got the job opportunities to 
show themselves. Every employee has strengths, when placed in an unsuitable position, the 
work performance may be affected. On the other hand, it may be that the superior's guidance 
or instruction is wrong, which affects the performance of employees' ability. Of course, to 
enable employees to fully tap the existing capabilities at work, they must also develop 
necessary capabilities. Otherwise, employees may not be able to perform their full 
capabilities due to the lack of knowledge or skills in certain areas.  
Companies can usually use the following three aspects of information to evaluate the 
potential of employees: the evaluation results of employees' work ability, the relevant 
working years, and various qualification certificates. The evaluation of potential should not 
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be separated from the evaluation of employees' working ability, and the enterprise evaluates 
the potential of employees through objective and relatively stable conditions such as their 
working years and relevant qualification certificates, the evaluation cycle of which is 
generally longer than the daily performance evaluation cycle. The results of employee 
potential evaluation can provide more objective evidence for various personnel decisions 
such as job rotation.  
(4) Work Attitude Evaluation  
As we know, different work attitudes usually produce different work results. Evaluating 
the work attitude of employees in performance evaluation can encourage employees to create 
better job performance with a good work attitude. At the same time, it should also be 
recognized that a good working attitude does not ensure that employees can fully exert their 
work ability. Therefore, to enable employees to fully exert their work ability, it also needs 
other human factors and external variables, such as the rationality of work design, the 
atmosphere of the workplace, and the external environment of the company. The relationship 
among work attitude, working ability and work performance is shown in Figure 4-3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-3 The Relationship Chart of Work Attitude, Work Ability and Work 
Performance 
 
The work attitude of employees plays an extremely important role in transforming their 
work ability into work performance. Therefore, it is an important means to promote 
employees' achievement of performance goals by guiding employees to improve their work 
attitude through evaluation of work attitudes. The assessment of work attitude is usually 
conducted from the following four dimensions, see Table 4-3.  
 
 
 
Work Ability Work Performance 
Work Attitude 
Other human factors and various external factors 
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Table 4-3 Dimension Table for Employee's Work Attitude Evaluation 
Evaluation Dimension Definition 
Coordination Having collective spirit and organizational concepts  
Enthusiasm 
Actively participating in the improvement of the work program; 
Putting forward valuable suggestions  
Sense of responsibility 
responsible for the work and undertaking the responsibilities in the 
work  
Awareness of self-
improvement 
Efforts to improve self abilities and challenge the higher goals  
 
The evaluation of employees' work attitudes is different from the evaluation of work ability. 
The attitude evaluation does not consider the rank, or ability of the employees, but only 
evaluates whether employees work hard and whether they have higher awareness of self-
improvement in their work.  
 
4.2.3 Effect of Employee Performance Evaluation Results  
(1) Promoting employees' work performance and work ability  
The results of performance evaluation can be used to improve employees' work 
performance and job skills. By finding out employees' difficulties in completing their work 
and gaps in their work skills, staff development plans and training plans can be formulated 
accordingly.  
(2) Providing the basis for employee bonuses and salary raise  
The results of performance evaluation can fairly measure the employees' contributions to 
the company, and in this way, employees' bonuses and salaries can be adjusted.  
(3) Promoting reasonable arrangements of staff positions  
The evaluation results of employee performance can explain to a certain extent whether 
the employees adapt to the existing positions, so that the corresponding personnel changes 
can be determined according to the degree of employee performance higher or lower than the 
standards, and the qualified employees can be arranged in suitable positions.  
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4.2.4 Evaluator’s Error in Employee Performance Evaluation  
In order to objectively and impartially evaluate the employees’ performance, both the 
evaluator and the evaluated employee must meet higher requirements. For evaluators, they 
are required to be relatively objective in the evaluation; for the evaluated employees, since 
their immediate interests will be closely linked with the results of the evaluation, they hope 
to be evaluated in a more fair manner. However, it is not realistic for the evaluator to be 
completely objective because the evaluator's personal feelings will play a greater role in the 
evaluation process and inevitably incorporate some subjective factors; it is also not realistic 
to design a performance evaluation system that satisfies all employees, because any 
evaluation system may make some employees feel relatively unfair. In the evaluation process, 
there will be a variety of evaluator errors which cannot be completely avoided, but can only 
be reduced by some measures.  
(1)  Halo effect  
The American psychologist Thorndike found out from the results of psychological 
experiments that an evaluator tends to act on a subjective impression when assessing a person 
so that the evaluation result tends to be higher or lower, and this phenomenon is named halo 
effect. It shows that in the evaluation process, the evaluator is often influenced by one highly 
rated indicator of the evaluated person and tends to overestimate other indicators, and vice 
versa.  
(2) Logical error  
Logical error is the error caused by simple reasoning when the evaluator evaluates some 
elements with logical relations. The essential difference between the halo effect and the logic 
error is: The former's error only works among the index characteristics of the same evaluated 
person, and in performance evaluation, it will appear when evaluated each indicator 
characteristic of the same person, while the latter has nothing to do with the person being 
evaluated, and it is generated for the reason that the evaluator thinks that there is a consistent 
logical relationship between evaluation indicators.  
(3) Leniency and severity errors  
Leniency error refers to the evaluator's unreasonably high evaluation toward the evaluated 
person. This error may affect the enthusiasm of employees and cause negative feelings of 
demotivation. The above two errors can be controlled by the following two methods: First, 
control the distribution of evaluation results, which requires a certain percentage of 
"excellent", "good", "qualified" and "failed" employees; Another method is to reduce the 
fuzzy definition of the evaluation indicator itself, so that the evaluator will conduct the 
evaluation according to a clear rating standard.  
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(4) Central effect  
The central effect means that the evaluator may make evaluations that are neither too good 
nor too bad for all person evaluated to avoid the extremes of evaluation, and unconsciously, 
move toward the middle level of all evaluators. Such performance evaluation obviously 
cannot distinguish the person evaluated. It can neither provide help for the formulation of 
management decisions nor provide pertinent advice on personnel training.  
(5) Recency error  
Recency error is also known as recency bias, which means that the evaluator only evaluates 
the person based on their recent performance. This means that the performance of the 
evaluated person in the final stage of the evaluation period determines their performance 
during the whole period, especially when the person evaluated have achieved good results or 
have made mistakes recently, this will cause the evaluator make too high or too low 
evaluation.  
 
4.2.5 Control Measures for Evaluator Errors  
(1) Train evaluators  
Through training, evaluators are made fully aware of the existence of various errors so that 
they can consciously reduce these errors. At the same time, the evaluators are required to 
learn through training to consciously collect the factual basis needed in the evaluation process 
and correct their attitudes.  
(2) Clearly define evaluation indicators and standards  
With clearly defined performance evaluation indicators and standards, the evaluators can 
make pertinent evaluations according to definitions of the indicators to be evaluated, so as to 
avoid compromising the evaluation on overall performance with improper views on a 
particular inspection of the performance.  
(3) Select the appropriate evaluation method.  
Each evaluation has pro and con. For example, although the ranking method can 
effectively reduce the central effect, if the performances of the evaluated are all excellent, 
the ranking method tends to cause the evaluator to be psychologically unbalanced. Therefore, 
appropriate evaluation methods should be selected according to the specific conditions such 
as the evaluation object and the evaluation purpose.  
(4) Determine a reasonable evaluation period.  
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The selection of evaluation period has an important impact on the evaluation results. The 
evaluation period should not be too long, or too short. Since one of the objectives of employee 
performance evaluation is to promote the improvement and development of employee work, 
if the evaluation period is too long, it is neither conducive to finding and correcting problems 
in a timely manner, and not conducive to the implementation of incentive measures; however, 
if the evaluation period is too short, the merits and demerits of the evaluated may not be fully 
demonstrated, which is not conducive to achieving the purpose of evaluation.  
 
4.2.6 Matters Needing Attention in Employee Performance Evaluation 
(1) The attention of the top management 
Performance evaluation is a work that requires mobilizing all of the company's resources. 
Without support from top management, performance evaluation will inevitably fail to 
achieve good results. Therefore, top management should be aware of their important role in 
the establishment and implementation of employee performance evaluation systems, and 
give full support to specific executive departments.  
(2) Establish an open feedback mechanism 
In many companies, employees were initially enthusiastic about performance evaluation, 
which usually would not last long. The important reason for this situation is that the 
performance evaluation system has not been established with a feedback mechanism. If 
employees do not see the significance of performance evaluation, they will not actively 
participate in the entire process of performance evaluation.  
(3) Link performance evaluation results with remuneration  
The evaluators and the evaluated of some companies do not attach importance to 
performance evaluation, merely regarding it as certain formality, the most important reason 
of which is that the results of performance appraisal do not directly affect the immediate 
interests of employees. The performance evaluation can only exert its true value when the 
enterprise has established a link between the results of employee performance and their 
salaries.  
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4.3 Employee Performance Evaluation System for State-owned Enterprises 
4.3.1 Characteristics of State-owned Enterprises' Employee Performance  
The employee performance of state-owned enterprises is characterized with multiple 
factors, multi-dimensionality, and dynamism. Understanding the factors and characteristics 
that affect the employee performance of state-owned enterprise has important guiding 
significance for designing a scientific and reasonable performance evaluation index system.  
(1) The multiple causes of employee performance  
The performance of employees in state-owned enterprises is the result of their working 
environment, their own ability level and incentive factors provided by enterprises. Among 
them, the work environment is an external factor that affects employee performance, which 
mainly includes the internal environment and the external environment. The internal 
environment, which consists of internal organizational structure, rules and regulations, 
corporate culture, employee workplace facilities and equipment, directly affects the 
performance of employees. The external environment consisting of social economic 
conditions, market competition intensity, and labor market conditions will have an indirect 
impact on employee performance. The ability level of employees will directly influence the 
performance of their duties. The level of ability is related to personal intelligence, education 
degree, experience and other factors. Meanwhile, the training of employees can also improve 
their working ability and work performance. Incentives mainly refer to the enthusiasm of the 
employees' work determined by the internal environment of the company and the work 
attitude of the employees. Incentives are the psychological basis for ensuring employees to 
create good performance, which depends on the characteristics of employees' needs, values, 
etc., among which the demand structure has the greatest impact. Among the various incentive 
measures, the distribution of salary and bonus and job adjustment that are related to 
performance are the most direct incentives.  
(2) Multiple dimensions of employee performance  
Employee performance includes the fulfillment of job responsibilities, the quality and 
efficiency of work tasks, and many other aspects. As state-owned enterprises in China 
continue to raise their knowledge levels and knowledge requirements, the overall quality and 
knowledge level of the employees of state-owned enterprises is developing to a higher level. 
Under this trend, employee performance reflects multi-dimensional characteristics. Although 
employees’ direct completion of work tasks at their posts constitutes a major aspect of their 
performance, when measuring employee performance, the work efficiency of employees, 
communication and collaboration with other colleagues, and the sense of teamwork and 
cooperation of employees also need to be considered.  
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(3) The dynamism of employee performance  
The dynamism of employee performance is mainly reflected in the fact that performance 
content changes with the development of state-owned enterprises and the adjustment of 
employees' work content. With changes in the socio-economic situation, market competition, 
as well as the internal environment of the state-owned enterprises, the levels of employees' 
capabilities and incentives taken by companies, employee performance will change 
accordingly. Therefore, these dynamism should be reflected in designing the index system 
of employee performance evaluation.  
 
4.3.2 Principles of Constructing Performance Evaluation Indicator System for 
Employees in State-owned Enterprises  
(1) Reflecting work performance and comprehensive quality concurrently  
The evaluation index system must not only reflect the work performance of employees, 
but also reflect their overall quality. There is a complementary relationship between work 
performance and the overall quality of employees. The overall quality is the basis for 
employees to create work performance. At the same time, the work performance is a direct 
reflection of the overall quality of employees in their work. If the comprehensive quality of 
employees is improved, it will directly promote employees' performance.  
(2) Combination of long-term and short-term incentives  
One of the purposes for employee performance evaluation is to motivate employees to 
improve their performance, and the employee performance consists of short-term 
performance and long-term working ability. The purpose of the so-called short-term 
incentives is to improve current performance; the purpose of long-term incentives is to 
improve the overall quality and ability of employees.  
(3) Combining qualitative indicators with quantitative indicators  
When designing the evaluation index system, qualitative indicators should be combined 
with quantitative indicators, and quantitative measures should be applied to certain 
qualitative indicators. The posts of employees in state-owned enterprises can be divided into 
two categories according to their nature: One category is non-management staff, such as 
manufacturing workers, office workers, etc.; the other category is management positions, 
such as employees engaged in planning, finance, strategy and other related work. The 
former's work performance is easy to quantify and easy to set quantitative indicators; work 
performance of the latter is difficult to quantify and usually described by using qualitative 
indicators. However, in order to be able to use quantitative mathematical methods to evaluate 
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the status of the evaluated subjects reflected by each indicator, it is necessary to quantify the 
qualitative indicator points in some way.  
 
4.3.3 Employee Performance Evaluation Index System of State-owned Enterprises  
(1)  Staff performance evaluation index system  
Based on the above principles, this thesis designs a performance evaluation index system 
for state-owned enterprise employees based on the four aspects of employee performance 
evaluation, work ability evaluation, job potential evaluation, and work attitude evaluation, as 
shown in Table 4-4.  
Table 4-4 Staff Performance Evaluation Index System 
Input indicators Output indicators 
Index names Expression Index names Expression 
Wages I1 
Degree of task 
completion 
O1 
Post level I2 Quality of the 
completed tasks 
completed 
O2 
Training costs I3 Complete efficiency of 
work task 
O3 
Education I4 Team awareness and 
cooperation 
O4 
Working years on the 
current post 
I5 Communication skills O5 
Work experience. I6 Coordination ability O6 
 
Among the input indicators, the four indicators including salary level, training cost, current 
job duration, and work experience are all quantitative indicators while the job level and 
education level, although belonging to qualitative indicators, they can be easily quantified. 
Positions in state-owned enterprises can be divided into four levels: The first-line basic level 
staff, basic level management staff, middle-level management staff, and senior management 
staff, whose indicator values are set as: 3, 5, 7, and 9. The qualifications of employees can 
be divided into the following categories according to the educational qualifications of China: 
junior college graduate, undergraduate, master, and doctor, their indicator values are also set 
as 3, 5, 7 and 9.  
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In the output indicators, except for the completion index of the work task, which is a 
quantitative indicator, the remaining five indicators are qualitative indicators. The same 
method is used to quantify the five indicators: Each indicator is scored by employees 
themselves and between employees and superiors. The score range is 1-100, and the final 
score value of the performance quality of the work task and the completion efficiency of the 
work task is equal to the weighted value of the evaluation subject score of the three parties 
with the weight of 10%, 10% and 80%, respectively. The final score values of the team 
awareness and cooperation spirit, communication ability, and coordination ability index are 
equal to the weighted value of the tripartite evaluation subject scores of 10%, 40%, and 50%, 
respectively.  
(2) Instructions for data acquisition of employee performance evaluation indicators 
The evaluation values of the specific indicators set in the employee performance 
evaluation index system will come from different evaluation subjects during the evaluation, 
and the data used in the models to be built later in this chapter are the comprehensive scores 
given by the evaluation entities, see Table 4-5.  
Table 4-5 Summary of Data Preprocessing for Employee Performance Evaluation 
Indicators 
                                                           Evaluation Date _               
Name of the 
evaluated 
person 
Evaluation index (input) Evaluation index (output) 
I1 I2 I3 
I4 
I5 
I6 
I4 
I4 
I5 
I6 
I5 
I4 
I5 
I6 
I6 
I4 
I5 
I6 
O1 
O2 
O2 
O2 
O3 
O2 
O4 
O2 
O5 
O2 
O6 
O2 1 
            
2             
3             
             
                                 Person responsible for data processing:                     
Input evaluation indicators of the evaluated person in the above table are directly 
provided by the relevant person in charge of the human resources management department, 
as shown in Table 4-6.  
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Table 4-6 Data Table of Employee Performance Evaluation Input Indicators 
Name of 
evaluator 
Evaluation index (input) 
Wages Post level Training costs Educati
on 
Working years on 
the current post 
Work experience 
1       
2       
3       
       
Data provided by: 
 
Continued (Table 4-6) 
Data Instruction: 
Corresponding values to all the post levels: 
Front-line basic level staff  Basic level management staff Middle level management staff  
Senior management staff 
        3                5                  7                    9  
Corresponding values to all the education levels 
Junior college        Bachelor’s degree       Master’s degree     Doctoral degree 
       3                 5                  7                    9 
 
The final numerical values of the evaluation indicators of the evaluated in Table 4-5 are 
derived from the evaluation values of the indicators by the employees themselves, between 
the employees, and by the superiors, as indicated in Table 4-7.  
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Table 4-17 Data Table of Employee Performance Evaluation Output Indicators 
 
(3) The performance evaluation index system constructed in this paper for employees 
of state-owned enterprise has the following characteristics: On the one hand, the evaluation 
system covers all aspects of employee performance, including work performance, work 
ability, job potential, and work attitude. All aspects have set corresponding indicators for 
evaluation so as to provide a more comprehensive reflection of employees' performance over 
a certain period. On the other hand, in order to reflect the matching evaluation of investment 
and output in employee performance evaluation, it not only sets indicators reflecting the input 
of enterprises and employees themselves, but also sets indicators reflecting the output of 
employees, which provides a clear direction for enterprises to improve their management and 
employees to improve themselves.  
 
4.3.4 Process Design for Employee Performance Evaluation of State-owned 
Enterprises  
(1) Evaluation period  
The evaluation period of employee performance of state-owned enterprises runs from the 
beginning to the end of each fiscal year. Evaluation work begins at the end of the previous 
fiscal year and ends within the first month of the new fiscal year.  
(2) Evaluation department  
Name of the evaluated person: Evaluation Date 
Evaluator Evaluation index (output) 
Name Job title 
Degree of 
work task 
completion 
Weights 
Quality of 
work task 
completion 
Efficiency 
of work 
task 
completion 
Weights 
Team 
awareness 
and 
cooperation 
Communication 
skills 
Coordination 
ability 
Weights 
1 (superior)  100%   80%    50% 
2 (self) — —   10%    10% 
3 
(Employees 
at the same 
level) 
    10%    40% 
Weighted rating          
Data processed by 
Data instruction:  
1. The scores of the six indicators are all between 1 and 100;  
The degree of the work task completion is directly determined by the superior.  
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The employee performance evaluation in state-owned enterprises needs the participation 
and cooperation of all departments and employees. Since the employee performance 
evaluation results will be linked to the salary of each employee, the Department of Human 
Resource Management in the enterprise shall be responsible for organizing the annual 
employee performance evaluation.  
(3) Evaluation process design  
The employee performance evaluation in state-owned enterprises can be completed 
according to the process shown in Figure 4-4.  
 
4.4 Introduction to Evaluation Models  
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) was originally developed by A. Chames, W.W. 
Cooper and E. Rhodes in 1978. It is an approach using linear programming techniques to 
conduct effective evaluation on relative efficiencies of homogeneous economies of multi-
indicator inputs and multi-indicator outputs. The basic idea is: Each evaluation object is 
regarded as a decision-making unit (DMU), a number of DMUs constitute evaluation groups. 
The evaluation and calculation are performed by setting the weights of the input and output 
indicators as variables to determine the effective production frontier, and whether DMU is 
DEA effective is determined by the distance between each DMU and effective production 
frontier, and the reasons for non-DEA effective or DEA weak efficiency as well as the 
direction and degree of improvement can be pointed out. The advantage of this method is 
that it can evaluate different dimension indicators, without artificially determining the weight 
of each indicator, and it has a strong objectivity. But there are also obvious drawbacks: When 
multiple DMUs have relative efficiency, they cannot be re-sequenced. In response to this 
defect, Anderson et al. made improvements to the basic model, and in 1993, proposed a 
super-efficiency DEA model. The basic idea is: when evaluating the k0 DMU, the input and 
output indicators of the DMU are replaced by a linear combination of input and output 
indicators of all other DMUs so that the DMU is excluded while the DMU is included in 
DEA basic model. Therefore, effective sequencing of evaluation objects can be achieved.  
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Figure 4-4 Flow Chart of Employee Performance Evaluation in State-owned 
Enterprises 
 
4.4.1 DEA Basic Model  
There are n DMUs of the same type, that is, each DMU has s types of inputs and t types 
of outputs. xir represents the input of the i-th input index of the r-th DMU and yjr represents 
the output of the j-th output index of the r-th DMU. The efficiency calculation of the k-th 
DMU can be transformed into the following linear programming:  
 
 𝑠. 𝑖.   
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 minθ                               
∑𝜆𝑟𝑥𝑖𝑟 + 𝑠𝑖
− = 𝜃𝑥𝑖𝑘
𝑛
𝑟=1
∑𝜆𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑟 − 𝑠𝑗
+ = 𝜃𝑦𝑖𝑘
𝑛
𝑟=1
𝑆𝑗
− ≥ 0, 𝑆𝑗
+ ≥ 0, 𝜆𝑟 ≥ 0
………………… . . (1) 
 
Where, are slack variables. is the efficiency value of the k-th DMU that satisfies 
0≤θ≤1. 
When  , the k-th DMU has DEA efficiency, indicating that the DMU has both technical 
efficiency and scale efficiency. From a technical point of view, in the operation process of 
The end of 
last fiscal 
year 
At the end of 
the first month 
of the current 
fiscal year 
Human resources management department organizes employee performance 
 Data collection 
Some of the index 
values of the evaluated 
person are directly 
provided by the 
human resources 
The score provided 
by the superior 
leader on the 
evaluated person's 
corresponding index 
The score provided 
by the evaluated 
person themselves 
on their own 
corresponding index 
The score provided 
by the peer on the 
evaluated person's 
corresponding index 
Organize and summarize 
Final evaluation value of each indicator for employee performance 
 
Performance evaluation results of each employee 
Feedback of evaluation 
 Formulate performance management improvement plan 
Use the model to implement the evaluation 
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DMU, the resources have been fully utilized, all inputs have reached the best combination, 
and the best output effect has been achieved. The scale efficiency means that the operation 
of DMU is in the best state of returns to scale.  
When k=1, there is at least one 
k
iS

>0, (i=1, 2,…s), or at least one kjS

>0, (j=1, 2,…t) , 
then the DMU is weak DEA efficiency. If 
k
iS

>0, that is to say 
k
iS

of inputs of the i-th 
input index are not fully utilized; If 
k
jS

>0, that is to say there is a difference of 
k
jS

between the j-th index input and the maximum output. Therefore, at this time, the operating 
activities of the DMU do not have technical efficiency and scale efficiency at the same 
time.  
When  k<1 , DMU is not DEA effective, namely, the operation activities of DMU are 
neither technical effective nor scale effective. 
 
4.4.2 Super-efficiency DEA Model 
When the kth DMU efficiency is calculated, the problem can be transformed into the 
following linear programming: 
 
  𝑠. 𝑖.   
{
 
 
 
 
 minθ                               
∑ 𝜆𝑟𝑥𝑖𝑟 + 𝑠𝑖
− = 𝜃𝑥𝑖𝑘
𝑛
𝑟=1,𝑟≠𝑘
∑ 𝜆𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑟 − 𝑠𝑗
+ = 𝜃𝑦𝑖𝑘
𝑛
𝑟=1,𝑟≠𝑘
𝑆𝑗
− ≥ 0, 𝑆𝑗
+ ≥ 0, 𝜆𝑟 ≥ 0
………………… . . (2) 
 
In this model, the maximum proportional value of a DMU that increases its input and 
maintains relative efficiency, is called the super-efficiency value of the DMU, which is also 
used to distinguish the efficiency of the relatively effective DMU. The super efficiency value 
may be greater than 1. The efficiency value of the invalid DMU in the super-efficiency DEA 
model is the same as the efficiency value of the ineffective DMU in the DEA basic model.  
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4.4.3 Advantages of Using the DEA Model to Evaluate Employee Performance  
Using the DEA model to evaluate employee performance has the following advantages. 
First, it does not require artificially setting the weight of performance evaluation indicators, 
so that the influence of subjective factors on the evaluation result is effectively reduced and 
the objectivity of the evaluation result is guaranteed. Second, according to the effective 
production frontier of the solution results, the direction and degree of improvement of the 
evaluation object can be obtained, which provides a basis for enterprises to formulate 
measures to improve employee performance; Third, the use of the super-efficient DEA model 
overcomes the deficiencies in which multiple relatively effective evaluation units cannot be 
further distinguished, thus, a clear division can be made on the performance of employees, 
which is conducive to the design of a reasonable merit-based pay scheme.  
 
4.5 Application of Super Efficiency DEA Model in Employee Performance Evaluation 
in LH Energy Group  
To illustrate the application of the DEA model to the employee performance evaluation 
in state-owned enterprises, this section intends to evaluate the performance of 16 employees 
in a division of A Limited Company, one of the wholly owned subsidiaries of the LH Energy 
Group.  
4.5.1 Establish Index System 
Based on the above-designed index system, the evaluation results of self-assessment, 
peer review, and superior evaluation of employees in the department are integrated to obtain 
the evaluation values of the corresponding indicators of 16 employees, as indicated in Table 
4-8.  
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Table 4-8 Performance Evaluation Indexes of 16 Employees in a Department 
Staff/Index Assessment Index (Inputs) Assessment Index (Outputs) 
I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 
1 2903 3 600 5 3 3 100 79 84 96 68 87 
2 4667 5 2400 5 8 9 70 94 88 76 90 99 
3 1918 3 1900 3 2 2 96 64 69 91 85 69 
4 5992 7 2900 5 4 9 75 97 83 82 91 95 
5 4417 7 1700 5 6 10 76 93 90 97 83 80 
6 6174 5 800 7 8 8 90 69 67 93 97 74 
7 7292 7 700 9 3 3 97 74 81 95 69 95 
8 2524 3 600 3 4 6 98 91 84 92 87 94 
9 1895 3 500 3 1 2 74 91 62 83 70 77 
10 5012 5 2700 7 9 9 87 79 85 93 94 82 
11 3683 3 600 5 3 4 96 72 60 92 83 62 
12 2316 3 500 3 7 7 94 95 68 87 66 61 
13 5211 7 1200 5 5 5 95 80 89 97 88 84 
14 6782 9 2200 5 12 14 95 92 70 89 82 75 
15 6028 7 2600 9 7 7 94 70 92 96 89 76 
16 7691 9 1700 7 4 5 90 82 86 87 64 95 
 
4.5.2 Modeling and Solving 
According to formula (1) and (2) in 4.4, the basic DEA evaluation model and super-
efficiency DEA evaluation model of the employee performance of the department are 
established, respectively. This thesis uses software DEA-Solver and EMS to solve the above 
models, respectively. The results are shown in Table 4-9, Figure 4-5, and Table 4-10.  
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Table 4-29 Results Obtained from DEA Basic Model for Employee Performance 
Evaluation 
DMU Score 
11 
S-(1) 
12 
S-(2) 
13 
S-(3) 
14 
S-(4) 
15 
S-(5) 
16 
S-(6) 
O1 
S+(1) 
O2 
S+(2) 
O3 
S+(3) 
O4 
S+(4) 
O5 
S+(5) 
O6 
S+(6) 
1 1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0.6519 402 0 865 0 1 0 34 4 0 23 2 0 
3 1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0.6895 1645 1 1161 0 0 2 25 3 0 19 0 1 
5 0.6661 233 1 481 0 0 1 29 8 0 4 11 22 
6 0.8362 2349 1 0 3 2 0 19 32 27 10 0 31 
7 0.9037 4003 3 0 4 1 0 0 32 0 9 15 1 
8 1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 0.6505 622 0 894 1 2 0 19 15 4 7 0 16 
11 1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 0.7798 1392 2 0 0 1 0 13 33 0 15 11 20 
14 0.6003 1596 2 744 0 2 2 2 0 10 2 0 11 
15 0.5097 187 0 0 0 0 0 22 19 0 15 3 20 
16 0.5767 1850 1 0 0 1 0 15 35 0 27 34 8 
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Figure 4-15 Employee Performance Evaluation Results 
 
Table 4-10 Results Obtained from Super-efficiency DEA Mode for Employee 
Performance Evaluation 
 
DMU Score 
1 123.76% 
3 129.73% 
8 130.81% 
9 318.18% 
11 106.65% 
12 118.35% 
When using the super-efficiency DEA model for evaluation, the score of the weak DEA 
effective decision-making unit does not change, so only the evaluation results of the six DEA 
effective decision-making units under the model are listed here.  
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4.5.3 Analysis of Evaluation Results  
According to the scores of the evaluation units and the values of the slack variables shown 
in Table 4-9, it can be estimated that : Among the 16 employees, the performance evaluation 
results of 6 employees are DEA efficient, that is, the input for these employees achieves the 
best combination and the output is in the best condition, and the 6 employees are employee 
1, 3, 8 ,9, 11, and 12; The performance evaluation results of the remaining 10 employees are 
all non-DEA efficient, that is, the inputs in these employees have not reached the optimal 
combination and their outputs have not reached the best status. The 10 employees are ranked 
7,6,13,4,5,2,10,14,16,15 according to their performance from good to bad. At the same time, 
the direction and degree of employee performance improvement can be derived, which to a 
certain extent, provides managers with reference for appropriate management measures. For 
example, through numerical analysis of the slack variables in employee 2's performance 
evaluation results, it can be concluded that the employee did not make good use of the 
company's input in salary, training, and work experience, thus the employee's completion 
degree of work tasks, work quality, team spirit, cooperative spirit and communication skills 
need to be improved. Obviously, the DEA basic model cannot be used to further evaluate 6 
employees who are DEA efficient.  
As the evaluation results shown in Table 4-10, the application of the super-efficiency DEA 
model solves the problem that the effective evaluation unit of DEA cannot be further 
distinguished. From the scores, it can be concluded that the performance of the 6 employees 
with DEA efficiency from good to poor is 9, 8, 3, 1, 12 and 11.  
 
4.6. Performance Evaluation and Optimization of Various Sectoral Enterprises of the 
State-owned Enterprise Group  
4.6.1 Selection of Evaluation and Optimization Methods  
In order to solve the performance evaluation and optimization of various sectoral 
enterprises of state-owned group, a powerful mathematical model and method is required to 
quantitatively analyze it, while the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a very suitable 
method for such purpose.  
As an excellent model with characteristics of fewer indicators, high sensitivity and high 
reliability, DEA model has been favored and adopted by more and more experts and scholars 
and since it was put forward in 1978 (such as Charnes and Cooper 1985; Seiford and 
Thrall,1990). Moreover, it has absorbed the core competence theory in other disciplines such 
as econometrics and advanced mathematical statistics to perfect its own model, and through 
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the establishment of "production frontier", compared the returns to scale and relative 
efficiency of each decision so as to determine the optimization of overall efficiency. 
Recent research advances in the study of DEA models were the publications of three 
articles in September 2004 by Gattoufi in the Journal of the Operational Research Society, 
Socio-Economic Planning Sciences magazines, which are about the latest investigation on 
DEA research. Gattuofi and others set forth the publication and scope expansion of DEA 
articles and magazines from 1978 to 2001, and found that the numbers of DEA articles and 
magazines had been increasing year by year, and the number of countries and regions 
applicable to DEA had also been increasing year by year. This was particularly true between 
1999 and 2001. It can be seen that as an excellent research planning model for decision-
making efficiency, DEA model had been given more and more attention and its application 
field had been gradually expanding with the passage of time.  
As an excellent evaluation tool, DEA only need to determine the clear input and output, 
and the efficiency comparison of each evaluation unit can be obtained. It is very convenient 
for its users, but at the same time we should also note: In practical operation, DEA is often 
limited due to its assumed rigidity, and for these defects, we should develop and extend 
various DEA models such as C2R, BC2, FG and ST models, in addition to confidence region 
model and super-efficiency DEA model. However, the DEA models used in China are limited 
to 10 or so models such as CCR, BCCs, cost efficiency and Malmquist index. In fact, the 
DEA models have reached more than 140 types. The space for DEA applications is still vast. 
It is also very important to introduce new innovative theories into Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA). We are delighted to see that many experts and scholars are devoting 
themselves to the research in this field, and are looking for new and effective theories and 
methods of performance evaluation techniques. In practice, we can comprehensively apply 
data envelopment analysis and other methods to solve different specific problems, and 
establish a synthetic evaluation and evaluation optimization model based on practical 
problems, which can advance the theory of data envelope analysis and at the same time plays 
an extremely important role in its development and theoretical innovation, and will surely 
bring about high practical value.  
 
4.6.2 Research on DEA Modeling  
4.6.2.1 Overview of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)  
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a non-parametric frontier efficiency analysis method 
developed by A. Charnes and W.W. Cooper on the basis of "relative efficiency evaluation". 
This method is often applied to the management and evaluation of production and life, 
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efficiency and decision-making among corporate departments. The data envelopment 
analysis is used to estimate the effective production frontier on the basis of a set of input-
output observations. It can be used to determine whether the corresponding point of the 
evaluated decision unit is on the frontier of the production possibility set (production frontier). 
Therefore, DEA method can be used to study the relative efficiency evaluation of various 
schemes, and currently has become an effective analysis tool in the fields of management 
science and systems engineering. It evaluates a group of "sectors" or "units" with multiple 
inputs and outputs (called Decision Making Unit (DMU), which is mainly realized through 
mathematical programming. A large number of DMUs are used to form evaluation sets, 
analyze and compare the relative efficiency, and based on the observed data of DMUs, 
whether each DMU is DEA efficiency is determined so as to determine the "effective 
production frontier". According to the distance between each DMU and the efficient 
production frontier, the DEA efficiency of DMUs is determined, besides, projection method 
can be used to point out the direction and extent of the reasons for non-DEA effective or 
weak DEA efficient of DMU.  
Generally speaking, the data envelopment analysis is suitable for synthetic evaluation of 
multi-output and multi-input efficiency. It can give a definite evaluation of efficiency by 
calculating the effective value of each evaluation unit with mathematical programming 
model based on the input-output data and evaluating whether it is DEA efficiency or weak 
DEA efficiency. It has the absolute advantage in dealing with the effectiveness evaluation of 
multi-output and multi-input.  
Because DEA characteristically does not need any weight hypothesis, compared with other 
decision prioritizing methods such as Analytic Hierarchy Process or Delphi that would 
require construction of judgment matrix or assumption of weights, it avoids the interference 
of subjective factors and effectively simplifies the calculation and reduces the errors, which 
has become the biggest advantage of data envelopment analysis. In addition, because it is not 
dimensionally considered, its application in practical production and life and decision 
analysis is very wide and convenient, and we can also use DEA projection method to give 
reasons for non DEA efficiency or weak DEA efficiency and the direction and the extent of 
improvement. It has very clear economic management significance and provides clear 
management information for the competent authorities of enterprises.  
The DEA method does not synthesize the data directly, so the optimal efficiency index of 
the decision making unit is independent of the dimension selection of the input index value 
and the output index value. It is not necessary to do dimensionless processing (of course, it 
can be done) before modeling with DEA method. When the magnitude order of  each of 
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input and output indicators is large, we can usually standardize the evaluation indicator for 
the convenience of programming solution.  
With its fewer indicators, high sensitivity and reliability, the decision method of Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) can be used to analyze the indicators which cannot be priced 
or whose weight cannot be easily determined. And each indicator to be measured can appear 
in its original form, does not need to unify the units, greatly simplifies the measurement 
process, guarantees the integrity of the original information, and avoids the subjective 
influence of the artificial determination of the weight. The DEA can comprehensively 
evaluate the relative efficiency of the same type of units with multi-indicator input and multi-
indicator output, and does not need any functional hypothesis between variables. It is 
especially suitable for the evaluation and comparison between units of the same nature 
(Athanassopoulos and Giokas 1997: Athnaassopoulos and KkarZais 1997: Athnaassopoulos 
and My lono Poulus, 1997). These advantages have allowed DEA method to be widely used 
in all kinds of organizations, individuals, enterprises and institutions. These areas of 
application include education, health care, banking, life insurance, the military, auditing, 
market research, retail trade, organizational effectiveness, transport, housing rental and 
manufacturing, etc.The industries involved relate to all aspects of the national economy and 
people's livelihood. At present, its application fields are still expanding.  
 
4.6.2.2 Establishment of DEA Model  
Description of the problem solved by Data Envelopment Analysis: There are n departments 
or units, called n evaluation units, and each evaluation unit has m kinds of "inputs" (indicating 
the department's consumption of "resources") and P kinds of "outputs" (indicating the 
amount of effective information after the department consumes "resources"), which are 
denoted with different economic indicators. Thus, an evaluation system with multiple 
indicator inputs and multiple indicator outputs for n evaluation units is constituted, as shown 
in Figure 4-6:  njDMUj ,...,2,1  
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Figure 4-6 Evaluation System for n Evaluation Units 
 
Where:  
xijdenotes the i-th input index of the evaluation unit, DMUj , 0ijx   
yrjdenotes the r-th input index of the evaluation unit, DMUj, 0rjy  . 
videnotes the weight coefficient of the i-th input index, 0iv   ;  
①  Determination of the DMU of N similar evaluation units.  
The determination of evaluation unit DMU is the first step to solve the decision problem 
with DEA method. We should note that when selecting DMU, we should select homogeneous 
units, that is, the selected departments and industries have the same nature as the overall 
evaluation objectives, and roughly equal degree of influence. At the same time, the input and 
output indicators of each selected department must be the same, otherwise the DEA cannot 
be calculated. Comparative evaluation between sectors with equal conditions and equal status. 
In the practical process, we can use the knowledge of other disciplines to classify and 
evaluate, such as clustering analysis in statistics for grouping judgment and evaluation.  
②  Selection of input-output indicators  
（Input） 
（Output） 
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As the DEA method does not have strict requirements for input and output price 
information, the weights of input and output variables are generated with mathematical 
planning on the basis of sample data, independent of human subjective factors. Therefore, it 
is suitable for evaluating the production efficiency of decision-making units with multiple 
inputs and outputs. Scientifically and rationally selecting input and output indicators is very 
important for the effective use of the DEA model. According to the basic variables of the 
function, the input-output indicators of different industries should be selected and measured 
from different directions and perspectives. However, in practical operation, we should pay 
attention to many problems in selecting input-output indicators, such as the data authenticity, 
reliability, availability, and the impact of the index data on the overall objective decision. In 
view of this, we should learn from the knowledge of other disciplines, such as hypothesis 
testing in statistics to help us identify the effectiveness of indicator selection and so on.  
③  Selection of the model type (commonly used 2 2C ,BCR )  
In actual process of multi-sector decision-making and development model optimization, 
DEA has various kinds of models such as C2R, BC2, FG and ST to address different aspects 
and different directions of problems. In actual practice, we usually involve C2R and BC2.  
 
C2R model:  
vi represents the weight coefficients of the i-th input-index 0( 1,2,..., )iv i m  , ur 
represents the weight coefficients of the r-th output-index, 0(r 1,2,...,p)ru   , xij and yrj 
represent the component weights of 1 2( , ,..., )
T
j j mjx x x x and 1 2( , ,..., )
T
j j rjy y y y . We can 
get the data such as historical data and statistical data with various methods, but they must 
satisfy the prerequisite of accuracy. vj and ur are index weight coefficients. In the evaluation 
system shown above, assume the weight coefficient vectors of input index and output index 
are 1 2( , ,..., )
T
mv v v v and 1 2u (u ,u ,..., u )
T
p  respectively. For evaluation unit DMU, its 
efficiency evaluation index is 
1
1
(j 1,..., n)
p
r rj
r
j m
i ij
i
u y
h
v y


 


 
We would like to know the effectiveness of an evaluation unit in all evaluation units, that 
is, whether the efficiency of this evaluation unit is "optimal" compared to other DMUs? We 
set up a model to evaluate it.  
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The most basic C2R model is:  
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
max
P . . 1(j 1,2,..., n)
, 0(i 1,2,..., ; 1, 2,..., p)
p
r rj
r
p
i ij
i
p
r rj
r
p
i ij
i
i r
u y
h
u y
u y
s t
u y
v u m r






 





  



  








 
Matrix form: 
0
0
0
max
P . . 1(j 1, 2,..., n)
0, 0
T
T
T
j
T
j
u y
h
v x
u y
s t
v x
v u




  

  


 
Among them, we can see: Efficiency 1 11
1
1
= (j 1,..., n)
p
T r rj
r
mT
i ij
i
u y
u YInput
h
Output v X
v y


  


, ur is a 
measure, or weight, of the r-th type of output. C2R model is the most basic DEA model, and 
in evaluating any evaluation unit, it is actually carried out relative to other evaluation units, 
so the DEA efficiency evaluation performed with this model is an evaluation of relative 
efficiency.  
Since it is a fractional programming, we can use the Charnes-Cooper transformation.  
 
Make: 01/ ( ), ,
Tt v x tv tu     
Transform the model into a linear programming problem for convenient solution.  
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Because the C2R model obtained is a linear programming model, the dual model can be used 
to solve the problem conveniently. The relaxation variables s+and s-are introduced, and then 
make
T
j j   , they can be transformed into :  
0
1
0
1
minV
. .
0(j 1,..., n)
, 0
D
n
j j
j
n
j j
j
j
s t
x s x
D
x s x
s s


 
 





 




 

 
  


 




 
where relaxation variables 1 2 1 2(s ,s ,...,s ) ; (s ,s ,...,s )
T T
m ps s
          
The difficulty of P model and D model in judging DEA efficiency is to find the optimal 
solution of the above mentioned conditions. In order to solve this problem, the C2R model of 
non-Archimedes infinitesimal ε is introduced, which is improved by perturbation method.  
0
1
0
1
ˆ ˆmin[ ( s s )] V ( )
. .
0(j 1,..., n)
0, 0
T T
D
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j j
j
n
j j
j
j
e e
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D
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  
 


 




 
   



 

 
  


 

 


 
This is the C2R model in the standard DEA evaluation system that we use in the actual 
operation. In the actual operation, we can calculate with it, and obtain the effectiveness of 
each evaluation unit.  
④  For each evaluation unit, the corresponding model is solved, and the validity evaluation 
value is obtained.  
We have obtained the dual model of C2R linear programming model, and added the 
relaxation variables s+ and s-, so we can easily get the solution by linear programming. In the 
practical operation, the solution we will use is s+ and s- through the results of these variables, 
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we can analyze the effectiveness of DMU of each evaluation unit, that is, analyze the 
efficiency of each evaluation unit.  
Under the model:  
Weak DEA efficiency: If the optimal solution of the linear programming problem satisfies: 
VD =1, then the evaluation unit DMU is weak DEA efficiency.  
DEA efficiency: If the optimal solution of the linear programming problem satisfies: VD =1, 
and each of its optimal solution, satisfies 0S S
   ,then the evaluation unit DMU is DEA 
efficiency. At the same time, we should note that in the actual calculation, it is difficult to 
find an effective solution.  
⑤  Analyze its economic and management significance and make adjustments  
DEA model has a wide range of applications and significance in actual production and life. 
It estimates the possible set T according to the reference set of input and output quantities, 
and determines which decision activities of the decision making units are relatively effective. 
That is, how to maintain the same output and reduce the input quantity in the same proportion. 
If the input load cannot be reduced in the same proportion, that is, the optimal solution of (D) 
satisfies :VD =1, then it is an effective production and living activity.  
Analysis of scale returns: The so-called scale returns refer to the ratio of the relative 
percentage of the output increment to the relative percentage of the input increment. In the 
actual operation, our judgment method is:  
When
0
0
1
1
n
j
j





, DMUj0 is the return on scale that remains unchanged;  
When
0
0
1
1
n
j
j





, DMUj0 is the scale return that increases proportionally;  
When
0
0
1
1
n
j
j





, DMUj0 is the scale returns are diminishing proportionally;  
Optimize the DEA decision results with the projection principle:  
According to the "projection principle", when comparing and optimizing the efficiency 
among different sectors, 0 0ˆ ˆ(x , y ) , the projection of 0 0( , )x y  corresponding to the decision 
making unit, where
0 0
0 0
ˆ ,x x s    0 00 0yˆ y s
  actually constitutes a new DEA 
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decision making unit, and the decision making unit is on the production frontier. In other 
words, 0 0ˆ ˆ( , y )x  , as an efficient DEA efficiency a decision making unit can obtain, 
theoretically, it gives the optimizable theoretical range 0 0( , y )x to be optimized to 0 0ˆ ˆ( , y )x . 
The optimizable range of inputs and outputs. The adjustment value of input xj is
jx
s  , 
and the adjustment value of yj is
jy
s  . Based on this, we can calculate the optimization 
value quantitatively.  
Although DEA model has the characteristics of wide range of use, few indices, high 
sensitivity and reliability, in the practical application, we should pay attention to the 
following matters:  
First, when we determine the DMU, we should ensure the homogeneity of the selected 
evaluation objects, that is, the selected department should have the same input-output indices, 
and the selected department or industry, is of the same nature relative to the overall evaluation 
objective, and the degree of influence is roughly equal.  
Second, although DEA model can provide efficiency comparison and optimization among 
different departments, for the departments with same 1  , that is, the departments of same 
DEA efficiency, it is impossible to give its accurate comparison. Its specific comparison 
method will be studied in the later research process.  
 
4.6.3 Application of DEA Method in Evaluation Optimization of Subsidiaries or Affiliated 
Enterprises  
4.6.3.1 The Main Idea of Intersectoral Development Model Optimization  
In fact, a large modern enterprise is a large system, which is made up of multi-sectors with 
their specific connections and combinations. These are the corporate subsystems constituted 
by the functional departments, but at the same time, we also notice that various functional 
departments as subsystems also have their own specific objectives, status and market 
conditions. Although the goal of the subsystem is to serve the goal of the system, of 
subordinate nature, this does not mean that the objectives and development patterns of 
subsystems are always consistent with the objectives of the system. It is certain that the 
development speed and mode of some subsystems will not be consistent with the overall 
development of enterprises.  
As a result of their respective independence and differences in policy making, decision-
making, market and the nature of the work, the development speed and efficiency of the 
departments will not be at the same pace, and the overall development is not coordinated. 
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For large enterprises as a whole, it is bound to cause obstacles to the realization of the overall 
objectives, and to reduce the overall operational efficiency. And the continuous development 
of such situation will inevitably affect the realization of the overall objective of the enterprise. 
The causes of this situation are manifold. Different conditions of each sector, different 
market environment, different national macro policies, and changes in external conditions or 
even differences in the nature of inter-sectoral work will lead to mismatch of efficiency and 
development speed. DEA decision optimization model is an effective method to solve this 
problem.  
Here, the main ideas of DEA decision optimization are: By making DEA decision on the 
enterprises of each sector, the relative validity is determined, and the whole quantitative 
optimization of the enterprises with weak DEA efficiency and non-DEA efficiency is carried 
out with the "projection principle". Because DEA decision has the characteristics of few 
indices, high sensitivity and high reliability, it can objectively evaluate its relative 
effectiveness. Eventually, a relatively satisfactory result can be obtained after systematic 
optimization.  
 
4.6.3.2 General Process of Optimizing Development Model with DEA  
It is relatively simple to use DEA decision making method in the process of optimizing 
development model of subsidiaries or affiliated enterprises. It can be divided into the 
following seven steps:  
Determine the purpose of the evaluation → select the decision-making unit → establish 
the input and output indicator system → select the DEA model → perform the DEA 
evaluation and analysis → adjust the input and output indicator system → obtain the synthetic 
evaluation conclusion and auxiliary decision. This is the general process of optimizing the 
development mode with DEA model. According to these steps, we can use DEA model to 
perform general optimization of the development mode. At this point, we should note: When 
the result of DEA decision evaluation and analysis is not satisfactory, we should adjust the 
index system of input and output. We can use the knowledge in statistics or other disciplines 
to select the index which has a great influence on the overall goal. This shall be adjusted on 
the basis of the adjustment until it is satisfied.  
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4.7 An Empirical Study of DEA on the Application of the Management and Control 
Optimization of State-owned Enterprises  
4.7.1 Basic Data  
According to the "Analysis and Research on the Supervision of State-owned Enterprises 
of Shandong SASAC", this thesis obtains eight kinds of enterprises belonging to the state-
owned group of Shandong SASAC. Total assets, liabilities, owners' equity, operating income, 
total profits, total assets, total liabilities, owners' equity, operating income, total profits, total 
assets and liabilities of coal, iron and steel, automobile and machinery manufacturing, 
transport, trade, investment, gold and pharmaceutical and chemical industries in 2017 Six 
indicators of net profit. See tables 4-11.  
We use statistical methods, such as t-test and F-test, according to the data we get. A variety 
of data selected for the eight categories of ownership enterprises have practical significance 
and have a greater impact on the development of six data DEA decision optimization models, 
we would not go into details here. Our goal is to make DEA decision optimization decision 
based on each index. We define input metrics: Total assets, liabilities and owner's equity. 
Output indicators: Operating income, gross profit and net profit. According to the actual data, 
the DEA decision model selected is the C2R model of the non-Archimedean infinitesimal ε, 
that is, the perturbation method. This thesis analyzes the efficiency and effectiveness of each 
group company, statistics which block enterprise is DEA efficient and weak DEA efficiency, 
and gives their  , s

, s

through the projection principle, the adjustment value is given, that 
is to say, by reducing income in proportion or improving by management, the output or 
efficiency can be increased, and finally the purpose of DEA effectiveness can be achieved. 
Analysis of its significance in economic management, help decision makers to carry out 
results analysis and auxiliary decision-making. This is of great significance to measure the 
efficiency of enterprises in Shandong Province, to optimize the efficiency of some plate 
enterprises, to optimize the development model of enterprises, and to optimize the 
development model of state-owned group companies, which can be widely used in a variety 
of production or service management, and has a strong practicability and applicability.  
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Table 4-11 Six Index Data of Eight Major Ownership Enterprises under the State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of Shandong Province 
 
Category Total assets Total liabilities Owner's equity Business 
income 
Total profit Net profit 
Coal-mining 
Category 
1798.60 1151.74 646.85 1136.78 135.77 99.98 
Iron and steel 
category 
1178.08 820.45 357.63 900.57 38.19 24.69 
Automobile and 
machinery 
manufacturing 
1028.71 623.09 405.62 833.33 78.97 65.58 
Transportation 
category 
1173.75 833.78 339.96 158.17 22.53 15.52 
Commerce & 
Trade category 
324.17 267.77 56.40 226.25 13.34 9.60 
Investment 
category 
395.65 228.74 166.91 68.30 8.49 7.41 
Gold product 
category 
174.16 116.45 57.71 254.03 9.72 6.56 
Pharmaceutical 
and chemical 
industry category 
133.54 68.52 65.02 97.71 7.42 6.24 
From Table 4-11, we can clearly see that: Because of the obvious differences in the levels 
of the selected data, the eight major categories of enterprises mentioned above, coal, iron and 
steel, automobile and machinery manufacturing, and transportation, do not differ 
significantly in the six indicators selected. However, they are far better than those of trade, 
investment, gold and pharmaceutical, chemical and industrial enterprises, and there are no 
differences among the four major categories of enterprises in these six indicators. Therefore, 
the eight selected indicators can be clearly divided into two categories: coal, iron and steel, 
automobile and machinery manufacturing and transportation enterprises are the first category, 
and coal, iron and steel, automobile and machinery manufacturing and transportation 
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enterprises are the second category. In the actual operation, due to the difference of purpose, 
we divide the DEA calculation process into two parts:  
Part I:  The two kinds of enterprises are respectively used to optimize the DEA decision, 
and the two kinds of enterprises are defined as large scale enterprises and small scale 
enterprises, respectively. Based on this, we can get the relative efficiency evaluation of each 
enterprise in each part of the enterprise. To get which enterprises should be relatively less 
efficient than other enterprises to move the shadow principle, its theoretical adjustment value 
is given through improving the management methods and means so that the output or 
efficiency is increased. Finally, the purpose of DEA efficiency is achieved.  
Part II:  By combining the two parts of enterprises together, that is, the eight major categories 
of enterprises carrying out DEA operations at the same time, we can get the relative efficiency 
among the eight major categories of enterprises. Not only can we get which enterprises are 
relatively less efficient than other enterprises, and make adjustments similar to the first part, 
we can also compare the relative efficiency between large-scale enterprises and small 
enterprises. The relative efficiency of resource allocation and market integration between 
large-scale and small-scale enterprises is analyzed, and it varies in some indicators, which 
will lay a theoretical and data foundation for reforming the development model of large and 
medium-sized state-owned enterprises in the future.  
 
4.7.2 Application of Super-efficiency DEA Method in Comparison of Benefits between 
Enterprises  
Relative indicators for large-scale enterprises: By collating, we get tables 4-12: 
Table 4-12 Relative Indicators for Large Scale Enterprises after Consolidation 
 
Category Total assets Total 
liabilities 
Owner's equity Business 
income 
Total profit Net profit 
Coal-mining Category 1798.6 1151.74 646.85 1136.78 135.77 99.98 
Iron and steel category 1178.08 820.45 357.63 900.57 38.19 24.69 
Automobile and machinery 
manufacturing 
1028.71 623.09 405.62 833.33 78.97 65.58 
Transportation category 1173.75 833.78 339.96 158.17 22.53 15.52 
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Here we see that the order of input and output of each index is large, in order to facilitate the 
solution of linear programming problem, we can improve the standardized treatment of each 
evaluation index.  
1. Calculation of the average value of unit i
10
1
1
,
10
j j ij
i
Z Z Z

   
2. Calculate the standard deviation of unit i
210
1
1
, ( )
10
j j ij j
i
S S Z Z

   
3. Order: Standardized indicators are specified 
. .
. .
' ' /ij ij j jZ Z Z S  
The standardized indicator data is reclassified as a new table. As a new input and output 
index, the DEA model is used to optimize the index.  
As a result, a standardized relative indicator for large-scale enterprises can be obtained, as 
shown in Table 4-13:  
 
Table 4-13 Standardized Data on Relative Indicators for Large-scale Enterprises 
 
Category Total assets Total liabilities Owner's equity Business 
income 
Total profit Net profit 
Coal-mining 
Category 
6.055386 6.08161 5.2493656 3.125132 3.1013 2.9605 
Iron and steel 
category 
3.966268 4.332277 2.9022658 2.475765 0.8723 0.7311 
Automobile and 
machinery 
manufacturing 
3.463381 3.29014 3.2917178 2.290915 1.8038 1.9419 
Transportation 
category 
3.95169 4.40266 2.7588689 0.434827 0.5146 0.4596 
We introduce the method in 4.2.2, that is, C2R model or perturbation method in DEA decision 
model. This thesis analyzes the efficiency and effectiveness of each group enterprise, 
statistics which group enterprise is DEA efficient and weak DEA efficiency, and gives their 
 , s

, s

. For the next step of optimization, the data are detailed in Table 4-14 below:  
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Table 4-14 Standardized Data on Relative Indicators for Large-scale Enterprises 
 
 ө S1- s2- S3- s4+ s5+ s6+ 
Coal-mining 
category 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Iron and steel 
category 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Automobile and 
machinery 
manufacturing 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Transportation 
category 
03157 0.2429 0.3809 0 0.0838 0 0.0317 
Through the DEA efficiency obtained in the table, we can know: Coal, iron and steel, 
automotive and mechanical manufacturing enterprises are equal to 1, so it is at least weak 
DEA efficiency, we also see that the three types of enterprises s+ and s- are all 0, which 
means that they are DEA efficient decision evaluation unit. It shows that in 2009, the 
operation of these three types of large-scale plate enterprises is relatively efficient, the 
operation mode is reasonable, the development model is good, and other enterprises are worth 
learning from the way and method. I will not go into details here. In contrast, the value of 
transportation and transportation enterprises is 0 ~ 3157 < 1. Even less than 0.5 shows that 
transportation enterprises are neither DEA weak efficiency nor DEA efficiency.  
At the same time, we can see from the principle of the C2R model that the size value of the 
sectoral enterprises represents the input-output efficiency. The smaller the value is, the 
smaller the efficiency of the plate enterprise is and the greater the efficiency is. For the less 
than 1 sectoral enterprise, we can not only reduce the input in proportion, but also improve 
the level of operation management through improvement. The improvement of technical 
equipment and other methods are strengthened to increase the output, and finally to achieve 
the effectiveness of DEA. For this example, the zero value of transportation enterprises is too 
small to 1, which shows that the development of transportation enterprises is relatively 
inefficient compared with several other major departments. It can be predicted that its 
operation mode has problems, the development momentum is not good, and some state-
owned enterprise groups are at a disadvantageous position in the competition of traffic and 
transportation market. To this end, we should improve the level of operation and management, 
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strengthen investment in equipment technology and so on. Specifically, we should choose 
which of the six indicators to invest in, and improve the number of goals, which is the role 
that "projection principle" plays.  
The following quantitative improvements are analyzed: By using the "projection principle", 
the input and output values of each indicator are calculated. In this case, the DEA analysis of 
large-scale enterprises, ө< 1 enterprises only transportation enterprises. Through the theory 
of "the principle of projection", we can see that: The relaxation variable that needs to be 
improved is called for. 2429, 0.3809, 0.0838, < 0.0317, not 0. That means: Total assets, total 
liabilities, operating income and net profit still have variable room for improvement, which 
should be greatly improved in the next year. We can optimize the DEA efficiency of 
transportation enterprises through the change of these variables, adjust the value of input xj 
to jx s
 , and the value of output yj to get jy s
 .  
From this we can conclude that theoretically the indicators can be changed to:  
Total assets: (0.3157*3.95169-0.2429) *Sj=298.464  
Total liabilities: (0.3157*4.40266-0.3809) *Sj=191.1225  
Business income: (0.3157*0.434827+0.0838) *Sj=80.41101  
Net profit: (0.3157*0.4596+0.0317) *Sj=5.971246  
Namely: through analysis and calculation, we can optimize the four indicators s

 and 
0s  that don’t satisfy the DEA efficiency by "projection principle", and we can get a 
relatively effective DEA evaluation unit. The practical level of the target evaluation unit is 
given. Through this method, we can make quantitative preparation for the decision makers 
of state-owned group enterprises, which paves the way for the department or even the whole 
group enterprise to optimize the development model of the next stage. In this case, we can 
improve the relative efficiency of transportation enterprises and prepare for the next stage of 
development.  
The second part is the DEA efficiency calculation of the relative indicators of small scale 
enterprises, including trade, investment, gold and pharmaceutical and chemical enterprises.  
Relative indicators for small-scale enterprises: By collating, we get the following as shown 
in Table 4-15:  
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Table 4-15 Relative Indicator Data for Small-scale Enterprises after Consolidation 
 
Category Total assets Total liabilities Owner's equity Business 
income 
Total profit Net profit 
Commerce & 
Trade category 
324.17 267.77 56.4 226.25 13.34 9.6 
Investment 
category 
395.65 228.74 166.91 68.3 8.49 7.41 
Gold product 
category 
174.16 116.45 57.71 254.03 9.72 6.56 
Pharmaceutical 
and chemical 
industry category 
133.54 68.52 65.02 97.71 7.42 624 
Like large scale enterprises, we have standardized treatment of each evaluation indicator. As 
a result, we can obtain the relative indicators of the standardized small-scale enterprises, as 
shown in Table 4-16:  
 
Table 4-16 Standardized Data on Relative Indicators for Small-scale Enterprises 
 
Category Total assets Total 
liabilities 
Owner's equity Business 
income 
Total profit Net profit 
Commerce & 
trade category 
3.0282 3.3102 1.21199 2.8331 5.98 7.3198 
Investment 
category 
3.6959 2.8277 3.58676 0.8553 3.8059 5.65 
Gold product 
category 
1.6269 1.4396 1.24014 3.181 4.3572 5.0019 
Pharmaceutical 
and chemical 
industry category 
1.2474 0.84704 1.39723 1.2235 3.3262 4.7577 
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Similar to large scale enterprises, we use the method introduced in 4.2.2, that is, C2R in DEA 
decision model. Model or perturbation method. This thesis analyzes the efficiency and 
effectiveness of each sectoral enterprise, statistics which sectoral enterprise is DEA efficient 
and weak DEA efficiency, and gives their ,  and .  , s

, s

For the next step of optimization, 
the data are detailed in Table 4-17 below:  
 
Table 4-17 Efficiency and Effectiveness Data for Large-scale Enterprises 
 
 ө S1- s2- S3- s4+ s5+ s6+ 
Commerce & trade 
category 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Investment 
category 
0.4338 0 0 0 0.7023 0.2389 0 
Gold product 
category 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pharmaceutical and 
chemical industry 
category 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Through the DEA efficiency obtained in the table, we can know: Trade, gold and 
pharmaceutical and chemical enterprises are equal to 1, so it is at least weak DEA efficiency. 
We also see that the S+ and S- of these three kinds of enterprises are all 0, which means that 
they are DEA effective decision evaluation units. It shows that in 2017, the operation of these 
three types of large-scale sectoral enterprises is relatively efficient, the operation mode is 
reasonable, the development model is good, and their ways and methods are worth learning 
for other enterprises. I will not go into details here.  
On the other hand, the value of investment enterprises is 0.4338 < 1. Even less than 0.5 
shows that investment enterprises are neither DEA weak efficiency nor DEA efficiency. At 
the same time, through the principle of C2R model in the data envelopment analysis, we can 
know that the value represents the input-output efficiency of the sectoral enterprise. The 
smaller the value 0 is, the smaller the efficiency of the sectoral enterprise is and the greater 
the efficiency is. For the sectoral enterprise with < 1, we can not only reduce the input in 
proportion, but also improve the level of operation management. The improvement of 
technical equipment is strengthened, other methods are used to increase the output, and 
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finally the effectiveness of DEA is achieved. For this example, the value of 0.4338 for 
investment enterprises is too small to 1, which shows that the development of transportation 
enterprises is less efficient than several other small sector enterprises. It can be predicted that 
there are problems in its operation mode, the development momentum is not good, and some 
investment enterprises of state-owned enterprise groups are temporarily at a disadvantageous 
position in the market competition. To this end, we should improve the level of operation and 
management, and strengthen the investment in science and technology intelligence, and so 
on. Specifically, we should choose which of the six indicators to invest in and improve the 
number of goals, which is the role that "projection principle" plays.  
The following quantitative improvements are analyzed: By using the "projection principle", 
the input and output values of each index are calculated. In this case, the DEA analysis of 
large-scale enterprises, ө< 1 enterprises only transportation enterprises. Through the theory 
of "the principle of projection", we can see that: the relaxation variable that needs to be 
improved is
4 0.0838S
  , 5 0.0317S
  . That means: For investment enterprises, there is still 
variable room for improvement of total operating income and profits, which should be greatly 
improved in the next year. We can optimize the DEA efficiency of investment enterprises by 
changing these variables, adjust the input value
jx  to jx s
 , and adjust the output value jy  
to the method of 
jy s
 to get the theoretical optimal value.  
From this we can conclude that theoretically the indicators can be changed to:  
Business income: (0.4338*0.8553+0.7023) *Sj=85.7162  
Total profit: (0.4338*3.8059+0.2389) *Sj=4.2162  
Namely: Through analysis and calculation, we optimize the two indicators (indicators of s

and 0s
  ) which do not satisfy DEA efficiency by "projection principle", and get a 
relatively effective DEA evaluation unit. The practical level of the target evaluation unit is 
given. Through this method, we can make quantitative preparation for the decision makers 
of state-owned group enterprises, which paves the way for the department or even the whole 
group enterprise to optimize the development model of the next stage. In this case, you can 
improve the relative efficiency of investment enterprises and prepare for the next stage of 
development.  
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4.7.3 Application of 3-super-efficiency DEA Method in Overall Optimization of Eight 
Categories of Enterprises  
Two parts of enterprises are combined to carry out operations, that is, eight categories of 
enterprises are combined at the same time for DEA efficiency operations. Two parts of the 
enterprise integrate a total of six indicators for overall optimization.  
The evaluation indexes are processed with standardized
.
.
' /ij j jZ Z S . As a result, we can get 
the standardized  
The relative indicators of each enterprise are indicated in Table 4-18 below:  
Table 4-18 Standardized Data of Six Major Indicators for Eight Categories of 
Enterprises 
  
Category Total assets Total 
liabilities 
Owner's 
equity 
Business 
income 
Total profit Net profit 
Coal-mining 
category 
3.1837 3.0874 3.2556 2.8595 3.1698 3.0783 
Iron and steel 
category 
2.0853 2.1993 1.8 2.2653 0.8916 0.7601 
Automobile 
and machinery 
manufacturing 
1.8209 1.6703 2.0415 2.0962 1.8437 2.0191 
Transportation 
category 
2.0777 2.2351 1.7110 0.3979 0.526 0.4779 
Commerce & 
trade category 
0.5738 0.7178 0.2839 0.5691 0.3114 0.2956 
Investment 
category 
0.7003 0.6132 0.84 0.1718 0.1982 0.2281 
Gold product 
category 
0.3083 0.3122 0.2905 0.639 0.2269 0.202 
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Pharmaceutical 
and chemical 
industry 
category 
0.2364 0.1837 0.3273 0.2458 0.1732 0.1921 
 
Table 4-19 Efficiency and Effectiveness Data for Eight Categories of Enterprises 
 ө S1- s2- S3- s4+ s5+ s6+ 
Coal-mining 
category 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Iron and steel 
category 
0.5994 0 0 0 0 0 0.0459 
Automobile and 
machinery 
manufacturing 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Transportation 
category 
0.3069 0 0 0 0.1974 0 0.03 
Commerce & 
trade category 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Investment 
category 
0.3078 0.0098 0 0.0279 0.065 0.0101 0 
Gold product 
category 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pharmaceutical 
and chemical 
industry category 
0.9505 0.0378 0 0.1075 0 0.0068 0 
In the same way as the above method, we use the method introduced in 4.2.2, that is, the 
model or perturbation method in DEA decision model. This thesis analyzes the efficiency 
and effectiveness of each sectoral enterprise, statistics which sectoral enterprise is DEA 
efficient and weak DEA efficiency, and gives their  , s

, s

. For the next step of 
optimization on the basis of volume, the data are detailed in Table 4-19.  
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Through the whole DEA efficiency operation, we find that the operation results obviously 
vary with the enterprise scale. When the DEA efficiency operation is carried out according 
to the enterprise scale, there is only one department of the enterprise with 1   in each part. 
In the integration of all departments of enterprises after DEA efficiency calculation, we found 
that the effectiveness of the original enterprise is still weak, the efficiency of the two 
departments do not meet the requirements. This is very normal, on the basis of the original 
enterprise sector, the new entry into the effective enterprise sector, will inevitably lead the 
effectiveness of some departments of the original enterprise to the weak effectiveness of the 
enterprise.  
Through the DEA efficiency obtained in the table, we can know: Coal, automobile and 
machinery manufacturing, commerce and gold enterprises are equal to 1, so it is at least weak 
DEA efficiency. We also see that the four categories of enterprises s

 and s

are all 0, which 
shows that they are all DEA effective decision evaluation units. It shows that in 2017, the 
operation of these four types of large-scale group enterprises is relatively efficient, the 
operation mode is reasonable, the development model is good, which are worth learning for 
other enterprises. I will not go into details here. On the other hand, the four types of 
enterprises are less than 1. Even if the value of transportation and investment enterprises is 
not more than 0.5, it shows that transportation and investment enterprises are not DEA weak 
efficiency, much less DEA efficiency. At the same time, through the data envelopment 
analysis of the principle of C2R model, we can see that the value of the size of the group 
enterprises expressed the input-output efficiency. The smaller the value is, the smaller the 
efficiency of the group enterprise is, and the greater the efficiency is. For the group enterprise 
with < 1, we can not only reduce the input by 6, but also improve the management level of 
the transportation company. The improvement of technical equipment is strengthened, other 
methods are used to increase the output, and finally the effectiveness of DEA is achieved. 
For this example, The value of transportation and investment enterprises is really too small 
relative to 1, which shows that transportation and transportation enterprises and two other 
group sector enterprises have developed inefficiently compared with several other small 
sector enterprises. It can be predicted that its operation mode has problem, the development 
momentum is not good, and some state-owned enterprise groups are at a disadvantageous 
position in the competition. To this end, we should improve the level of operation and 
management, strengthen the investment in science and technology intelligence and so on. 
Specifically, we should choose which of the six indicators to invest in, and improve the 
number of goals, which is the role that "projection principle" plays.  
The following quantitative improvements are analyzed: By using the "projection principle", 
the input and output values of each indicator are calculated. In the DEA analysis of large-
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scale enterprises in this case, the enterprises with < 1 are iron and steel, transportation, 
investment and pharmaceutical and chemical enterprises. Through the theory of "the 
principle of projection", we can see that: The relaxation variable that needs to be improved 
is the relaxation variable whose si is not 0 as indicated in the above table. That means: For 
these four categories of enterprises, there is still a lot of variable room for improvement, and 
in the next year, these four categories of enterprises should make great efforts to improve 
these indicators. We can optimize the DEA efficiency of these four categories of enterprises 
by changing these variables, and adjust the value that the input amounts xj to jx s
 , the 
method of adjusting the value of the output amounts yj to the method of jy s
  to obtain 
the theoretically reachable optimal value.  
From this we can conclude that theoretically the indicators can be changed to:  
Iron and steel category  
Net profit: (0.5994*0.7601+0.0459) *Sj=16.29  
Transportation category:  
Business income: (0.3069*0.3979+0.1974) *Sj=127.018  
Net profit: (0.3069*0.4779+0.03) * Sj=5.741  
Investment category:  
Total assets: (0.3078*0.7003-0.0098) * Sj=116.236  
Owner's equity: (0.3078*0.84-0.0279) *Sj=45.831  
Business income: (0.3078*0.1718+0.065) *Sj-46.882  
Total profit: (0.3078*0.1982+0.0101) *Sj=3.046  
Pharmaceutical and chemical industry category:  
Total assets: (0.9505*0.2364-0.0378) *Sj=105.572  
Owner's equity: (0.9505*0.3273-0.1075) *Sj=40.444  
Total profit: (0.9505*0.1732+0.0068) *Sj=7.343  
Business income: (0.4338*0.8553+0.7023) *Sj=85.7162  
Total profit: (0.4338*3.8059+0.2389) *Sj=4.2162  
Namely: Through analysis and calculation, we optimize the two indicators (indicator of s

and 0s
   indicator) which do not satisfy the DEA efficiency by "projection principle", 
and get a relatively effective DEA evaluation unit. The practical level of the target evaluation 
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unit is given. Through this method, we can make quantitative preparation for the decision 
makers of state-owned group enterprises, which paves the way for the department or even 
the whole group enterprise to optimize the development model of the next stage. In this case, 
you can improve the relative efficiency of investment enterprises and prepare for the next 
stage of development. This is organized into the following tables 4-20:  
Table 4-20 Relative Efficiency of Four Categories of Enterprises 
 
 Total assets Total liabilities Owner's equity Business 
income 
Total profit Net profit 
Iron and steel 
category 
     16.29 
Transportation 
category 
   127.018  5.741 
Investment 
category 
116.236  45.831 46.882 3.046  
Pharmaceutical 
and chemical 
industry category 
105.572  40.444  7.343  
Namely: By changing the four indicators which do not satisfy the DEA efficiency through 
the "projection principle", a relatively effective DEA evaluation unit can be obtained. The 
types of indicators which can be improved and optimized as well as the amount of 
optimization achieved in theory are given. Through this method, we can make quantitative 
preparation for the decision makers of state-owned group enterprises. It can effectively 
improve the relative efficiency in the future development model of enterprises in the four 
sectors.  
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4.8 Conclusion  
In this way, we get the relative efficiency among the eight major categories of enterprises. 
We not only get which enterprises are DEA effective and which are DEA ineffective, but 
also compare the relative weight of the efficiency of these enterprises with that of other 
enterprises, and make the corresponding adjustment in theory. It provides a powerful 
quantitative basis for the decision makers of state-owned group enterprises to reform the 
development model in the future.  
More importantly, with this DEA model, we compared the efficiency between large and 
small enterprises, and draw conclusions as follows: Shandong SASAC state-owned large and 
medium-sized enterprises have maintained a relatively balanced development, where the 
development efficiency of each of the two enterprise sectors is slightly smaller than that of 
other enterprises. And the number ө is similar, which shows that in terms of relative 
efficiency of development, the large enterprises and the small and medium-sized enterprises 
are about the same. This shows that under the unified leadership of the State Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission of Shandong Province, the economic 
development of Shandong Province tends to be balanced and stable, and the momentum of 
development is good. But while they have maintained a good momentum of development, 
we also see some problems, for example, the pharmaceutical and chemical industry 
enterprises have already been very close to 1, and the DEA efficiency of pharmaceutical and 
chemical enterprises is very high. Only a little adjustment will be needed to achieve the 
effectiveness of DEA.  
For transport and investment enterprises: In the first part, when large enterprises and the 
small and medium-sized enterprises are analyzed by DEA respectively, the DEA is not 
effective for sectoral enterprises (that is, enterprises in these two sectors), the values of which 
are 0.3157 and 0.4338 respectively in the second part of the analysis. Their values are 0.3069 
and 0.3078 respectively, relatively smaller and relatively lower than the first part, which fully 
shows that their efficiency is really relatively smaller compared with that of other plate 
enterprises, and needs to be improved. Moreover, through the comprehensive DEA analysis 
of the efficiency of the eight major sectoral enterprises, it is not difficult to understand that 
the value is becoming smaller.  
Compared with the multi-decision units, the relative efficiency of the small number of 
decision-making units must be relatively high. The results of this example also fully verify 
the data envelopment analysis in practical work. This paper analyzed and researched on the 
supervision and control of state-owned enterprises of Shandong SASAC in 2017, and has 
obtained data on its eight major categories of enterprises, including coal, iron and steel, 
automobile and machinery manufacturing, transportation, commerce, investment, gold and 
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medicine and chemical industry. This paper analyzed the relative efficiency and the 
theoretical values of the eight sectoral enterprises in 2017, and with its practicability and 
applicability, it will benefit the decision-making and policy formulation of Shandong SASAC 
and its various sectors, and lay a theoretical and practical foundation for large and medium-
sized state-owned enterprises to reform the development model in the future.  
Based on the analysis of the multi-cause, multi-dimensional and dynamic characteristics 
of the performance of state-owned enterprise employees, this paper combines the employees’ 
work performance, work ability, job potential and work attitude in four aspects, and designs 
the performance evaluation indicators for the employees of state-owned enterprises. In the 
system, a basic DEA model and a super-efficiency DEA model for the performance 
evaluation of employees in state-owned enterprises were established. It also evaluated the 
performance of 16 employees in a certain division of the LH Energy Group's wholly-owned 
subsidiary A.  
Its different evaluation results can reflect the aspect that the enterprise needs to adjust as 
an investor, as well as the improvements made by the employee as a subject that accepts 
input. The research results not only provide ideas for state-owned enterprises to formulate 
measures to improve their performance management status, but also provide basis for them 
to design a more reasonable compensation system. In addition, it should be noted that since 
the DEA model evaluates the relative efficiency of the evaluation unit, the scope set by the 
indicator value will affect the overall level of employee performance, and the value range of 
each indicator should be reset in further study as necessary.   
At the same time, this paper introduced the research background of Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) and the current development and research, and elaborates on its application 
and significance in the efficiency evaluation of enterprise groups. The Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) theory was introduced in details, especially the model and its application. 
Through the brief "projection principle" and its application, the results of Data Envelopment 
Analysis were optimized, and the numerical value that can be improved theoretically was 
obtained. This paper briefly introduced the whole process of coordination and optimization, 
which made this paper more practical and applicable. It opened up a new way for enterprise 
decision makers to understand how to evaluate, improve and optimize the efficiency of 
different departments of the enterprise. Based on the actual data of Shandong enterprises in 
2017, this paper evaluated and optimized the efficiency of various departments with DEA 
method, made an empirical analysis as well as the theoretical and economic analysis of the 
actual situation.  
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Chapter 5 Performance Evaluation and Its Optimization for 
Subsidiaries of State-owned Enterprise Groups 
With the gradual improvement of China's market economic system, both the government 
management function and the enterprise supervision mechanism are undergoing changes. In 
accordance with the requirements of establishing a modern enterprise system, most state-
owned enterprises began to have independent legal person status, which means that the state 
no longer has full control over the development of enterprises and instead it implements 
indirect management over ownership of the enterprises through investment, and the 
enterprises gradually become competitive market entities responsible for their own 
management decisions, profits and losses. 
In order to promote the correct decision-making and effective management of the 
company's business operators, it is required to regularly and scientifically evaluate the 
company's operating conditions, management level, and the formation and maintenance of 
its core competitiveness. Therefore, scientific evaluation of the operating performance of 
state-owned enterprises has become an urgent requirement for the transformation of 
government functions and corporate supervision mechanisms.  
At the same time, in the increasingly fierce competition, state-owned enterprise groups 
constantly eliminate some inefficient departments and branches that are harming the overall 
interests of enterprises, and then a competitive economic organization system, which has an 
impact on the national economy and people's livelihood, has been formed to adapt to the 
market economy. Under this background, enterprise decision makers are inevitably faced 
with the requirements that subsidiaries of the state-owned enterprise improve the internal 
efficiency of the company, strengthen the links between various internal departments, 
enhance the relationship between the enterprise and the market as well as its external relations, 
and evaluate the efficiency of production and management services in various sectors of 
state-owned enterprises. Therefore, the enterprise group should not only evaluate the 
efficiency of each section, but also need to give the directions and goals for their optimization, 
in the course of which only through quantitative analysis can the problems of enterprise 
efficiency evaluation and overall optimization be solved in a real sense.  
The following parts will analyze the above two problems and establish the corresponding 
models.  
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5.1 Performance Evaluation for Subsidiaries of State-owned Group 
The accuracy of performance evaluation results is usually affected by three factors: 
whether the design of the performance appraisal indicator system is reasonable, whether the 
appraisal method is appropriate, and whether the indicator data are accurate. Some 
literature[73] pointed out that in the performance evaluation of state-owned enterprises, there 
are problems such as the unconsidered opportunity cost of equity capital, single assessment 
method, and simple technology; other literature[74] introduced the current performance 
evaluation systems: the performance evaluation system based on the Balanced Scorecard and 
the one based on economic rent of ability; some literature[75] also established for China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation a comprehensive performance evaluation system, which 
includes four vertical aspects: financial efficiency, asset operation, debt paying ability and 
development ability, and three horizontal levels: quantification indicators, orientation 
indicators and reference indicators. For determination of indicator weights in the evaluation 
system, the related literature [76] mainly expounds the application of mathematical methods 
such as fuzzy mathematics theory, analytic hierarchy process, entropy weight method, the 
Delphi method, etc. in the process of indicator weight determination.  
According to the performance evaluation system based on Balanced Scorecard, this thesis 
establishes a performance evaluation indicator system for state-owned enterprises by 
enriching specific indicators of various indicators. Based on the theory of fuzzy mathematics 
and combined with Delphi method and entropy weight method, the indicator weights are 
determined so as to conduct the performance evaluation.  
 
5.1.1 Theoretical Basis of Enterprise Performance Evaluation  
Principal-agent theory, stakeholder theory and strategic management theory are the 
theories that have extended significant impacts on corporate performance evaluation.  
(1) Principal-agent theory  
Under the modern enterprise system, the ownership of the enterprise is separated from the 
right of management, and the owner grants the management the decision-making and 
executive rights to by making a contract, so that the management can engage in economic 
activities on behalf of the owner [77]. As a result, the principal-agent relationship is formed 
[78]. According to the stipulations of the contract, the agent should maximize the interests of 
the principal when making business decisions, but the information asymmetry between the 
principal and the agent often results in obvious differences in their pursuits of objectives for 
corporate legal governance: The principal wants to maximize the value of the company, while 
the agent may pursue the appreciation of his own value and the maximization of his own 
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interests [79]. As a result, the agent may consider more about the short-term interests of the 
company for his personal gains but give up those plans which are beneficial to the long-term 
development of the company. In such circumstances, the principal must guide the agent to 
work for his or her best interests by taking some measures. If the medium and long-term 
performance of an enterprise is used as an assessment standard to measure the performance 
of the agent, it can effectively constraint agent’s attempts and behaviors to “consider for 
personal gains”. Therefore, it shows that enterprise performance evaluation is an inevitable 
action for the owner to supervise, restraint and control the management under the principal-
agent relationship. 
(2) Stakeholder theory  
According to the stakeholder theory, modern company is a contractual consortium 
composed of various stakeholders, thus the management’s decisions should be based on the 
interests of all stakeholders in the company [80]. For an enterprise, stakeholders refer to all 
entities and individuals that can affect or be affected by the enterprise, including principals 
(shareholders, creditors, etc.) who have an economic relationship with the enterprise as well 
as enterprise employees, corporate customers, society, and government. The role of 
stakeholder theory for corporate performance evaluation is: Enterprise should reflect the 
expectations of different stakeholders in formulating a performance evaluation indicator 
system. The competitiveness of an enterprise depends on whether it can meet the expectations 
of different stakeholders. However, the expectations of different stakeholders are different. 
Therefore, it is necessary to design a performance evaluation system that can effectively 
measure whether the needs of different stakeholders are satisfied and balanced.  
(3) Strategic management theory  
The term "strategic management" was first proposed by American scholar Igor Ansoff in 
the book From Strategic Planning to Strategic Management in 1976[81]. The subsequent 
research on strategic management has always been a hot topic in the field of corporate 
management. Strategic management includes the process of strategic planning and strategy 
implementation. Strategic planning is the planning for realizing the company's strategic goals 
and is the long-term development direction of the company; Strategic implementation is the 
implementation of the phased tactical objectives of the enterprise serving for its strategic 
target, and a phased realization of the company's goals. For its research, there are broad and 
narrow senses on the macroscopic level. Strategic management in a broad sense refers to the 
use of strategies to manage the entire enterprise, the main representative of which is Igor 
Ansoff; strategic management in a narrow sense refers to the management of corporate 
strategy formulation, control and correction, the main representative of which is the 
American scholar Steiner[82]. In a narrow sense, strategic management theory has a more 
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direct impact on the performance evaluation system, mainly in the four stages of the 
performance evaluation process: the construction stage of the performance evaluation 
indicator system where appropriate performance evaluation indicators are designed by 
analyzing the key success factors of strategic objectives; the stage of process control and 
management where the performance evaluation criteria should be determined when 
formulating strategic system and program, and the performance evaluation indicators should 
be decomposed into departments or individuals; the appraisal and evaluation stage where a 
comparative analysis is conducted between the results of strategic implementation and the 
target performance; the results application stage where the strategy is revised based on the 
results of evaluation.  
 
5.1.2 Balanced Scorecard Evaluation System  
(1) Introduction of the balanced scorecard  
The balanced scorecard was the result of a research project carried out by the Nolan Norton 
Institute in 1990 involving 12 companies for one year. The 12 companies participating in this 
program belonged to the manufacturing and service industries, including high-tech, heavy 
industry and other industries. This study mainly discussed the organization of future 
performance evaluation systems so that the company’s operating performance can be 
simultaneously recognized by the company’s shareholders, employees, and customers. In this 
plan, they developed a set of methods that could turn strategies into actions, and transform 
strategic indicators into the strategy management tool, namely the "balanced scorecard" 
method. This method is a comprehensive performance management system that can 
implement the organizational strategy and objectives, and at the same time, attach importance 
to the results and the process. The balanced scorecard approach covers the financial 
objectives and the factors that contribute to the conversion of these financial goals into 
performance, and allows managers to look at the overall performance of the company from 
different perspectives in pursuing corporate financial performance. At the same time, the 
performance drivers for the company's future growth can be monitored at any time.  
The balanced scorecard system emphasizes the coordination and balance between different 
performance areas [83], and the excellent performance in a particular area often fails to 
compensate for the poor performance of other areas. Its most prominent characteristic is to 
link the company's vision, mission, and development strategy with the company's 
performance evaluation and evaluation system, and transform the company's mission and 
strategy into concrete goals and evaluation indicators. The balanced scorecard system is 
based on the company's strategy and integrates various measurement methods into an organic 
whole that both includes financial indicators and supplements financial indicators through 
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customer satisfaction, internal business processes, and learning growth business indicators. 
These business indicators are the starting factors of financial indicators. The Balanced 
Scorecard diagram is shown in Figure 5-1.  
(2) Indicators of the balanced scorecard system  
The balanced scorecard is a comprehensive performance assessment system. In addition 
to the traditional financial measurement indicators, it also involves three new assessment 
areas: Customers, internal operations and learning growth [84].  
① Financial perspective  
The measure for evaluating corporate performance from a financial perspective is how the 
company can better meet the needs of shareholders. The most basic demand of shareholders 
busying shares is to realize capital gains through their investment. Therefore, the setting of 
financial evaluation indicators should reflect whether the company's strategy and its 
implementation contribute to profit increase. Typical financial goals involve profit, growth, 
and shareholder value. The selection of financial indicators should also take into account the 
company's life cycle, the requirements of strategic objectives on financial performance and 
other factors [85]. 
 
 
Figure 5-1 Schematic Diagram of the Balanced Scorecard (Yves, 2010) 
 
② Customer perspective 
Balanced scorecard method requires that indicators should truly reflect various factors 
associated with the customer. There are usually four types of things that customers are 
concerned about: Time, quality, performance, service and cost. In order for the balanced 
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scorecard approach to work, a company should define the goals that time, quality, 
performance, service and cost should achieve, and then transform these goals into specific 
assessment objectives [86].  
③ Perspective of internal business operation  
It is important for the evaluation indicators to be based on customers provided that the 
company's internal operational goals are guaranteed. Excellent customer performance comes 
from the processes, decisions, and behaviors that occur in the organization. Internal business 
operations refers to the key internal business activities that the company can meet with 
customer needs. The internal assessment indicators of the balanced scorecard should come 
from business processes that have the greatest impact on customers, including factors such 
as cycle time, quality, staff skills and productivity.  
④ Perspective of innovation and learning  
Corporate abilities to innovate, improve, and learn are directly related to corporate 
performance. Only by continuously developing new products, providing customers with 
more value and improving operation efficiency can companies enter new markets, increase 
revenue, and continue to grow so as to increase shareholder value.  
(3) Application of the balanced scorecard in performance evaluation of state-owned 
enterprises in China  
Since the balanced scorecard method appeared in 1992, it has been widely used in 
European and American companies. Statistics show that more than 80% of the Fortune 
Global 500 are using the BSC evaluation method. Many state-owned enterprises in China 
also applied the balanced scorecard evaluation method. For example, SINOTRANS, one of 
the 179 state-owned large-scale enterprise groups directly under the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission, began the pilot work of the balanced scorecard 
evaluation within the Group since 2001. Since 2003, among its secondary subsidiaries, the 
Group has fully implemented the balanced scorecard evaluation system.  
Fan Songlin and Li Wenjuan introduced the value contribution model of Baosteel Steel 
Pipe Co., Ltd. constructed with the theory of economic value added and the balanced 
scorecard[87]. The model includes four aspects of the balanced scorecard evaluation system, 
which are divided into financial factors and non-financial factors. Non-financial factors are 
divided into user factors, internal process factors, and learning and innovation processes. At 
the same time, the literature points out that this model not only effectively measures financial 
indicators, but also quantifies non-financial indicators, and truly satisfies customer needs 
with minimal cost so as to increase the overall value of the company's operations.  
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And many experts and scholars have studied application of the balanced scorecard 
evaluation system in the performance evaluation of state-owned enterprises. Fu Guangyou 
mentioned that when the Balanced Scorecard evaluation system was used in the performance 
evaluation of state-owned enterprises, it was very important to find out the key success 
factors, but it was found in its application to practical problems that it still lacked scientificity 
in identifying the relevant key success factors in the evaluation system of the balanced 
scorecard [88]. In addition, he also pointed out that the Balanced Scorecard was not a 
standardized evaluation template suitable for all enterprises or the whole industry. It appeared 
to evaluate the company from the aspects of finance, customers, internal business processes 
and learning and growth, but it actually required each enterprise to set the Balanced Scorecard 
evaluation system with its own emphasis. In addition, he pointed out that the issue of 
determining the weight of performance indicators is also worth exploring. Yao Yue, Yang 
Wangui, Jiang Yanzhang, and Yang Lan pointed out that introduction of the balanced 
scorecard system to certain state-owned enterprises in China could comprehensively evaluate 
the enterprise performance[89]. Their research also showed that in designing performance 
evaluation system for state-owned enterprises with the balanced scorecard evaluation system, 
first, the quality of state-owned enterprise's accounting information should be fully 
considered for scientific sake; Second, the evaluation system should include the social 
contribution level of state-owned enterprises; Third, the company's safety production issues 
and environmental protection issues should also be included in the evaluation to examine the 
company's safety and environmental awareness; In addition, different companies have 
different backgrounds and strategic tasks, and even the same goals may be measured by 
different indicators. When the balanced scorecard evaluation system is used in state-owned 
enterprises, their objectives of the four levels should be different from the measurement 
indicators of other enterprises. Wei Hongmei applied the Balanced Scorecard evaluation to 
the case of Exxon Mobil Corporation [90]. The study found the preconditions and principles 
for the balanced scorecard evaluation system to be used by state-owned enterprises as follows: 
The company's strategy could be broken down into layers; the causal relationship between 
the four aspects of the Balanced Scorecard could be found; management rules and regulations 
in line with the implementation of Balanced Scorecard should be in place; employees at all 
levels should be competent for their job.  
Some problems need attention for the application of the Balanced Scorecard in the 
performance evaluation of state-owned enterprises. The opinions of scholars such as Fu 
Guangyou, Yao Yue, Yang Wangui, Li Yazhe, and Wei Hongmei are mainly expressed in 
the following points: the status of China's under grade quality of accounting information 
should be fully considered for designing scientific performance evaluation indicators; 
According to the special nature of China's state-owned enterprises, the indicators of corporate 
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social responsibility should be designed to effectively evaluate the contribution of state-
owned enterprises to society when Balanced Score Card is used in the performance 
evaluation of state-owned enterprises in China. The status of environmental protection of 
state-owned enterprises should be evaluated, the balanced scorecard for performance 
evaluation of state-owned enterprises should be designed with indicators for environmental 
protection; Although the balanced scorecard evaluates a company's performance from four 
aspects, it is not a fixed template and each company should focus on its own characteristics.  
 
5.1.3 Design of Performance Indicator System for Enterprise Organization  
5.1.3.1 Design Principles  
Whether the design of the performance evaluation indicator system is reasonable or not 
extend a direct impact on the accuracy of evaluation results. The design of performance 
evaluation indicators usually follows three principles: the rationality of the indicator setting, 
that is, the information reflected by the indicator can meet the requirements of the design 
goal; Comprehensively reflecting the objects, that is, the designed indicator system can fully 
reflect the information of the evaluated object; The availability of indicator data, which 
means that the data of indicators can be obtained directly or quantified by some method.  
The performance evaluation system of state-owned enterprise is expressed by breaking 
down the long-term development strategy of the company from top to bottom and converting 
them into quantifiable indicators, to communicate as far as possible the strategy to employees 
at different job levels so that the basic level employees and senior managers can act in a 
unified manner.  
① Overall balance  
The design of the performance evaluation system for state-owned enterprises should 
consider the overall balance, and design secondary indicators from four perspectives: 
financial perspective, customer perspective, internal business process perspective, and 
learning growth perspective. Each of these four aspects has its distinct emphasis, and at the 
same time, they have close causal relationship which reflects the idea of seeking the overall 
balance and harmony of enterprises. The balance contained in the performance evaluation 
system is reflected in the balance between financial and non-financial evaluations, the 
balance between long-term and short-term goals, the balance between external and internal 
requirements, and the balance between management and operating performance.  
② Comprehensive relationship  
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The four evaluation perspectives of the performance evaluation system for state-owned 
enterprises have the relationship of sequential safeguard and promotion. “Learning and 
growth” is the long-term, basic, and process-based key success factor that can guarantee and 
promote “internal business processes”; “Internal business processes” are the key to 
improving corporate performance, and compared with learning and growth, it is a semi-basic, 
indirect and process-based key success factor which can guarantee and promote "meeting 
customer needs"; “Meeting customer needs” is the quick effective, direct, and process-based 
key success factor that can guarantee and promote “financial performance”; “financial 
performance” is the result-based key success factor of the enterprise that is the most direct 
and important performance indicator of the enterprise management.  
③ Combining qualitative analysis with quantitative calculation  
The design of the performance evaluation system for state-owned group enterprises is 
based on the reading of relevant literature, and uses repeated qualitative analysis and two 
quantitative analysis methods including the Delphi method and the entropy weight method, 
and finally, establishes a more reasonable performance evaluation system.  
 
5.1.3.2 Design scheme  
Following the basic principles of the performance evaluation system and highlighting the 
characteristics of the performance evaluation system obtained through analysis, this paper 
referred to the balanced scorecard performance appraisal system from four aspects: financial 
affairs, customers, internal business processes and learning and growth, and established an 
evaluation system including 16 secondary indicators, as indicated in Table 5-1.  
(1) Asset liability ratio  
Asset liability ratio is an indicator that evaluates corporate performance from a financial 
perspective. This indicator has become a financial leverage factor which reflects the 
percentage of creditors’ funds in the total assets of the company and the extent to which the 
corporate assets guarantee the rights of creditors. Under good conditions in production and 
operations, the positive effects of financial leverage can be used to gain more profits. 
However, if the company's operating conditions are not good and its financial strength cannot 
guarantee the security of debt repayment, the financial leverage may play a negative role and 
aggravate the financial situation.  
Smaller asset liability ratio indicates stronger long-term solvency of the company. With 
relatively high business risk, companies will usually choose a relatively low asset liability 
ratio to reduce financial risks; with low business risk, companies will usually choose a higher 
asset liability ratio to increase shareholders’ returns. As the asset-liability ratio plays a role 
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of financial leverage, different stakeholders have different requirements for this indicator. 
From the perspective of creditors, the lower the debt ratio the better. When the asset liability 
ratio is low, the ratio of the capital provided by creditors to the total capital of the enterprise 
is low, and the possibility of insolvency is low. Since the risks of the enterprise is mainly 
borne by the shareholders, this is very beneficial to the creditors; From the perspective of 
shareholders, it is an ideal state to maintain the asset-liability ratio at a relatively high level, 
which can give full play to the positive role of financial leverage; From the perspective of 
operators, they hope that the asset-liability ratio will remain within a reasonable range, make 
full use of borrowed capital to create profits for the enterprise and reduce financial risks as 
many as possible.  
(2) Operating cost ratio  
The operating cost ratio is an indicator for evaluating corporate performance from a 
financial perspective. This indicator reflects the relationship between operating costs and 
operating income in business operations. According to the value of this indicator, both the 
level of profitability of the company's business operations and its ability to control operating 
costs as well as its management level can also be evaluated.  
Smaller operating cost ratio indicates lower price for the company to pay for gains and 
greater profitability.  
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Table 5-1 Performance Evaluation Indicator System for the Subsidiaries of State-
owned Group 
First-level indicators Secondary grade index 
Name Expression Name Expression Calculation formula  
Financial 
perspective 
 Asset liability ratio a11 (total liabilities / total assets) * 100%  
a1 
Operating cost ratio a12 (Operating cost/operating revenue)*100%  
Net profit margin on 
sales 
a13 (net profit/operating revenue)*100%  
 Return on total assets a14 
(Total profit before interest and taxes/total average 
assets) * 100%  
Customer 
perspective 
 
Growth rate of 
operating revenue 
a21 
(Operating revenue of report period - operating 
revenue of base period)/Operating revenue of base 
period * 100%  
a2 
Contribution ratio of 
operating revenue 
a22 
(Operating revenue of subsidiaries/Operating 
revenue of parent company) * 100%  
 
Profit rate of main 
business 
a23 
(Main Business Profit/Main Business Net Revenue) 
* 100%  
Internal 
business 
perspective 
 Current ratio a31 Current assets / current liabilities  
 Quick ratio a32 Quick assets/current liabilities  
a3 Cash ratio a33 (cash + short-term investments) / current liabilities  
 
Turnover of fixed 
assets 
a34 
(Main business revenue/net value of fixed 
assets)*100%  
 
Total asset turnover 
ratio 
a35 Prime operation revenue/total average assets  
Learning 
and growth 
perspective 
a4 
Net asset growth rate a41 
(Net assets of report period - net assets of base 
period) / net assets of base period * 100%  
Net profit growth rate a42 
(Net profit of report period - net profit of base 
period)/Net profit of base period  
*100%  
Total asset growth 
rate 
a43 
(Total assets of report period - total assets of base 
period) / Total assets of base period * 100%  
Growth rate of debt a44 
(Total liabilities of report period - total liabilities of 
base period) / Total assets of base period * 100%  
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(3) Net profit margin on sales  
Net profit margin on sales is an indicator that evaluates corporate performance from a 
financial perspective. As the initial basis for corporate profits, this indicator reflects the 
proportion of the company's net profit to operating income.  
Generally speaking, the higher the net profit margin on sales, the stronger the company's 
profitability.  
(4) Return on total assets  
Return on total assets is an indicator that evaluates corporate performance from a 
financial perspective. This indicator shows the level of the company's total assets gains, 
which fully reflects the profitability of the company and the output of the investment. In-
depth analysis of this indicator can strengthen the enterprise's attention to asset management 
and promote the enterprise to improve the income level of unit assets.  
Larger indicator value of the return on total assets indicates better proportion of enterprise 
input and output, and the higher overall operating efficiency of enterprise’s total assets.  
(5) Growth rate of operating revenue  
The growth rate of operating revenue is an indicator for evaluating corporate performance 
from the perspective of customers. This indicator is an important indicator to measure the 
operating status of the company and its market share as well as to predict the development 
trend of its business operations. Sustained and stable business income is the foundation and 
development conditions for the company's survival.  
Higher growth rate of operating income indicates greater growth rate of its operating 
income and greater market potential; If the value of this indicator is less than zero, it indicates 
that the company's products or services or market may have problems.  
(6) Contribution ratio of operating revenue  
The operating income contribution ratio is an indicator for evaluating company 
performance from the perspective of the customer. This indicator is the proportion of the 
operating income of the subsidiary to the total revenue of the parent company.  
Higher indicator value of the operating income contribution ratio indicates greater 
contribution of the subsidiary to the parent company.  
(7) Profit rate of main business  
The profit rate of main business is an indicator for evaluating corporate performance from 
the perspective of customers. This indicator refers to the ratio between the profit and the net 
income of main business over a certain period of time, which indicates the amount of the 
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main business profit that can be brought by each unit of the enterprise income, and reflects 
the profitability of enterprises' main businesses, and is the main indicator to evaluate the 
economic benefits of enterprises.  
The higher profit rate of the main business indicates that the prices of goods or services 
are scientific, the added value of products or services is high, the marketing strategy is 
appropriate, the market competitiveness of the main business is strong, and the profit level is 
high. Only when the main business of the company stands out, that is, the profit margin of 
the main business is relatively high, can it capture an advantageous position in the 
competition.  
(8) Current ratio  
The current ratio is an indicator of corporate performance from the perspective of internal 
business processes. This indicator shows how many current assets of the company guarantee 
for repayment of its current liabilities, and reflects the ability of the company to liquidate 
assets within one year to repay the current liabilities.  
The greater the current ratio, the stronger the short-term solvency of the company, and the 
smaller the financial risk of the company’s inability to repay the short-term debt due. 
However, if the indicator is too high, it means that the company's liquid assets are used 
excessively, which may reduce the profitability of funds.  
(9) Quick ratio  
The quick ratio is an indicator for evaluating corporate performance from the perspective 
of internal business processes. Since the inventory in current assets may not be realized or 
the realized value is far lower than its book value due to long backlog, etc., the deferred 
expenses generally will not generate cash inflows. Therefore, the quick ratio is calculated 
only through the ratio of the strongest component of liquid assets to current liabilities.  
The greater value of quick ratio indicates greater guarantee for the company's future 
solvency. However, if excessively high value of this indicator indicates that the company has 
so many monetary assets as to reduce the profitability of funds.  
(10) Cash ratio  
The cash ratio is an indicator for evaluating corporate performance from the perspective 
of internal business processes. The cash ratio is the ratio of the amount of quick assets after 
deducting accounts receivable to the current liabilities. This indicator can best reflect the 
ability of companies to directly repay their current liabilities.  
Similarly, greater value of the cash ratio indicates stronger solvency of the company for 
current liabilities. However, if this ratio is too high, it means that the company's current 
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liabilities have not been properly used; and excessively high amounts of cash assets can 
increase the opportunity cost of the company.  
(11) Turnover of fixed assets  
The turnover rate of fixed asset is an indicator for evaluating corporate performance from 
the perspective of internal business processes. This indicator reflects the degree of utilization 
of enterprise assets.  
Higher value of the fixed asset turnover indicator indicates higher utilization rate of fixed 
assets by the company and better management.  
(12) Total asset turnover ratio  
The total asset turnover ratio is an indicator for evaluating enterprise performance from 
the perspective of internal business processes. This indicator is an important indicator for 
examining the operational efficiency of corporate assets and reflects the management quality 
and utilization efficiency of all corporate assets.  
Higher value of the total asset turnover indicator shows faster turnover rate and higher 
utilization efficiency of assets.  
(13) Net asset growth rate  
The net asset growth rate is an indicator for evaluating corporate performance from the 
perspective of learning and growth. This indicator reflects the level of change in assets of an 
enterprise in the current year and also the accumulation of corporate capital.  
Higher value of the index indicates greater capital accumulation, stronger capital 
maintenance and stronger ability in risk response and sustainable development.  
(14) Net profit growth rate  
The net profit growth rate is an indicator for evaluating corporate performance from the 
perspective of learning and growth. Net profit is the final result of the company's operating 
performance, the growth of which is the basic characteristic of the company's growth. The 
larger increase in net profit indicates that the company has outstanding business performance 
and strong market competitiveness. In the actual calculation, if the net profit of last year is 
negative, the net profit growth rate is the ratio of the difference between the net profits of the 
two years and the absolute value of the net profit of the previous year.  
(15) Total asset growth rate  
The total asset growth rate is an indicator for evaluating enterprise performance from the 
perspective of learning and growth. This indicator reflects the growth of the company's assets.  
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The higher the total asset growth rate, the faster the company's asset growth. However, the 
higher growth rate of assets is not necessarily good. Only when sales growth and profit 
growth exceed the growth of assets, the growth of asset size is appropriate and profitable.  
(16) Growth rate of debt  
The growth rate of debt is an indicator to evaluate corporate performance from the 
perspective of learning and growth. This indicator reflects the growth of the company's 
liability scale. Company's operation with borrowed fund could have leverage to a certain 
extent.  
The lower growth rate of the debt is not necessarily good, and with a certain relationship 
with the growth rate of the assets, higher debt growth rate may bring more benefits to the 
company.  
The above performance evaluation system for state-owned enterprises was constructed 
based on considerations of the company's finances, customers, internal business processes, 
and learning and growth, so it can more comprehensively reflect the performance of 
enterprises during a specific period of time. Second, corresponding quantifiable indicators 
are set for all aspects examined, and these indicators can all be obtained from the company's 
annual financial statements, so as to lay the foundation for the objectivity and accuracy of 
enterprise performance evaluation results. In addition, classified performance evaluation 
indicators can help enterprises to formulate corresponding performance improvement 
measures based on the evaluation results. 
 
5.1.4 Construction of Fuzzy Synthetic Evaluation Model  
This paper proposes a fuzzy synthetic evaluation model constructed on the basis of fuzzy 
mathematics theories, Delphi method and entropy weight method, whose specific steps go as 
follows:  
(1) Construction of fuzzy set (feature set and weight set)  
Assume that feature set of the first grade indicators of evaluation indicator system (Table 
5-1) is A={a1,a2…,an}, W is the fuzzy set of importance degrees of A, then the weight set of 
each indicator of corresponding feature layers is W={W1,W2,…,Wm}, where w1 denotes the 
weight of the ith feature in A and satisfies 

m
i
iw
1
=1 
The feature set of the second grade indicator is a1={ai1,ai2,…aij,…ain}（ i=1,2,…,m; 
j=1,2,…,n ） , the weight of indicator corresponding to its set of features is 
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W1={wi1,wi2,…wij,…win},（i=1,2,…,m; j=1,2,…,n）, where wi1 denotes the weight of the aijth 
feature in a1 and satisfies 

m
i
ijw
1
=1. 
(2) Construction of fuzzy evaluation matrix  
Assume that object of evaluation is V= {V1, V2, … VP}, the feature set of the 
corresponding first-order indicator layer is a1={ai1, ai2, aij,… ain}, a fuzzy mapping of the 
first-order indicator feature from V to a1 is established to be ƒ:V→ƒ(ai).  
vi→a ij =
1
1
v
ri
+
2
2
v
ri
+…+
p
mn
v
r
( i =1,2,…,m; j=1,2,…,n) 
The fuzzy relation can be induced by ƒ and denoted by the matrix as follows:  
 
                           ...      
 
 
 
 
Formula (5-1)  
 
 
Ri denotes a fuzzy relation between evaluation object set V and index factor set ai, and rijp 
denotes the membership of evaluation object vP to the feature aij of the secondary grade index 
layer.  
(3) Determination of index weights in the model  
① Determination of the weights of the first grade indices  
The weights of the first grade indicators are determined by the Delphi method. By Delphi 
method, a group of experienced experts are invited to comment on how to determine the 
weight of each indicator, and then to estimate the weight of each indicator by means of 
statistical average method. And its specific steps are as follows:  
First, more detailed background information is sent to a certain number (n) of selected 
experts, each of whom is asked to estimate the weight of each objective independently, as 
shown in Table 5-2:  
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Table 5-2 Expert Scoring Results by the Delphi Method 
 
           Index  
Score        Expert 
 
a1 
 
a2 
 
… 
 
am 
1 w11 w12 … w1m 
2 w21 w22 … w2m 
… … … … … 
n wn1 wn2 … wnm 
After calculating the sample mean of each indicator weight M (wj) = 
n
1 

n
i
ijw
1
( j=1,2,…,m) and the deviation of each expert to the estimated value of each indicator weight 
ij = wij- M (wj), further analyze whether M (wj) is reasonable or not, especially let the experts 
with larger deviations
ij of estimate value fully express their opinions, and eliminate some 
errors in the estimated value.  
Then, with the attached additional information, experts are invited to re-estimate the 
weight of each indicator and calculate the average value M
~ (wj) = 
n
1 

n
i
ijw
1
and the 
variance D
~
(wj) =
1
1
n


n
i 1
(wij - M
~
(wj))
2 again. Repeat the above steps until the k-th step, 
where the estimated variance is less than or equal to the preset standard ε (ε> 0). Send the 
mean estimate M
~
(wj) and D
~
(wj) obtained from the k-th step to the experts, and ask them 
to give the final estimates of the objective weights and to give, at the same time, the 
"credibility" of the estimated values lij (0< lij <1) , indicating the confidence given by the i-
th expert on the j-th index weight value.  
Finally, determine the final estimated value of objective function weight. Let iM = {i:lij
  , i=1,2,…,n}, (0< <1), which is a preset criterion, then the final estimate of the j-th 
objective weight is  = 
)(
1
iM 
i
ijw , 
)(iM  denotes the number of elements in 
)(iM  . 
  
 
127 
 
In the process of determining the weight of each indicator by the Delphi method, the 
members of the expert group do not communicate directly among themselves and may 
change their opinions anonymously, so that various arguments can be fully expressed. While 
from the feedback questionnaires, the experts get collective opinions and the current situation 
as well as the arguments for or against various opinions, and make their own new judgments 
thereon, which constitute the anonymous interaction among experts. Finally, the use of 
statistical assessment methods for predicted results can cover the views of the entire group 
and thus find the mainstream opinion representing the experts.  
② Determination of the weights of the second grade indicators  
The weights of the second grade indicators are determined by entropy weight method. In 
information theory, entropy is a measurement of uncertainty. The smaller the entropy, the 
smaller the uncertainty. The greater the entropy, the greater the uncertainty. According to 
this characteristic of entropy, the discrete degree of the indicator can be judged by calculating 
the entropy value of the indicator. The greater the discrete degree, the greater the entropy 
value of the indicator. If the value fluctuation of each evaluation object is very large for a 
certain indicator, it shows that the discrete degree of the indicator is very large, and that the 
indicator plays an important role in the whole evaluation system.  
The entropy weight method takes the ratio of the difference coefficient of entropy value 
of each indicator to the sum of difference coefficients of entropy values of indicators as the 
weight of the indicator. Because this method can offer an insightful perspective of the 
information contained in the original data, it effectively avoids the influence of subjective 
factors on the indicator weight. The weight of the secondary grade indicator of the 
corresponding first grade indicator in the performance evaluation indicator system proposed 
by this thesis is W1 = {wi1,wi2, … wij,… Win}, and with the entropy weight method, the weight 
of each second grade indicator can be obtained by the following formula:  
wij = 
 

 



n
j
p
ijij
p
ijij
rr
p
rr
p
1 1
1
)ln
ln
1
1(
ln
ln
1
1




, 
 (i=1,2, …, m; j = 1,2, …, n ;=1,2, …, p)……………………... Formula (5-2) 
Wij denotes the weight of the aij-th indicator in ai, and satisfies 10  ija , 

n
j
ija
1
=1. 
It can be seen from the above formula that, in the evaluation by entropy weight method, 
all the indicator values must be treated as positive numbers. In view of the characteristics of 
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the indicator system established in this paper, the following formula is used to process each 
indicator value.  
i
ijr  = 
)min()max(
)min(
..
.
ijij
ijij
rr
rr


+
ij …….… Formula (5-3)  
(i=1,2, …, m; j = 1,2, …, n ;=1,2, …, p)  
where max (rij) is the satisfaction value of the evaluation object in the aij-th indicator, and 
min (rij) is the most unsatisfactory value of the evaluation object in the aij-th indicator; βijis 
the adjustment coefficient, and if aij is a moderate indicator, assign 0.5 to βijand if aij is a 
positive or negative indicator, assign 1 to βij. Then the assigned values of βij in this indicator 
system are shown in Table 5-3.  
.  
Table 5-3 List of the assigned values for indicator system βij 
 
β11 β12 β13 β14 β21 β22 β23 β24 
0.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
β25 β31 β32 β33 β41 β42 β43 β44 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 0.5 
(4) Establishment of the fuzzy systhetic evaluation model  
After constructing the fuzzy evaluation matrix Ri of ai and determining the importance Wi 
of ai, the fuzzy entropy weight evaluation is performed on each feature of ai={ai1, ai2, …, 
aij, …, ain}(i=1,2, …, m; j = 1,2, …, n). 
Ui denotes fuzzy evaluation vector of ai, then the fuzzy evaluation model of the second grade 
indicator feature goes as follows:  
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The first grade indicator feature set is    mn wwwWaaaA ,,,,,,, 2121   is a weight set 
of A, the total evaluation matrix is U, which is calculated by the following formula:  
…… Formula (5-5)  
 
The above is the fuzzy synthetic evaluation model established in this paper. By the 
principle of maximum membership, the evaluation results of each evaluation object can be 
obtained from the total evaluation matrix U.  
 
5.1.5 Design of Performance Evaluation Process for Subsidiaries of State-owned 
Enterprises  
(1) Evaluation process  
The performance evaluation process for subsidiaries of state-owned group is shown in Figure 
5-2.  
(2) Evaluation cycle  
Because all the indicators contained in the performance evaluation system in this paper 
require the corresponding data to be obtained from the financial department, and the annual 
financial statements can reflect the operating situation of the enterprise in a more 
comprehensive way, therefore, the evaluation cycle is set at one year and the performance of 
the enterprise is evaluated at the end of each accounting year.  
(3) Subject of evaluation  
The performance evaluation on subsidiaries of the state-owned enterprise group shall be 
carried out by the strategic research department with the assistance of the financial 
department of the corporate headquarters.  
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Figure 5-2 Flow Chart of Performance Evaluation on Subsidiaries or Affiliates of 
State-owned Enterprise Group 
 
 
5.1.6 Application of Fuzzy Synthetic Evaluation in the Performance Evaluation on 
subsidiaries of LH Group  
The performance evaluation indicator system for subsidiaries or affiliated enterprises of 
LH Energy Group is shown in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2. This section will carry out 
performance rating on the three sectors of subsidiaries and affiliated enterprises of LH Energy 
Group, respectively: Real Estate and Project Management Section, Biopharmaceutical 
Section and Hotel Management Section.  
 
 
  
Enterprise group headquarters 
Proprietary enterprise 
Select the applicable Indices in the existing evaluation Index system 
according to the industry category which subsidiaries or affiliated 
enterprises belong to 
Evaluate with the established evaluation model 
Get the evaluation result 
At the end of accounting year, 
subsidiaries or affiliated enterprises 
submit the current year's financial 
statements to the parent company 
Perform the evaluation 
Result feedback 
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5.1.6.1 Performance Evaluation on Enterprises of Real Estate and Project Management 
Sector  
The real estate and project management sector of LH Energy Group is shown in Figure 5-
3.  
Shandong Huaneng Real Estate Development Co., Ltd. with registered capital of 18 
million RMB, is a wholly owned subsidiary of LH Energy Group. It is specialized in real 
estate development with the third class of real estate development qualifications issued by 
Construction Commission of Shandong Province. At present, the company develops and 
manages real estate projects mainly in Weihai City and Shouguang City. By now it has 
successfully developed the Shandong Huaneng Building and the Jinan Baiwang Shopping 
Mall in Jinan City; Tai'an Jinshan Residential Area; Huaneng City Garden and Weihai Xuefu 
Jiayuan projects in Weihai City.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-3 Enterprises of Real Estate and Project Management Sector 
 
Weihai Yunhua Real Estate Development Co., Ltd. was established in 2001 and was 
acquired in November 2007 by Shandong Huaneng Real Estate Development Company, a 
wholly owned enterprise of LH Energy Group. In April 2008, the company was transferred 
with 100% equity for free to LH Energy Group as a wholly owned enterprise, and increased 
the registered capital from 10 million RMB to 50 million RMB. In May 2008, after selling 
part equity of the company, the LH Group held 51% of the stocks. The company is specialized 
in real estate development business.  
Shandong Huaneng Construction Project Management Co., Ltd. is a wholly owned 
enterprise of LH Energy Group with registered capital of 3 million RMB. The company is 
mainly engaged in the construction and supervision of civil construction, municipal 
engineering and large thermal power plants, thermal power plants and others; it possesses 
two Class-A qualifications for housing construction engineering supervision and electrical 
engineering supervision.  
(1) Determination of the weights of the first grade indicators  
Real estate and project management Sector 
Shandong Huaneng Real Estate 
Development Company 
Weihai Yunhua Real Estate 
Development Co., Ltd. 
Shandong Huaneng Construction 
Project Management Co., Ltd. 
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Six experts (including business administrators) from related fields are invited to score the 
importance of the first grade indicators of the performance evaluation indicator system 
designed in this paper and the score scale is 1-10, denoting progressive importance degrees 
in turn. The results are shown in Tables 5-4:  
Table 5-4 Initial Analogue Scores for the Importance of the First Grade Indicators 
Indices  
Experts 
Score  
 
a1 
 
a2 
 
a3 
 
a4 
Expert 1 8 1 4 7 
Expert 2 10 9 4 2 
Expert 3 7 5 2 7 
Expert 4 10 8 7 9 
Expert 5 8 5 6 7 
Expert 6 7 8 9 7 
According to the steps of determining each indicator weight by the Delphi method, the 
first grade indicator weight set W= (0.37, 0.26, 0.12, 0.25) is obtained through calculation.  
Although the balanced scorecard evaluation system emphasizes the balance between 
finance, customer, internal business process and innovation and learning, different 
enterprises should have their own focus. While the above weights reflect exactly this idea, in 
the performance evaluation on subsidiaries or affiliated enterprises of LH Energy Group, the 
group attaches the most importance to the financial performance of subsidiaries or affiliated 
enterprises, followed by customers, and innovation and learning, and finally, the internal 
business process. These evaluation weights are determined on the basis of fully considering 
the development stages of the affiliated enterprises and the overall strategy of the group. With 
the development of subsidiaries and affiliated enterprises and the overall strategy adjustment 
of the group, the weights will inevitably change.  
(2) Determination of the weights of the second grade indicators  
Related indicators of the enterprises of real estate and project management sector of LH 
Energy Group in 2017 as shown in Table 5-5  
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Table 5-5 Corresponding Indicators for the Enterprises of Real Estate and Project 
Management Sector 
 
Company  
Secondary  Indicator value  
grade indicator 
Company 1 Company 2 Company 3 
a11 69.06 61.61 36.62 
a12 76.37 85.53 80.95* 
a13 14.31 4.21 10.52 
a14 7.40 3.81 16.78 
a21 164.23 94.40* 24.56 
a22 7.38 19.51 2.00 
a23 23.63 12.36 94.45 
a31 1.29 7.35 2.39 
a32 0.82 3.10 2.39 
a33 16.54 137.16 143.37 
a34 39.92 91.64 9.11 
a35 0.40 0.64 1.20 
a41 19.86 6.58 21.61 
a42 319.02 205.5* 91.88 
a43 24.20 30.08 10.14 
a44 26.24 -67.34 -5.00 
*The number with asterisk indicates the missing data, and this paper assigns to it the average 
value of the evaluation object, hereinafter the same.  
According to formula (5-3), the pre-processed data is shown as Table 5-6.  
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Table 5-6 The Corresponding Indicators for the Enterprises of Real Estate and 
Project Management Sector after Pre-processing 
Company  
Secondary  Indicator value  
grade indicator  
Company 1 Company 2 Company 3 
a11 1.50 1.27 0.50 
a12 1.00 2.00 1.50 
a13 3.66 1.00 2.66 
a14 1.28 1.00 2.00 
a21 2.00 1.50 1.00 
a22 1.31 2.00 1.00 
a23 1.14 1.00 2.00 
a31 1.00 2.00 1.18 
a32 1.00 2.00 1.69 
a33 1.00 1.95 2.00 
a34 1.37 2.00 1.00 
a35 1.00 1.30 2.00 
a41 1.88 1.00 2.00 
a42 2.00 1.50 1.00 
a43 2.89 3.89 0.50 
a44 1.50 0.50 1.17 
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According to the formula (5-1), we can get  
…….……..Formula (5-6) 
 
  
 
 
According to the formula (5-2), we can by calculation obtain 
 W1 = (0.10, 0.19, 0.53, 00.17)………………………………. Formula (5-7) 
 
Similarly, it can be calculated 
 W2 = (0.36, 0.33, 0.31) ……………………………….………Formula (5-8) 
 
W3=(0.17,0.22,0.24,0.19,0.18) ………………………… Formula (5-9)  
W4=(0.21,0.18,0.52,0.09) ……………………………… Formula (5-10)  
(3) Calculation of total fuzzy evaluation matrix  
The fuzzy evaluation models of the second grade indicator features are as follows:  
)10.2,22.1,51.2(111  RWU ……………………………….. Formula (5-11)  
)31.1,51.1,51.1(222  RWU ……………………………….. Formula (5-12)  
)60.1,86.1,07.1(333  RWU ……………………………….. Formula (5-13)  
)96.0,56.2,40.2(444  RWU ………………………………. Formula (5-14)  
The total fuzzy performance evaluation matrix of real estate and project management sector 
enterprises of LH Energy Group is as follows  
)55.1,71.1,05.2( iUWU ………………………………… Formula (5-15)  
(4) Evaluation result and analysis  
Formula (5-7)-Formula (5-10) illustrate the weights of the specific indicators involved in 
the four aspects of the balanced scorecard system in evaluating the enterprises of real estate 
and project management sector. From a financial perspective, the weight of asset-liability 

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ratio is 0.1, the weight of operating cost is 0.19, the weight of net profit margin on sales is 
0.53, and the weight of total asset return is 0.17; From a customer perspective, the weight of 
operating income growth rate is 0.36, the weight of contribution ratio of operating income is 
0.33, and the weight of main business profit rate is 0.31; From the perspective of internal 
business processes, the current ratio indicator weighs 0.17, the quick ratio indicator weighs 
0.22, the cash ratio indicator weighs 0.24, the fixed asset turnover indicator weighs 0.19, and 
the total asset turnover indicator weighs 0.18; From the perspective of learning and growth, 
the weight of net assets growth index is 0.21, the weight of net profit growth rate is 0.18, the 
weight of total asset growth rate is 0.52, and the weight of debt growth rate is 0.09.  
Formula (5-11)-Formula 5-12 show the performances of the enterprises of real estate and 
project management sector in various evaluation perspectives. From the financial perspective, 
the performances of the three enterprises from good to bad are: Company 1, company 3, 
company 2; For performances of the three enterprises from the customer perspective, 
company 1 and company 2 are at the same relatively superior level, followed by company 3; 
From the perspective of internal business processes, the performances of the three enterprises 
from good to bad are: Company 2, company 3, company 1; From the perspective of learning 
and growth, the performances of the three enterprises from good to bad are: Company 2, 
Company 1, Company 3.  
From the synthetic fuzzy evaluation vector of Formula (5-15), the performances of the 
three enterprises can be concluded as in a superior-bad order, respectively: Company 1, 
Company 2, and Company 3.  
 
5.1.6.2 Performance Evaluation on the Enterprises of Biopharmaceutical Sector  
Biopharmaceutical sector companies of LH Energy Group are shown in Figure 5-4.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-4 Enterprises of Biopharmaceutical Sector 
Jining Huaneng Biotech Co., Ltd. has a registered capital of 10 million RMB, of which 
LH Energy Group holds 70% of the shares, and Jining Research Institute of Biotech 
Applications holds 30% of the shares. The company mainly produces health care products, 
and is mainly engaged in the production and sales Longxin oral liquid, Longxin jade liquor, 
Biopharmaceutical sector 
Jining Huaneng Biotech 
Co., Ltd. 
Jining Huaneng 
Pharmaceutical Factory 
Shandong LH Energy 
Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. 
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golden energy oral liquid, positive pressure tea and other health products. This company and 
Jining Huaneng Pharmaceutical Factory are two independent legal entities owned by the 
Group Company in the biopharmaceutical sector, but currently their administration bodies 
are the same.  
With a registered capital of 1.14 million RMB, Jining Huaneng Pharmaceutical Factory is 
a wholly-owned subsidiary of LH Energy Group, and mainly produces pharmaceutical 
products. With its core technology of the imported extractive technique of lumbrokinase from 
Tsinghua University, the company has developed biological health products by adopting 
high-tech biotechnology, formed preliminarily three major product series of curing, 
rehabilitating and nourishing types for the treatment of cardiovascular and cerebrovascular 
diseases and become the largest earthworm research and development base in China. At 
present, Qilong capsules, Jiangmeiling capsules, Salviae Miltiorrhizae Shuxin Capsules, Sea 
Cucumber Capsules and other products developed by the company have a fairly high market 
share in China.  
Shandong LH Energy Pharmaceutical Sales Co., Ltd. is an affiliated enterprise bought by 
Jining Huaneng Pharmaceutical Factory, a secondary enterprises of LH Energy Group. With 
a registered capital of 3.1 million RMB, the company, formerly known as Shandong Songhai 
Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., is mainly engaged in sales business of Chinese patent medicines, 
chemical medicine preparations, biochemical drugs and others, and has the GSP certification 
granted by the pharmaceutical regulatory bodies. With approval of the Provincial 
Commission of State-owned Assets Supervison and Administration, the company was 
acquired in August 2008 by Jining Huaneng Pharmaceutical Factory, a wholly owned 
enterprise of the group company, and renamed Shandong LH Energy Pharmaceutical Co., 
Ltd.  
(1) Determination of indicator weight  
Related indicators of the enterprises of pharmaceutical sector of LH Energy Group in 2017 
are shown in Table 5-7.  
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Table 5-7 Corresponding Indicators of the Enterprises of Biopharmaceutical Sector 
 
Company  
Indicator value 
Second   
grade indicator  
Company 1 Company 2 Company 3 
a11 59.03 43.41 94.76 
a12 56.00 31.00 97.00 
a13 2.00 18.00 0.15 
a14 4.15 30.44 3.18 
a21 -31.79 1.85 755.82 
a22 2.00 5.00 13.00 
a23 2.00 18.00 0.15 
a31 0.39 1.75 0.98 
a32 0.29 1.42 0.65 
a33 11.00 6.00 20.00 
a34 0.44 15.13 101.85 
a35 0.23 1.29 4.51 
a41 1.48 75.25 13.83 
a42 -89.00 67.00 -11.00* 
a43 -14.83 -3.40 18.93 
a44 -23.00 -39.00 19.20 
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Table 5-8 Corresponding Indicator Values of the Enterprises of Biopharmaceutical 
Sector after Pre-process Treatment 
According to Formula (5-3), the pre-processed data are shown in Table 5-8.  
 
Company 
Indicator value  
Secondary grade indicator  
Company 1 Company 2 Company 3 
a11 0.80 0.50 1.50 
a12 1.38 1.00 2.00 
a13 1.10 2.00 1.00 
a14 1.04 2.00 1.00 
a21 1.00 1.04 2.00 
a22 1.00 1.27 2.00 
a23 1.10 2.00 1.00 
a31 1.00 2.00 1.43 
a32 1.00 2.00 1.32 
a33 1.36 1.00 2.00 
a34 1.00 1.14 2.00 
a35 1.00 1.25 2.00 
a41 1.00 2.00 1.17 
a42 1.00 2.00 1.50 
a43 0.50 0.84 1.50 
a44 0.77 0.50 1.50 
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According to Formula (5-1), obtain  













00.100.204.1
00.100.210.1
00.200.138.1
50.150.080.0
1R  
 
………..Formula (5-16)  
According to Formula (5-2), it can be calculated ……………………. 
 27.028.032.013.01 W  
Formula (5-17)  
Similarly, it can be calculated  33.035.032.02 W ……………. Formula (5-18)  
 20.019.020.020.021.03 W ……………………………….. Formula (5-19)  
 14.015.038.033.04 W ……………………………………… Formula (5-20)  
(2) Calculation of total fuzzy evaluation matrix  
The fuzzy evaluation models of the second grade indicator features are as follows:  
 ,38.1,49.1,13.0111  RWU …………………………………. Formula (5-21)  
 ,38.1,44.1,03.1222  RWU …………………………………. Formula (5-22)  
 ,74.1,49.1,07.1333  RWU ………………………………… Formula (5-23)  
 ,39.1,61.1,89.0444  RWU ………………………………… Formula (5-24)  
The total fuzzy performance evaluation matrix of the enterprises of biological sector of LH Energy 
Group is  
 ,50.1,51.1,04.1 iUWU …………………………………… Formula (5-25)  
(3) Evaluation results and analysis  
Formula (5-17)-Formula (5-20) illustrate the weights of the specific indicators involved in 
the four aspects of the balanced scorecard system in the evaluation on enterprises of 
biopharmaceutical sector. From the financial perspective, the weight of asset-liability ratio is 
0.13, the weight of operating cost ratio is 0.32, the weight of net profit margin on sales is 
0.28, the weight of return on total asset is 0.27; From a customer perspective, the weight of 
operating income growth rate is 0.32, the weight of operating income contribution ratios is 
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0.35, and the weight of main business profit margin is 0.33; From the perspective of internal 
business process, the weight of current ratio index is 0.21, the weight of quick ratio index is 
0.20, the weight of cash ratio is 0.20, the weight of fixed assets turnover ratio is 0.19, the 
weight of total assets turnover ratio is 0.20; From the perspective of learning and growth, the 
weight of net assets growth rate is 0.33, the weight of net profit growth rate is 0.38, the weight 
of total asset growth rate is 0.15, and the weight of debt growth rate is 0.14.  
Formula (5-21) - Formula (5-24) show the performances of the enterprises of 
biopharmaceutical sector in various evaluation perspectives. From the financial perspective, 
the performances of the three enterprises from good to bad are: Company 2, company 3, 
company 1; From the customer perspective, the performances of the three enterprises from 
good to bad are: Company 3, Company 2, Company 1: From the perspective of internal 
business processes, the performances of the three enterprises from good to bad are: Company 
3, company 2, company 1; From the perspective of learning and growth, the performances of 
the three enterprises from good to bad are: Company 2, company 3, company 1  
From the synthetic fuzzy evaluation vector of Formula (5-25), the performances of the three 
enterprises can be concluded, respectively: Company 2, Company 3, and Company 1.  
 
5.1.6.3 Performance Evaluation on Hotel Business Sector  
There are three companies in hotel business sector of LH Energy Group, as shown in Figure 
5-5.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-5 Enterprises of Hotel Business Sector 
Shandong LH International Hotel Management Co., Ltd. is a wholly owned subsidiary of 
LH Energy Group. With a registered capital of 6 million RMB, the company is a specialized 
hotel management company which integrates hotel management, project investment, 
entrustment management, professional training and exhibition service, and denotatively 
expands the hotels industry sector of the group company mainly through acquisition, renting, 
trusteeship and other managerial means. Since this year, the company has rented and run a 
hotel in Linyi City, and run 3 hotels through trusteeship and lease in Weihai City.  
Hotel business sector 
Shandong LH International 
Hotel Management Co., Ltd. 
Shandong Huaneng 
Building Co., Ltd. 
Weihai Golden Bay 
International Hotel Co., Ltd. 
Shandong LH Energy 
Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. 
  
 
142 
 
Shandong Huaneng Building Co., Ltd. has a registered capital of 60 million RMB, among 
which LH Energy group holds 90% of the shares, and Shandong Huaneng Real Estate 
Development Company holds 10% of the shares. The building is a four-star tourist hotel 
integrating with guest rooms, restaurants, office rooms and conference rooms.  
Weihai Golden Bay International Hotel Co., Ltd. has a registered capital of 88 million 
RMB, among which LH Energy group holds 25% of shares, Shandong Huaneng Building-
an enterprise wholly owned by the group company holds for 35.23% of shares, and Weihai 
Jinfeng Real Estate Comprehensive Development Co., Ltd holds 39.77% of shares. The 
company is a five-star tourist hotel which integrates guest room rental, catering, 
entertainment and leisure.  
With a registered capital of 57.29 million RMB, Qingdao Huaneng Building Co., Ltd. is 
mainly engaged in guest rooms, restaurants, housing rental, beauty salon, business center and 
other business.  
(1) Determination of index weight  
Related indicators of the enterprises of hotel sector of the LH Energy Group in 2017 are 
shown in Table 5-9.  
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Table 5-9 List of Corresponding Indicators for Enterprises of Hotel Management 
Sector 
 
Company  
Indicator value 
Secondary  
grade indicator  
Company 1 Company 2 Company 3 Company 4 
a11 4.05 80.33 55.55 71.38 
a12 19.00 15.00 21.00 14.00 
a13 -6.00 -4.00 -3.00 0.40 
a14 -3.87 1.14 0.99 3.84 
a21 2.63* -12.76 -6.81 27.46 
a22 1.00 8.00 7.00 5.00 
a23 -6.00 -4.00 -3.00 -0.40 
a31 14.71 0.83 1.09 2.21 
a32 13.47 0.80 0.94 0.86 
a33 310.00 58.00 51.00 5.00 
a34 39.08 0.21 0.21 0.56 
a35 0.52 0.13 0.17 0.17 
a41 -3.00 -2.45 -1.13 -0.25 
a42 -1463.00* -249.00 -4048.00 -92.00 
a43 1.09 8.92 2.08 -0.14 
a44 86.73* 239.00 21.00 0.20 
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Table 5-10 The Corresponding Indicator Values of the Enterprises of Hotel Business 
Sector after Pre-processment 
According to Formula (5-3), the pre-processed data are shown in Table 5-10. 
 
Company  
Indicator value 
Secondary  
grade indicator  
Company 1 Company 2 Company 3 Company 4 
a11 0.50 1.50 1.18 1.38 
a12 1.71 1.14 2.00 1.00 
a13 1.00 1.36 1.54 2.00 
a14 1.00 1.65 1.63 2.00 
a21 138 1.00 1.15 2.00 
a22 1.00 2.00 1.86 1.57 
a23 1.00 1.36 1.54 2.00 
a31 2.00 1.00 1.02 1.10 
a32 2.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 
a33 2.00 1.17 1.15 1.00 
a34 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 
a35 2.00 1.00 1.10 1.10 
a41 1.00 1.20 1.68 2.00 
a42 1.65 1.96 1.00 2.00 
a43 0.64 1.50 0.75 0.50 
a44 0.86 1.50 0.59 0.50 
 
  
 
145 
 
According to Formula (5-1), obtain  













00.263.165.100.1
00.254.136.100.1
00.100.214.171.1
38.118.150.150.0
1R  
 
 
……….Formula (5-26)  
According to Formula (5-2), it can be calculated 
 31.0,27.0,27.0,16.01 W  
.…….Formula (5-27)  
Similarly, it can be calculated W2 = (0.28, 0.39, 0.32)………………….. Formula (5-28)  
 20.0,19.0,21.0,19.0,20.03 W ……………………………… Formula (5-29)  
 11.0,10.0,44.0,35.04 W ……………………………………… Formula (5-30)  
(2) Calculation of total fuzzy evaluation matrix   
The fuzzy evaluation models of the second grade index features are as 
follows:  
 63.1,63.1,41.1,11.1111  RWU …………………………….. Formula (5-31)  
 83.1,55.1,51.1,11.1222  RWU ……………………………. Formula (5-32)  
 04.1,06.1,04.1,00.2333  RWU …………………………… Formula (5-33)  
 68.1,17.1,60.1,24.1444  RWU …………………………… Formula (5-34)  
Then the total fuzzy performance evaluation matrix of the enterprises of hotel business sector of LH 
energy group is as follows:  
 63.1,43.1,44.1,25.1 iUWU ………………………………. Formula (5-35)  
(3) Evaluation results and analysis  
Formula (5-27)-Formula (5-30) illustrate the weights of the specific indicators involved in 
the four aspects of the balanced scorecard system in evaluating the enterprises of hotel 
business sector. From the financial perspective, the weight of asset-liability ratio indicator is 
0.16, the weight of operating cost ratio is 0.16, the weight of net sales interest rate indicator 
is 0.27, and the weight of total asset return ratio indicator is 0.31; From the customer 
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perspective, the weight of operating income growth rate is 0.28, the weight of business 
income contribution rate is 0.39, and the weight of main business profit margin is 0.32; From 
the perspective of internal business process, the weight of current ratio indicator is 0.20, the 
weight of quick ratio indicator is 0.19, the weight of cash ratio indicator is 0.21, the weight 
of fixed assets turnover ratio indicator is 0.19, the weight of total assets turnover ratio 
indicator is 0.20; From the perspective of learning and growth angle, the weight of net assets 
growth rate indicator is 0.35, the weight of net profit growth rate indicator is 0.44, the weight 
of total asset growth rate indicator is 0.10, and the weight of debt growth rate indicator is 
0.11.  
Formula (5-31) - Formula (5-34) show the performances of the enterprises of hotel 
business sector from various evaluation perspectives. From the financial perspective, the 
performances of the four enterprises from good to bad are: Company 3 is at the same superior 
level as company 4, followed by company 2, and the performance of company 1 is the worst; 
From the customer perspective, the performances of the four enterprises from good to bad 
are: Company 3, company 2, company 1; From the perspective of internal business processes, 
the performances of the four enterprises from good to bad are as follows: Company 1, 
company 3, company 2 and company 4 are at the same poor level; From the perspective of 
learning and growth, the performances of the four enterprises from good to bad are: Company 
4, Company 2, Company 1, Company 3  
From the comprehensive fuzzy evaluation vector of Formula (5-35), the performances of 
the four enterprises can be obtained, from superior to poor: Company 4, company 2, company 
3, company 1.  
 
5.2 Conclusion 
In this paper, the fuzzy performance evaluation model for state-owned group enterprises 
is established by combining the characteristics of overall balance, overall connection, 
qualitative analysis and quantitative calculation and using the Delphi method and entropy 
weight method for the managers of the state-owned groups to understand and improve the 
management of subsidiary enterprises.  
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Chapter 6 Analysis of Coordination and Decision-making among 
Subsidiaries of State-owned Enterprise Group 
Since the reform and opening up, China's economy has been on a path of sustained and 
rapid development, and become an important part of world economy. Against this backdrop, 
the state-owned enterprises in China have gradually improved in practice.  
As state-owned enterprise groups implement the diversified management strategies, some 
product lines that lack competitiveness are gradually eliminated, while some resources 
conducive to the development of the enterprise groups are effectively integrated, and the 
dominant positions of enterprise groups within the industries are on constantly rise. However, 
with the implementation of horizontal or vertical integration strategy, the decision makers of 
enterprise groups are inevitably faced with the problem of how to effectively strengthen the 
coordination between subsidiaries or departments within the groups in order to consolidate 
and develop their core competitiveness and internal cohesion.  
The decision-making process of coordination between subsidiaries or departments of 
enterprise group has been characterized with complexity and poor symmetry of information 
and data. Therefore, in the process of inter-departmental coordination and decision-making, 
the quantitative factors are often impossible to complete. Usually, the decision makers can 
only use the method of subjective decision to determine the overall objectives of the 
enterprise and the tasks of each sector in the next period. The Analytic Hierarchy Process 
(AHP) is a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods that determines the relative 
importance of many factors in the hierarchy by comparing in pairs, and synthesizes the 
relative importance of people's judgment and the determined decision factors to carry on the 
overall sequencing. Its most important and basic idea is to make complex problems 
hierarchical and to consider the problem layer by layer. It provides quantitative basis for 
analysis and decision making and is widely used in analysis and evaluation.  
However, with the increasing application of Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), its 
limitations are gradually exposed: When establishing judgment matrix, the data processed by 
AHP are "point" data or "rigid" data. But in actual decision-making process, it is often 
difficult for the decision-makers to make a clear judgment on the comparison of the two 
factors, where it might not be appropriate to use rigid point data. In management, because 
the information is not complete, the experts are often uncertain about their judgment. In this 
case, we use the interval AHP method that is using the interval number to replace the point 
value to form a judgment matrix, and then solve the weight vector and the comprehensive 
weight of interval number, and finally sequence them.  
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6.1 Research on IAHP Modeling  
6.1.1 Brief Introduction to the Interval Analytic Hierarchy Process (IAHP)  
（1）The difference between IAHP and AHP  
By comparing IAHP and AHP, we can see that with the introduction of interval number 
judgment matrix, the construction of judgment matrix becomes more and more in line with 
human subjective judgment. The differences between IAHP and AHP decision making 
methods are also enlarged accordingly. In the process of theoretical research and practical 
operation, we can see that there are several main differences between IAHP and AHP.  
① IAHP needs to construct interval number judgment matrix.  
② The methods used to roughly solve the eigenvector are different.  
③The introduction of k and m, to determine which interval number the matrix emphasizes. 
The k/m is the most important influence factor to solve the final eigenvector.  
④ the difference of consistency test.  
（2）Application scope of IAHP decision-making method  
IAHP decision making method combines qualitative and quantitative methods and has the 
characteristics of hierarchical and broad judgment intervals. It is widely used in various 
decision-making fields and provides an effective mathematical model for decision-making. 
However, in the process of practical decision operation, we should pay attention to using 
experts or experienced hands to construct the judgment matrix, which can avoid both the 
difficulty to pass the consistency test and the distortion in the actual decision.  
 
6.1.2 Establishment of IAHP Model  
(1) Establishment of a hierarchy  
Similar to the AHP method, the establishment of hierarchical structure is also the key to 
modeling and comprehensive ranking with IAHP, which is the first step to simplify the 
complex problems. When building the hierarchical model, we should first define the decision 
goal and accurately analyze the relevant influence factors. Build a hierarchical model in turn, 
until the final decomposition into the corresponding related factor criteria, that is, there 
should be a target layer, criterion layer, sub-criterion layer, program layer.  
The whole calculation process of IAHP model is based on the establishment of hierarchical 
structure, and the relative importance of each sub-factor to the overall goal is taken as the 
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weight. It should be noted that each factor of the same layer should be graded in relation to 
the relative factors of the previous layer.  
(2) Forming judgment matrix  
After the hierarchical structure is established, the judgment matrix should be established to 
scale out the local weights in each layer. It is a comparison of one factor in pairs with other 
factors in the same layer. By solving the largest eigenvalue and eigenvector of the matrix, we 
can get the weight ranking of each factor relative to other factors. In the calculation of IAHP, 
the relative importance scale of AHP method is still used.  
In the process of establishing judgment matrix by IAHP calculation, if A and B are 
considered to be between very important and absolute important, the comparative language 
scale is quantified by looking up Table 6-1, and the relative importance indicator is as follows: 
[7,9], according to which the judgment matrix can be constructed. In the process of practical 
operation, experts should be asked to make a careful comparison and scoring to make it more 
scientific and credible.  
Table 6-1 Positive Reciprocal 1-9 Scale Table 
 
Scale aij Definition 
1 i factor is as important as j 
3 i factor is slightly more important than j 
5 i factor is more important than j 
7 i factor is more important than j 
9 i factor is more important than j 
2, 4, 6, 8 For the intermediate state between the above two judgments 
Reciprocal Importance of factor j compared with factor i 
 
(3) Solve the weight of judgment matrix  
After establishing the judgment matrix according to the above first two steps, we can 
calculate the weight of the interval number. In this paper, the interval eigenvalue method is 
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used to solve the eigenvector of the interval number judgment matrix. We usually calculate 
interval number matrices by means of numerical matrices or vectors.  
Note nxnijaA )( as an interval matrix, that is
nxnijaA )(
  , also note:, nxnijaA )(
  , that is
],[  AAA . In the same way, for the interval vector ),...,,( 21 nxxxx 
, that is ],[ xixii
x  , 
for the interval vector 
T
nxxxx ),...,( 21
  , 
T
nxxxx ),...,( 21
  , and note ],[  xxx . 
In addition: If:  XA  , namely   is the eigenvalue of A, x is the eigenvector of A. Then
  xxA  ,   xxA  . And if  and   is the largest eigenvalue of the 
corresponding matrix, then: x- and x+and are the normalized feature vectors corresponding to
 and   respectively. ],[  mxkxx is the corresponding full eigenvector of x-, where 
k and m are all positive real numbers satisfying
  mxkx0 . The ratio between K and m 
is the judgment of experts that is closer to which importance in the scale of 1-9. According 
to the symmetry of the left and right endpoints of the weight vector, we can obtain the 
expressions of k and m. Assume:  



 





n
j
n
i
ij
n
j
n
i
ij a
m
a
k
1
1
1
1
11
, where we can get the calculation method of the weight of 
interval number.  
The steps are as follows:  
The interval judgment matrix is divided into two matrices: A- and A+ for calculation.  
① Normalize the judgment matrix by column.  
njni
a
a
a
n
i
ij
y
y ,...,2,1;,...,2,1,
1



 
② The normalized matrix is added by rows.  
niaw
n
j
iji ,...,2,1,
1


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And then normalize the vector T
nwwww ),...,,( 21 , that is



n
i
i
i
i
w
w
w
1
, when: 
T
nwwww ),...,,( 21 is the eigenvalue to be solved. 
Calculate the largest eigenvalue  of the judgment matrix, then 


n
i i
i
nw
Aw
1
)(
 ; where: (Aw)i 
is the i-th element of the vector Aw. Obtain the eigenvectors x- and x+ of the two matrices.  
③ From the expressions of k and m, 


 





n
j
n
i
ij
n
j
n
i
ij a
m
a
k
1
1
1
1
11
, obtain k and m, 
and the corresponding weights of weight vectors ],[  mxkxx  can be obtained by 
introducing the formula.  
④ After determining the corresponding weight values of n weight vectors, we use the form 
of center interval to represent the above interval, and select the greater influence factors to 
sequence. Namely: 
),(
2
1
)(   iii mxkxAm
. Based on this, the weights of n targets can be 
determined and sequenced.  
(4) Consistency test  
Definition: If kji ,, all have ikjk aaa
ji
 , A is called the consistency judgment matrix.  
Test methods: I.  Calculate consistency indicators:
1
.. max



n
n
IC

. II. Calculate consistency 
ratio:. ../... IRICRC  Where the value ..IR  is  
Dimen
sion 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
RI 0 0 0.58 0.89 1.12 1.26 1.36 1.41 1.46 1.49 1.52 1.54 1.56 1.58 
When C.R. < 0.1, the judgment matrix satisfies the consistency, and the next operation can 
be carried out.  
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6.1.3 Matters Needing Attention 
In general, it is a multi-level model. When building hierarchical structure and judgment 
matrix, there should be target layer, criterion layer, sub-criterion layer and scheme layer. 
When calculating the ranking weight of the previous indicator in each indicator system, the 
influence of the eigenvector  of the previous indicator on the next layer should 
be calculated. When calculating the hierarchical total sequence consistency indicator, the 
hierarchical total sequence random consistency indicator is 


m
i
ii ICaIC
1
.... . When
1.0../........
1


m
i
ii IRICRCIRaIR 。 , the hierarchy total sort matrix satisfies consistency. 
when the consistency is too low, correction judgment matrix should be adopted to correct 
and recalculate until the requirements are met.  
When the consistency test of each judgment matrix is up to standard, and the total test is not 
qualified, we should start to reconstruct the judgment matrix with the largest C.R.  
 
6.2 Process of Coordinated Decision  
6.2.1 Main Thrust of Inter-sectoral Coordinated Decision  
Modern enterprise group is a large system composed of many functional departments. 
These functional departments are called the subsystem of enterprise group. As a system, 
enterprise groups have their own specific goals, and different as their goals are, these goals 
are global, such as the pursuit of profit maximization, rapid expansion of enterprises and so 
on. While as subsystem each functional department also has its own specific goals, and the 
goals of the subsystem are subordinate to and serve the system goals. Of course, this does 
not mean that the objectives of the subsystems are always consistent with the overall 
objectives of the enterprise group. In fact, the objectives of the subsystems and the objectives 
of the groups are to a large extent not compatible with the objectives of the enterprise groups. 
The measures taken by various functional departments to achieve their own goals often 
damage the realization of the objectives of other departments or are restricted by other 
departments, and ultimately affect the realization of the overall objectives of the enterprise.  
There are many reasons for this. For example, information asymmetry, conflicting 
objectives of the various subsystems, and so on. Traditional methods focus on the 
establishment of appropriate overall planning model, set up a reasonable global objective 
function, ignore the local objectives of each department, set up resource constraints, establish 
a goal programming model, and then solve the model, so as to determine the decision plan. 
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This method is undoubtedly a scientific and effective method, an important basis of decision-
making science, and also an important theoretical cornerstone of decision support system 
research. However, when faced with the decentralized organization and the decisions in 
contradiction with the specific objectives of some departments, it will inevitably give rise to 
a decrease in the working enthusiasm of the departments, inefficient production and services 
and other obstacles to the development of enterprises.  
In order to avoid such a situation, the main ideas for this paper to adopt decision approach 
are: Each department of the enterprise first independently formulates its own decision scheme, 
then carries on many information exchanges and adjusts their decision scheme, finally 
achieves the satisfactory solution, and realizes the system overall optimization. In this 
method, each department adjusts the parameters of its decision model, and after many 
interactive dynamic processes, finally obtains the optimized decision results that all parties 
are satisfied with.  
 
6.2.2 General Model for Coordinated Decision-making between Functional 
Departments  
Assuming that there are n departments involved in coordinated decision-making, each with 
information autonomy, the optimization model is a single-objective optimization model (or 
a multi-objective model that can be transformed into a single-objective model), the global 
decision vector is )...,( n21  ，，I  where ),...,1( nii   is the global decision variable, 
n is the decision number, and
iii    11  is the difference between the interdepartmental 
decision steps in the decision-making process.  
 
6.2.3 General Process of Coordinated Decision-making between Functional 
Departments  
The final purpose of coordinated decision-making among the functional departments of 
enterprises is to find a scheme to satisfy all departments. That is, there is no decision goal 
made by the superior department, which causes dissatisfaction among some departments due 
to their own special reasons or the overall fairness, so as to result in the decrease of work 
efficiency and the degree of inter-departmental cooperation and reduce production and 
service efficiency. For example, when formulating a fund allocation programme, that is, how 
the state-owned group should allocate the funds to the various sectors, so that the departments 
will be more satisfied with the funds allocation programme if the plan can be fully completed 
rather than complain about their own difficulties or fairness and other circumstances. Or each 
department plan objective coordination plan that is how to formulate the production or target 
quota plan in the next period, so that some departments will not think their quota poses too 
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much pressure on them. In the process of coordination, all departments should take the 
interests of their departments as the priority, that is to say, a department will lead the AHP 
ranking allocation, prioritize allocation for its own department slightly over others, and 
finally reach a relatively satisfactory allocation plan for each department.  
The coordination principles are: (1) In the process of coordination, the differences between 
various departments should be reduced continuously, that is, the coordination process is 
convergent. If the process of coordination is becoming more and more divisive, that is, the 
process of coordination diverges, then this situation should be given up. This paper 
guarantees the convergence of the results is to properly increase the weight of the last round 
of inconsistent results in the next cycle. (2) It is to determine the conditions in which all 
departments can be satisfied, that is, how to determine the final satisfactory results. The 
method of choosing satisfactory solutions in this paper is to compare the results of the two 
allocations before and after, in order to determine whether it is less than the established 
acceptable optimal coordination difference.  
The process of multisectoral participation in coordinated decision-making is described 
below:  
① system initialization. Assuming that there are n departments, the candidate order of each 
department can be arranged in a predetermined order, and a sufficiently small positive ε 
acceptable to each department is set to be the difference in the optimization and coordination 
process acceptable to all departments.  
② choose the first department to make the decision, and give the decision result i . Then 
choose the next department decision, and again give the decision results of each department
1i .  
③  
iii    11  
④ compare the distribution results 1i with the minimum ε acceptable to each department: 
If  1i , then the coordination process is completed, find the solution that makes each 
department satisfied; If  j , so select the next department and re-make the decision. 
1 ii ; And before the next round of coordination, we should appropriately increase the 
weight of the last round not in line with the department, to ensure the convergence of the 
coordination process.  
⑤ if i=n, all departments have been fully coordinated, it is impossible to find a coordination 
plan that will satisfy all departments, and coordination ends with failure.  
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This is the process of building a decision system model with information technology based 
on coordination, which is widely used in the field of information technology. Based on its 
scientific and normative nature, this paper applies it to the coordination of decision-making 
among departments. The essence of this coordination process is: There are a lot of methods 
for coordinated decision for selected sectoral departments, and this thesis selects interval 
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), then makes decision by replacing the decision 
department step by step, and finds out whether all the sectors are satisfied by certain 
constraints, that is, whether the decision-making process is over.  
There are two criteria to be satisfied in this thesis:  
①  whether 1i  is less than ε, that is, whether it satisfies the gradual convergence of the 
coordination difference in the process. If 1i  cannot satisfy the gradual reduction, or if the 
quantized divergence is gradually becoming larger, then the decision vector is divergent, the 
reasons for and solutions to such problems must be found.  
②  Whether i is equal to n. that is, whether all departments that need coordination have 
been coordinated. If all of them have been coordinated, that is, i=n, under this margin ε, it is 
impossible to find a solution that will satisfy all sectors. The solution in this paper is: 
Appropriately increase ε, that is, appropriately increase the minimum difference acceptable 
to various departments, then the coordinated decision based on IAHP method is carried out.  
And it should be noted that in the process of selecting ε, the size of ε is more critical. The 
excessively large ε will shorten the coordination process, and inevitably cause excessively 
large gap among various departments. The excessively small ε might satisfy various 
departments, but the coordination process will be too long, or even can not appear satisfactory 
solution. Therefore, it depends in the actual operation process.  
 
6.3 Empirical Study of IAHP in LH Group's Coordinated Decision-making Investment  
6.3.1 Basic Data  
According to the "Analysis and Research on the Supervision of State-owned Enterprises 
of Shandong SASAC", this thesis obtains eight categories of enterprises belonging to the 
state-owned groups of Shandong SASAC. Total assets, liabilities, owners' equities, operating 
income, total profits and net profits of coal, iron and steel, automobile and machinery 
manufacturing, transport, trade, investment, gold and pharmaceutical and chemical industries 
in 2017. 
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6.3.2 Question Assumptions and Indicator Layers 
③ In the next quarter, the SASAC of Shandong Province is to allocate a sum of funds to 
the enterprises under its jurisdiction to promote the implementation of its accelerated 
development strategy in the next quarter. Through preliminary observation, it indicates that 
the real estate development sector enterprises from the above four aspects are far better than 
other sectors. Consideration could therefore be given to allocating its funds separately to 
support its next phase of rapid and stable development. Real estate development sector 
enterprises are not within the scope of consideration. The problem becomes the reasonable 
allocation of the remaining funds to hotel management, coal logistics, biopharmaceutical, 
new finance pawn and project management. To promote its development in the next quarter, 
the funds allocation is required that the amount of funds allocated to enterprises in various 
sectors enable all departments to be satisfied with the allocated amounts, including the 
amounts of their own and other sectors, provided that the normal development in the next 
stage is ensured, and there should not be a decline in the overall productivity of state-owned 
enterprise groups or a decline in inter-sectoral synergy among sectors due to the 
dissatisfaction of some departments with the allocation plan.  
④ For this problem, the coordinated decision-making for subsidiaries of state-owned 
enterprise group as discussed in this thesis with the IAHP method can be performed. Start 
with a hierarchy diagram, as shown in Figure 6-1.  
 
Figure 6-1 Indicator Hierarchy of State-owned Group Enterprise’s Subsidiaries 
Fund allocation plan 
Proportion Net profit Year-on-year 
increase 
Hotel 
management 
Coal-mining 
Category 
Biopharmaceutical Xinrong 
Pawnshop 
Project 
management 
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In order to allocate state funds to various departments in a reasonable manner and avoid 
dissatisfaction of some departments with the funds allocated we construct three criteria at the 
criterion layer in the construction hierarchical diagrams：C1 is proportion, C2 is net profit 
and C3 is year-on-year growth. Any criterion include five sectors of departments，which are 
hotel management, coal logistics, biopharmaceutical, new finance pawn and project 
management. The task is to use the IAHP method and the general process of inter-
departmental coordination decision-making to coordinate the decision-making, so that these 
five sectors of enterprises can realize the reasonable allocation of funds under the hierarchy 
structure through a reasonable funds allocation plan.  
 
6.3.3 Establishment and Analysis of Evaluation System  
Assume that the Shandong SASAC is allocating 10 million funds in next quarter to these 
five sectors of enterprises, and according to the general process of synergy optimization, set 
the minimum ε acceptable to various sectors to be 1 million. Then optimize according to the 
above mentioned process and the given table.  
①n=5, ε=1 million  
② Select the hotel management sector as the leading department, and carry out IAHP 
ranking and distribution. The relative judgment matrix developed by hotel enterprises is  
A—C C1 C2 C3 
C1 (1,1) (3,5) (2,4) 
C2 (1/5,1/3) (1,1) (1,3) 
C3 (1/4,1/2) (1/3,1) (1,1) 
Obtain:  
X
-= (0.627, 0.206, 0.166), X+= (0.587, 0.233, 0.180). 
The k and m are: k=0.902,m=1.082.  
Accordingly, according to ),(
2
1
)(   iii mxkxAm : the total eigenvector of the third order 
judgment matrix is (0. 6, 0. 219, 0. 173).  
That is: When IAHP distribution is dominated by the hotel management section, the 
importance of proportion, net profit and year-on-year growth to the enterprises of the hotel 
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management section, account for 60%, 21.9% and 17.3%, respectively. This is the condition 
for the final total sort.  
The construction of such judgment matrix is reasonable. If the judgment matrix is constructed 
on the hotel management section, for proportion, net profit and year-on-year growth, the 
performances of the proportion and the year-on-year growth are far better than those of other 
industries, so when building a judgment matrix led by hotel management sector enterprises, 
the weights of these two indicators will be added to increase their own advantages over other 
sectors accordingly.  
C1—D D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 
D1 (1,1) (1,3) (2,4) (3,5) (3,5) 
D2 (1/3,1) (1,1) (1,3) (3,5) (3,5) 
D3 (1/4,1/2) (1/3,1) (1,1) (2,4) (2,4) 
D4 (1/5,1/3) (1/5,1/3) (1/4,1/2) (1,1) (1,2) 
D5 (1/5,1/3) (1/5,1/3) (1/4,1/2) (1/2,1) (1,1) 
Obtain through calculations:  
x-= (0.386, 0.274, 0.176, 0.087, 0.076),x+=(0.379, 0.286, 0.186, 0.8, 0.068). The k and m are: 
k=0.851, m=1.139.  
Thereafter, according to ),(
2
1
)(   iii mxkxAm , the total eigenvector of the fifth order 
judgment matrix is (0.38, 0.28 ~ 0.181 ~ 0.083 ~ 0. 071).  
Namely: When IAHP distribution is dominated by the hotel management section, based on 
the criterion of proportion, the distribution proportions of hotel management, coal logistics, 
biopharmaceutical, new financial pawn and project management should be as follows: 38%, 
28%, 18.1%, 8.3% and 7.1%.  
The construction of such judgment matrix has its rationality. If the judgment matrix is 
constructed on the hotel management section, the hotel management sector will surely 
increase its own weight over other sector in order to increase its competitive advantage over 
other sectoral enterprises, and even for similar indicators, the hotel management sector is 
bound to increase its weight relative to those of other departments in order to increase its own 
advantage and compete for a better share in final funds allocation, which is the main reason 
why this paper adopts such a coordinated decision-making process.  
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C2—D D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 
D1 (1,1) (1,3) (1/3,1) (1,2) (2,3) 
D2 (1/3,1) (1,1) (1/5,1/3) (1/4,1/2) (1,2) 
D3 (1,3) (3,5) (1,1) (1,3) (3,5) 
D4 (1,1) (2,4) (1/3,1) (1,1) (2,4) 
D5 (1/3,1) (1,2) (1/5,1/3) (1/4,1/2) (1,1) 
Through calculations obtain:  
x-= (0.213,0.099,0.35,0.238,0.099), x+= (0.22,0.101,0.359,0.218,0.101).  
The k and m are: k=0.832, m=1.13.  
Accordingly, according to ),(
2
1
)(   iii mxkxAm , the total eigenvector of the fifth order 
judgment matrix is (0.213, 0.098, 0.349, 0.223, 0.098).  
Namely: When IAHP is assigned under the leadership of the hotel management section and 
based on net profit criterion, the assigned proportions of hotel management, coal logistics, 
biopharmaceutical, new finance and pawn and project management should be: 21.3%, 9.8%, 
34.9%, 22.3% and 9.8%, respectively.  
The rationality of the construction of judgment matrix has been stated in the C1-D matrix 
and will not be restated.  
C3—D D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 
D1 (1,1) (3,5) (2,3) (2,3) (1,2) 
D2 (1/5,1/3) (1,1) (1/4,1/2) (1/4,1/2) (1/6,1/4) 
D3 (1/3,1) (2,4) (1,1) (1,2) (1/5,1/3) 
D4 (1/3,1) (2,4) (1,2) (1,1) (1/5,1/3) 
D5 (1,2) (4,6) (3,5) (3,5) (1,1) 
Through calculations obtain:  
x-= (0.308, 0.057, 0.127, 0.127, 0.38), x+= (0.294, 0.053, 0.147, 0.147, 0.36).  
The k and m are: k=0.817, m=1.048.  
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Accordingly, according to ),(
2
1
)(   iii mxkxAm , the total eigenvector of the five-order 
judgment matrix is (0.28, 0.051, 0.129, 0.129, 0.344).  
Namely: When IAHP assignment is led by the hotel management section based on the year-
over-year growth criteria, the assigned proportions of hotel management, coal logistics, 
biopharmaceutical, new finance and pawn, and project management should be as follows: 
28%, 5.1%, 12.9%, 12.9%.,34.4%.  
The rationality of the construction of judgment matrix has been stated in the C1-D matrix 
and will not be restated.  
Set simultaneous A-C matrix/C1-D matrix, C2-D matrix and C3-D matrix. Perform total 
sorting based on the hotel management sectoral enterprises.  
 C1 C2 C3 
0.6 0.219 0.173 
D1 0.38 0.213 0.28 
D2 0.28 0.098 0.051 
D3 0.181 0.349 0.129 
D4 0.083 0.223 0.129 
D5 0.071 0.098 0.344 
Through comprehensive ranking and calculation, obtain:  
W= (0.323, 0.198, 0.207, 0.121, 0.124),  
Consistency check: Total C.1=0.018 and R, I.=1.12, total C.R.=0.016 < 0.1. The matrix 
satisfies the consistency, that is, the overall satisfies consistency. The established matrix is 
true.  
Namely: In the case of IAHP decision allocation led by hotel management section and based 
on the joint criteria of proportion, net profit and year-on-year growth, the assigned 
proportions of hotel management, coal logistics, biopharmaceuticals, new finance pawn and 
project management should be: 32.3%, 19.80%, 20.7%, 12.1% and 12.4%, respectively.  
The test passed, so: The 10 million assigned by SASAC, if the hotel management section is 
chosen as the dominant one, will be allocated through IAHP ranking and assignment to hotel 
management, coal logistics, biopharmaceutical, new finance pawn and project management 
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3.23 million, 1.98 million, 2.07 million, 1.12 million and 1.24 million RMB Yuan, 
respectively.  
Through the construction and gradual calculation of the judgment matrices which are 
superior to other sectoral enterprises, it clearly indicates that the results of IAHP coordinated 
decision-making led by the hotel management sector tend to increase the funds allocation of 
the hotel management sectoral enterprises. The 3.23 million RMB is much higher than that 
in other sectors. This is only natural but bound to lead to dissatisfaction, uncoordinated 
cooperation and ultimately inefficiencies among other departments as well as failure for rapid 
and steady growth of production efficiency. Therefore, according to the general process of 
coordinated optimization in this paper, the next step of coordinated optimization should be 
carried out.  
Then the IAHP ranking and assignment is carried out led by the coal logistics section. The 
relative judgment matrix of the coal logistics enterprises is as follows.  
 
A—C C1 C2 C3 
C1 (1,1) (1,2) (3,5) 
C2 (1/2,1) (1,1) (3,5) 
C3 (1/5,1/3) (1/5,1/3) (1,1) 
Through calculations, obtain:  
x-= (0.49, 0.392, 0.117), x+= (0.494, 0.394, 0.111).  
The k and m are: k=0.905, m=1.089.  
Accordingly, according to ),(
2
1
)(   iii mxkxAm , the total eigenvector of the third-order 
judgment matrix is (0.491, 0.392, 0.114).  
Namely: When IAHP assignment is led by coal logistics section, the importances of the 
proportion, net profit and year-on-year growth to the enterprises of coal logistics sector, 
account for 49.1%, 39.2% and 11.4%, respectively. This is the condition for the final total 
ranking.  
The construction of the judgment matrix has its rationality. If the judgment matrix is 
constructed from the coal logistics sector, among the proportion, the net profit and the year-
on-year growth, the performance of the proportion is much better than that of other sectors. 
Therefore, when the coal logistics -management-sector-enterprise-led judgment matrix is 
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constructed, the weight of this indicator will be increased to enhance its own advantage over 
other sectors.  
Cl—D D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 
D1 (1,1) (1/3,1) (1,3) (3,5) (3,5) 
D2 (1,3) (1,1) (2,4) (3,5) (3,5) 
D3 (1/3,1) (1/4,1/2) (1,1) (2,4) (2,4) 
D4 (1/5,1/3) (1/5,1/3) (1/4,1/2) (1,1) (1,2) 
D5 (1/5,1/3) (1/5,1/3) (1/4,1/2) (1/2,1) (1,1) 
Through calculations, obtain:  
x-= (0.274, 0.386, 0.176, 0.087, 0.076), x+= (0.286, 0.379, 0.186, 0.08, 0.068).  
The k and m are: k=0.851, m=1.139.  
Accordingly, according to ),(
2
1
)(   iii mxkxAm , the total eigenvector of the fifth order 
judgement matrix is (0.28, 0.38, 0.181, 0.083, 0.071)  
Namely: When the assignment of IAHp is led by coal logistics sector and based on the 
proportion criterion, the assigned proportions of hotel management, coal logistics, 
biopharmaceutical, new finance and project management should be: 28 %, 38%, 18.1%, 8.3% 
and 7.1%, respectively.  
The construction of such judgment matrix has its rationality. If the judgment matrix is 
constructed with the coal logistics sector, the coal logistics sectoral enterprises will surely 
increase their weights relative to those of other sectoral enterprises in order to enhance their 
competitive advantage over other sectoral enterprises, and even for similar indicators, the 
coal logistics sectoral enterprises are bound to increase their weights relative to those of other 
departments in order to increase its own advantage and compete for a better share in final 
funds allocation, which is the main reason why this paper adopts such a coordinated decision-
making process. 
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C2—D D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 
D1 (1,1) (1/5,1/3) (1/6,1/4) (1/5,1/3) (1/4,1/2) 
D2 (3,5) (1,1) (1/3,1) (1,2) (1,3) 
D3 (4,6) (1,3) (1,1) (1,2) (3,5) 
D4 (3,5) (1,2) (1/2,1) (1,1) (2,4) 
D5 (2,4) (1/3,1) (1/5,1/3) (1/4,1/2) (1,1) 
Through calculations, obtain:  
x-= (0.06, 0.219, 0.35, 0.261, 0.11), x+= (0.051, 0.244, 0.337, 0.252, 0.116).  
The k and m are: k=0.842, m=1.115.  
Hence, according to ),(
2
1
)(   iii mxkxAm , the total eigenvector of the five-order judgment 
matrix is (0.054, 0.228, 0.335, 0.25, 0.111).  
Namely: When the assignment of IAHP is led by coal logistics sector based on net profit 
criteria, the proportions of hotel management, coal logistics, biopharmaceutical, new finance 
and project management sectoral enterprises should be as follows: 5.4%, 22.8%, 33.5%, 25% 
and 11.1%.  
The construction rationality of judgment matrix has been stated in the C1-D matrix and will 
not be restated.  
C3—D D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 
D1 (1,1) (2,4) (1,3) (1,3) (1/4,1/2) 
D2 (1/4,1/2) (1,1) (1/3,1) (1/3,1) (1/6,1/4) 
D3 (1/3,1) (1,3) (1,1) (1/2,1) (1/5,1/3) 
D4 (1/3,1) (1,3) (1,2) (1,1) (1/5,1/3) 
D5 (2,4) (4,6) (3,5) (3,5) (1,1) 
Through calculations, obtain:  
x-= (0.189, 0.753, 0.11, 0.127, 0.499), x+= (0.22, 0.081, 0.124, 0.141, 0.434).  
The k and m are: k=0.883, m=1.116.  
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Hence, according to ),(
2
1
)(   iii mxkxAm , the overall feature vector of the fifth-order 
judgment matrix is (0.206, 0.078, 0.118, 0.135, 0.463).  
Namely: When the assignment of IAHP is led by the coal logistics sector and based on the 
year-on-year growth criteria, the assigned proportions for hotel management, coal logistics, 
biopharmaceuticals, new financial pawn, and project management sectoral enterprises should 
be: 20.6%, 7.8%, 11.8%, 13.5% and 46.3%.  
The rationality of the construction of the judgment matrix has already been described in the 
C1-D matrix, and will not be restated.  
Set simultaneous A-C matrix, C1-D matrix, C2-D matrix, and C3-D matrix. Carry out a 
comprehensive ranking based on the coal logistics sectoral enterprises.  
 
 C1 C2 C3 
0.491 0.392 0.114 
D1 0.28 0.054 0.206 
D2 0.38 0.228 0.078 
D3 0.181 0.335 0.118 
D4 0.083 0.25 0.135 
D5 0.071 0.111 0.463 
Through calculations, obtain:  
W= (0.182, 0.285, 0.234, 0.154, 0.131),  
Total C.I.=0.021, R, I.=1.12, total C.R.=0.019<0.1.  
The matrix satisfies the consistency, that is, generally satisfies consistency. The matrix is 
true.  
Namely: In the case of IAHP's decision-making assignment led by the coal logistics sector 
and based on the combined criteria of proportion, net profit, and year-on-year growth, the 
assigned overall proportions of hotel management, coal logistics, biopharmaceuticals, new 
financial pawn and project management should be: 18.2%, 28.5%, 23.4%, 15.4% and 13.1%  
The test passed, so: The 10 million allocated by the SASAC, if the hotel management section 
is selected to lead the IAHP rank allocation, should be allocated to hotel management, coal 
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logistics, biopharmaceuticals, new financial pawn and project management, 1.82 million, 
2.85 million, 2.34 million, 154 million and 131 million RMB Yuan of funds.  
Through the construction and the gradual calculation of each judgment matrix superior to 
other sectoral enterprises, it clearly indicates that the results of the IAHP's coordinated 
decision-making with the coal logistics sector as the dominant factor tended to increase the 
allocation of funds to the coal logistics sector. Its allocated fund of 2.85 million RMB Yuan 
is higher than those of other departments. This is an inevitable result but will inevitably lead 
to dissatisfaction, incoordination and low coordination efficiency among various departments 
as well as failure for rapid and steady growth of production efficiency. Therefore, the next 
step of coordinated optimization should be carried out according to the general process 
mentioned in this paper.  
Calculate iiii    111, of each department, obtain the differences 1i  
between the five departments are 1.41 million, 0.87 million, 0.27 million, 0.33 million, and 
70,000, which indicate: In the coal-logistics-dominated AHP ranking and assignment, the 
difference of hotel management departments is too much, which is greater than the optimized 
minimum difference of 1 million acceptable to the sectoral enterprises. The degree of 
satisfaction is too low and adjustments need to be made.  
Select another sector of enterprises to make the next adjustment.  
Then the biopharmaceutical sector is used as the leading IAHP allocation, and the 
biopharmaceutical companies' relative judgment matrix is  
A—C C1 C2 C3 
C1 (1,1) (3,5) (2,4) 
C2 (1/5,1/3) (1,1) (1,3) 
C3 (1/4,1/2) (1/3,1) (1,1) 
Through calculations, obtain:  
x-= (0.627, 0.206, 0.166), x+= (0.587, 0.233, 0.18).  
The k and m are: k=0.902, m=1.082.  
Hence, according to ),(
2
1
)(   iii mxkxAm , the overall feature vector of the third-order 
judgment matrix is (0.6, 0.219, 0.173).  
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Namely: When IAHP assignment is dominated by biopharmaceutical sector, the importance 
of proportion, net profit and year-on-year growth to the biopharmaceutical sectoral 
enterprises account for 60%, 21.9% and 17.3%, respectively. This is the final condition of 
the total ranking.  
The construction of such judgment matrix is reasonable. If the biopharmaceutical sector is 
used to construct the judgment matrix, among the three indicators of proportion, net profit 
and year-on-year growth, the performance of net profit is much better than that of other 
sectors. Therefore, the bio-pharmaceutical sector will increase the weight of this indicator so 
as to increase its own advantage over other sectors.  
C1—D D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 
D1 (1,1) (1,2) (1,3) (4,6) (4,6) 
D2 (1/2,1) (1,1) (1,3) (4,6) (4,6) 
D3 (1/3,1) (1/3,1) (1,1) (3,5) (3,5) 
D4 (1/6,1/4) (1/6,1/4) (1/5,1/3) (1,1) (1,2) 
D5 (1/6,1/4) (1/6,1/4) (1/5,1/3) (1/2,1) (1,1) 
Through calculations，obtain::  
x-= (0.352, 0.306, 0.209, 0.071, 0.063), x+= (0.347, 0.303, 0.23, 0.065, 0.055).  
The k and m are: k=0.861, m=1.135.  
Hence, according to ),(
2
1
)(   iii mxkxAm , the overall feature vector of the fifth-order 
judgment matrix is (0.348, 0.303, 0.221, 0.067, 0.058).  
Namely: When the IAP assignment is led by the biopharmaceutical sector and based on the 
proportion criterion, the proportions of hotel management, coal logistics, biopharmaceuticals, 
new financial pawn and project management should be: 34.8%, 30.3%, 22.1%, 6.7% and 
5.8%.  
The structure of such judgment matrix is reasonable. If the bio-pharmaceutical sector is used 
to construct the judgment matrix, the bio-pharmaceutical enterprises will increase their 
weights relative to other sectoral enterprises to increase their competitive advantage over 
other sectoral enterprises. Even for previously similar indicators, bio-pharmaceutical sectoral 
enterprises will increase the corresponding weight to increase their own advantages compete 
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for better share of funds allocation, which is the main reason why this paper adopts such a 
coordinated decision-making process.  
 
C2—D D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 
D1 (1,1) (1/4,1/2) (1/8, 1/6) (1/6,1/4) (1/4,1/2) 
D2 (2,4) (1,1) (1/6,1/4) (1/5,1/3) (1/2,1) 
D3 (6,8) (4,6) (1,1) (1,3) (4,6) 
D4 (4,6) (3,5) (1/3,1) (1,1) (3,5) 
D5 (2,4) (1,2) (1/6,1/4) (1/5,1/3) (1,1) 
Through calculations, obtain:  
x-= (0.051, 0.094, 0.447, 0.302, 0.105), x+= (0.046, 0.096, 0.438, 0.311, 0.109).  
The k and m are: k=0.875, m=1.112.  
Hence, according to ),(
2
1
)(   iii mxkxAm , the overall eigenvector of the fifth-order 
judgment matrix is (0.048, 0.094, 0.439, 0.305, 0.107).  
Namely: When the IAP assignment is led by the biopharmaceutical sector and based on the 
net profit criterion, the proportions of hotel management, coal logistics, biopharmaceuticals, 
new financial pawn, and project management sectoral enterprises shall be: 4.8%, 9.4%, 
43.9%, 30.5% and 10.7%.  
The rationality of the construction of the judgment matrix has already been described in the 
C1-D matrix, so it will not go into details here.  
C3—D D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 
D1 (1,1) (5,7) (1,3) (2,4) (1/4,1/2) 
D2 (1/7, 1/5) (1,1) (1/5,1/3) (1/4,1/2) (1/8, 1/6) 
D3 (1/3,1) (3,5) (1,1) (1,3) (1/5,1/3) 
D4 (1/4,1/2) (2,4) (1/3,1) (1,1) (1/7, 1/5) 
D5 (2,4) (6,8) (3,5) (5,7) (1,1) 
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Through calculations, obtain:  
x-= (0.221, 0.047, 0.134, 0.087, 0.511), x+= (0.241, 0.042, 0.158, 0.097, 0.461).  
The k and m are: k=0.897, m=1.095.  
Accordingly, according to ),(
2
1
)(   iii mxkxAm , the overall feature vector of the fifth-
order judgment matrix is (0.231, 0.044.147, 0.092, 0.482).  
Namely: when the IAHP assignment is led by the biopharmaceutical sector and based on the 
criteria for year-on-year growth, the proportions for hotel management, coal logistics, 
biopharmaceuticals, new financial pawn, and project management enterprises should be: 
23.1%, 4.4%, 14.7%, 9.2% and 48.2%.  
The rationality of the construction of the judgment matrix has already been described in the 
C1-D matrix, so it will not go into details here.  
Set simultaneous A-C matrix, C1-D matrix, C2-D matrix, and C3-D matrix. Carry out a 
comprehensive ranking based on the coal logistics sector.  
 
 C1 C2 C3 
0.6 0.219 0.173 
D1 0.348 0.048 0.231 
D2 0.303 0.094 0.044 
D3 0.221 0.439 0.147 
D4 0.067 0.305 0.092 
D5 0.058 0.107 0.482 
Through calculations, obtain:  
W= (0.26, 0.21, 0.254, 0.123, 0.142) 
Total C.I. = 0.018, R, I. = 1.12, total C.R. = 0.017 < 0.1.  
The matrix satisfies consistency, that is, it generally satisfies consistency. The matrix is true.  
Namely: when the IAHP decision-making assignment is led by the bio-pharmaceutical sector 
and based on the combined criteria of proportion, net profit and year-on-year growth, the 
assigned proportions of hotel management, coal logistics, bio-pharmaceuticals, new financial 
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pawn, and project management sectoral enterprises should be: 26%, 21%, 25.4%, 12.3% and 
14.2%  
The test passed, so: the 10 million RMB Yuan allocated by SASAC, if bio-pharmaceutical 
section is selected to lead the IAHP ranking and assignment, the hotel management, coal 
logistics, bio-pharmaceuticals, new financial pawn and project management are allocated 
with 2.6 million, 2.1 million, 2.54 million, 1.23 million and 1.42 million RMB Yuan, 
respectively. 
Through the construction and the gradual calculation of each judgment matrix superior to 
those of other sectoral enterprises, it clearly indicates that the results of the IAHP 
coordination and decision-making dominated by the biopharmaceutical sector tend to 
increase the allocation of funds for biopharmaceutical sectoral enterprises. The allocation of 
2.54 million RMB Yuan is higher than those for the other three sectors. This is an inevitable 
result and will inevitably lead to dissatisfaction, incoordination of cooperation and a low 
level of coordination and efficiency among various departments as well as failure for rapid 
and steady development of production efficiency. Therefore, the next step of coordinated 
optimization should be carried out according to the general process of coordinated 
optimization in this paper.  
Calculate iiii    111, of each department, and obtain the differences 1i  between 
the five departments are 0.78 million, 0.75 million, 0.20 million, 0.31 million, and 0.11 
million RMB Yuan. It indicates that: Through the three-step calculation and two-step 
adjustment and under the IAHP ranking and assignment dominated by the bio-
pharmaceutical sector, the differences among all the sectoral enterprises are smaller than the 
acceptable optimized minimum difference of 1 million and a satisfactory allocation plan for 
each sectoral enterprise is obtained, that is, the hotel management, coal logistics, bio-
pharmaceuticals, new financial pawn and project management are allocated with 2.6 million, 
2.1 million, 2.54 million, 1.23 million and 1.42 million RMB Yuan of funds, respectively. In 
this case, all departments can be satisfied with the amounts of funds allocated, including 
those of their own and other sectors, and there will be no decline in production efficiency of 
the whole state-owned enterprise group or in the synergy among sectoral departments due to 
dissatisfaction of some sectors with the allocation plan.  
In the process of coordination, since a minimum quantity ε of the optimization process that 
all sectoral departments are satisfied with is set in advance, provided that the optimized 
difference is less than the preset ε, it can be asserted that all departments satisfy with the 
optimization process. In this case, the biopharmaceutical sector has been allocated 2.54 
million RMB Yuan of funds, which is higher than all sectoral enterprises, but it also indicates 
that among the funds of all departments, the allocated funds of the first three sectors are 
  
 
170 
 
basically on average, those of the latter two are on average. In addition, the balances between 
various departments gradually decreases in coordition process, and the coordination results 
converge. Such results are acceptable and satisfactory. In the coordination process, the 
coordination margins of all sectoral departments are all smaller than the preset ε, which meets 
the coordination process requirements. This proves that in the actual production and life, the 
interval AHP method has a certain feasibility of coordinated decision-making.  
 
6.4 Conclusion  
Through the above analysis, it can be concluded that in the process of system reform and 
development, the subsidiaries of state-owned group enterprises in Shandong Province may 
measure decisions, especially for internal allocation system and task assignment on the basis 
of the above analysis, which is very powerful in terms of practicality, applicability and 
operability, and provides a new perspective for leadership decisions of subsidiaries of state-
owned enterprise groups.  
Decision makers of enterprises, especially state-owned enterprise group generally manage 
many more subordinate sectoral departments due to the larger enterprise scale, and 
accordingly, are increasingly faced with issues of coordinated optimization among various 
departments, which is a common occurrence in actual production and life of subsidiaries of 
state-owned enterprise group and private enterprises, and plays a decisive role. Therefore, in 
actual production and life, more attention should be paid to the application of various 
coordinated decision methods in corporate governance and coordinated development of 
various departments. For example, the Delphi method and the interval AHP method 
mentioned in this article were used to address this situation with a strong scientific and 
practical operationally. In the course of coordinated decisions, the decision-makers of an 
enterprise can design the interval judgment matrix based on the actual situation, and invite 
experienced experts to make practical judgments, although there is a certain subjectivity to 
the department itself, but it does not deviate too much from the actual situation. Financial 
departments at all levels can also use this method in formulating allocation strategies or 
assigning tasks. Through soliciting the relevant opinions of each sectoral department, the 
minimum difference of the optimization process ε is determined on the basis of the actual 
situation. For example, the paper set ε to 1 million. In the process of decision-making, the 
enterprise leaders construct hierarchical rankings and judgment matrix, solve AHP and 
coordinate decision-making process according to the procedures discussed in this paper. 
Interval AHP coordinated decision-making for various departments has been widely used, 
and brought about irreplaceable benefits in allocating funds, assigning tasks and others. It is 
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hoped to provide corporate managers and decision-makers with some new ideas for 
management decision-making.  
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Chapter 7 Empirical Research on Risk Control Strategies Under 
State-owned Enterprise Group Control 
Drawing lessons from the investigation by Chen Lijie and Ye Xiaozhong on the risk 
management system of large-scale enterprise groups in China, the author of this chapter 
conducted an empirical survey on the risk control of the LH enterprise group, a company 
controlled by Shandong Province, found problems in term of risk control existing in Chinese 
enterprise groups, and proposed corresponding risk control strategies [91].  
7.1 Status Quo of Risk Control of State-owned Enterprise Groups  
Some well-known international companies have failed due to serious problems arising in 
the process of management and risk control, such as the “Bahrain Banking Incident in the 
UK” and the “Aero Fuel (Singapore) Incident”[92]. These cases of failure have provided very 
valuable materials for the studies in China. Through analysis on several domestic and foreign 
cases of failure, the author believes that the enterprise groups as a whole should strengthen 
the following awareness:  
First, establish a risk culture and strengthen risk awareness. As risk control is an 
enterprise's overall and long-term work, enterprise groups, especially state-owned enterprise 
groups, must rely on the cohesion of risk culture to promote all employees of the company 
to work together to withstand risks.  
Second, improve risk control departments, and enhance risk control staffing. Improving 
risk control departments, includes organizational leadership and obligations of corporate 
governance structure, risk control functional departments, internal audit departments and 
legal affairs departments and other relevant functional departments and business units, and 
regulating the risk control responsibilities of the relevant departments.  
Third, pay attention to major corporate risks and strengthen high-risk forecasting and 
monitoring. In production and operating activities, enterprises do not have to pay equal 
attention to every single risk, but focus on the major risks or high risks, in order to forecast 
and monitor in a scientific and reasonable manner to prevent the occurrence of the risk.  
In order to understand China's state-owned enterprise groups in term of risk control, the 
author of this paper, on the basis of the existing research findings, focused on investigating 
the status quo of risk control in state-owned enterprise groups of Shandong Province and 
finally summed up the risk control status of Chinese state-owned enterprise groups[93]. 
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7.1.1 Status Quo of Risk Control of State-owned Enterprise Groups in Shandong 
Province  
(1) Basic situation of risk control  
In 2012, pilot project of total risk management for Shandong province-run enterprises was 
first carried out in 8 province-run enterprises such as LX, YK, HJ, GS, ZK, LK, LG, and WC. 
In 2016, the total risk management was fully implemented across Shandong Province in 24 
corporate headquarters and all levels of enterprises. In the process of comprehensive risk 
management, the board of directors of enterprise group was responsible for risk control 
decisions. Generally, a comprehensive risk management committee was established and the 
risk management office was responsible for the specific work. The group headquarters had 
full-time departments and full-time staff. Important subsidiary companies (secondary and 
third-tier companies) also set up full-time departments (generally risk management office or 
department) with full-time staff. The group headquarters had formulated risk management 
system, risk management process, and major risk response plans, and established risk 
management information base. Total risk management was generally actively involved in 
important business activities and management decisions in accordance with systems and 
work processes.  
(2) Risk control measures taken 
In summary, at present Shandong Province has taken following risk control measures for 
state-owned enterprise groups.  
①  Develop plans and programs to specify the direction for total risk management.  
In accordance with the working idea of "integrated planning, stepwise implementation, 
fanning out from point to area, emphasizing practical results", a construction plan for total 
risk management system was formulated, and a total risk management system covering the 
entire group was established. Based on its industrial characteristics and risks, 
countermeasures have been formulated for each monitoring indicator and the corresponding 
person in charge has been identified. Related plans and specific measures are formulated for 
before, during and after the major risks.  
②  Establish and improve the organizational system and strengthen the organization of risk 
management.  
A risk management committee or an audit and risk management committee was 
established to perform risk management duties and enabled the board of directors to play the 
central role in total risk management. The risk management department was set up to 
formulate the “total risk management measures” to clarify the responsibilities of all levels 
and departments of the company in risk management. A risk management liaison system was 
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established at all levels and departments to promote the effective implementation of risk 
management.  
③  Strengthen the system construction and provide basic guarantees for risk management.  
In accordance with their own characteristics, province-run enterprise groups have 
successively formulated a series of risk management systems and methods, which laid the 
foundation for promoting risk management. For example, LX Group has formulated 28 
regulations including the Total Risk Management System, Guidelines for Internal Risk 
Control, and Corporate Business Decision Making Methods.  
④  Closely focus on production and operation, and strengthen risk management measures.  
SG Group conducts comprehensive and in-depth analysis of major risks such as mergers 
and acquisitions, crude fuel markets, and marketing management in terms of the causes and 
possible impact of risks, sets one or more quantitative key indicators for major risks and 
formulates control measures for risk events under major risks.  
⑤  Emphasize the use of information tools to improve the efficiency and level of total risk 
management.  
SG Group has independently designed and developed a risk management information 
system to build a risk management system platform suitable for SG operation system and 
professional management; YK Group and HJ Group's risk management information systems 
embody the idea of “three-level management and control” idea as well as the concept of 
“business-led and total involvement”, and set up modules of “risk response”, “precautionary 
warning”, “risk report” and “comprehensive view” and others. The Group’s headquarters and 
all its subordinate organizations will used the same information system for risk management.  
⑥  Strengthen enterprise’s internal control to ensure that the responsibility for risk 
management is implemented.  
Continuously optimize corporate governance, improve and perfect the internal control 
environment; further standardize business processes and strengthen business activity control; 
the system should be sorted out at the headquarters of the Group and at the main subsidiaries. 
Based on the identified risk points, rules and regulations should be formulated and revised 
to increasingly perfect the Group's internal control system. Focus on strengthening control 
over corporate governance structure, authorization and approval, accounting system, asset 
protection, budget, risks, and auditing, and strengthen internal and external supervision and 
inspection to ensure that control measures are implemented.  
⑦  Vigorously cultivate risk management culture and firmly establish risk awareness.  
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In the corporate risk management culture, various companies have formulated practical 
and effective measures in accordance with their actual conditions and have received very 
good results. For example, LK Group integrates risk management culture with corporate 
culture construction by organizing total risk management lectures.  
(3) Major risks facing the enterprise group  
Although the enterprise groups in Shandong Province adopted these types of measures in 
risk control, they are still faced with various risk due to the different internal and external 
environments, development history, and organizational structure. In 2016, the State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of Shandong Province organized 
province-run enterprises to identify and assess five major types of risks in strategy, 
investment, finance, market, operations, and law, and in the end, 24 province-run companies 
assessed major risks for the industry in 2016 and identified them as follows:  
Investment risk: It refers to various uncertainties that lead to untimely or biased investment 
decisions in identifying investment opportunities, project feasibility studies, and 
deliberations in the decision-making process. This type of risk mainly involves 12 province-
run companies.  
Health and safety environment risk: It refers to various uncertainties of various health, 
safety and environmental accidents that cause losses or adverse effects to the company in 
production and operation process. This type of risks mainly involves 12 province-run 
companies.  
Human resources risk: It refers to the uncertainties in the structure, quantity, training and 
remuneration of human resources that impact on the long-term development of the company 
in its rapid development. This type of risks mainly involves 12 province-run companies.  
Strategic Management risk: It refers to the various future uncertainties that influence the 
realization of the strategic objectives in formulating, implementing, evaluating and adjusting 
strategies. This type of risk mainly involves nine province-run companies.  
Group control risk: It refers to various uncertainties for corporate management and 
operating objectives due to the fact that the company has not established a proper 
management and control model or does not specify the scope and content of the parent 
company's management of the subsidiary company, and has not effectively managed the 
subsidiary company in funds, personnel, investment and financing, system construction, 
business activities, etc. This type of risk mainly involves 8 province-run companies.  
Resource guarantee risk: It means that the group does not have sufficient reserves of 
resources to meet the needs of enterprise development and may affect the sustainable 
development of the group. This type of risk mainly involves 8 province-run companies.  
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Cash flow risk: Such risks mainly arise when the group develops at rapid pace, launches 
too many new projects, finances through huge amount of loans with large pressure of interest 
payment and huge inventory, lacks the ability to quickly realize assets to pay short-term 
liabilities, and unreasonably allocates the overall structure of liquid assets, which has resulted 
in a large funding gap and a high debt-to-equity ratio. The tight funding chain may lead to 
slow progress of projects or even project failures, and a high debt-to-asset ratio may result in 
a large pressure on the group's debt repayment, adversely affect its operations, and may 
reduce the group's creditworthiness and increase the difficulty of fundraising. The reasons 
for this type of risks include the impact of the market environment, poor financing channels, 
and poor application of fund in land resources. These types of risks involve eight province-
run enterprises.  
(4) Measures to strengthen risk control ability of enterprise groups in Shandong Province  
By combining the risk control theory with the current status of the state-owned enterprise 
groups in Shandong Province, the author believes that all enterprises in Shandong Province 
should, based on their own circumstances and the external environment, focus on the 
development strategy objectives, conduct an in-depth analysis of the risks identified and 
assessed, find out the causes of the risks, assess the scope and extent of the risk impact, and 
based on the risk preference and risk tolerance, determine the risk management strategy, and 
formulate corresponding risk response measures to ensure that the risks are under control. 
This article gives the following suggestions and countermeasures:  
For strategic planning risks, start from the three links of strategic research, strategic 
planning, and strategic planning adjustment, and formulate control measures based on the 
risk control points of information collection, information analysis, strategy formulation, 
formulation of development planning, performance evaluation of strategic plan 
implementation and strategic planning adjustment, respectively.  
For investment risks, improve the investment management process, and carefully 
demonstrate and evaluate each node of project reserve, project approval and initiation, project 
financing, project implementation and post-project evaluation; establish an investment risk 
monitoring mechanism to keep informed of the industry and overall economic performance, 
and be able to quickly respond to decision-makers; Strengthen risk awareness and strengthen 
risk education in the training of staff at all levels of the organization; improve post-
investment evaluation process and systematically summarize the entire implementation 
process of project investment so as to identify deficiencies.  
For industrial policy risks, set up specialized industrial policy research institutions; make 
full and timely communication with policy makers.  
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For control risks over subsidiary, further improve the corporate governance structure and 
management system of group company; in accordance with the requirements of the modern 
enterprise system, establish a scientific management and control model, clearly define the 
extent, depth, mode, authorization, supervision, assessment and feedback of the group 
headquarters’ control over branches and subsidiaries from the aspects of strategy, finance, 
personnel and business; delegate to subsidiaries, improve corporate governance structure of 
subsidiaries, and give full play to the enthusiasm and initiative of subsidiaries; strengthen the 
appointment and supervision of top management personnel of subsidiaries and try to avoid 
alternate-appoint of parent and subsidiary companies.  
For human resource risks, establish a sound corporate culture and set up correct valuesfor 
members; learn from the successful experience of competition for posts, improve the training 
system, and prepare job descriptions to promote employees' enthusiasm for learning and 
motivation; Improve the labor and personnel system, and strengthen the reward and 
punishment mechanism and personnel protection mechanism.  
For risks such as tight capital chain and high debt-to-asset ratio, strengthen fund 
management of the group, design and implement a fund management system, and implement 
real-time monitoring of funds; strengthen the circulation of internal funds of the group and 
strengthen the adjustment of the internal funds of the group; strengthen the group's budget 
management.  
 
7.1.2 Problems in the Risk Control of State-owned Enterprise Groups  
Through the main investigation and analysis of the status quo of risk control of state-owned 
enterprise groups in Shandong Province, and drawing on the analysis results of existing 
scholars, the author of this paper believes that the state-owned enterprise groups in China 
have following problems in risk management and control:  
(1) Awareness of overall risk management needs to be further strengthened  
Although the risk awareness of various companies has been enhanced, many efforts have 
been made in risk management and great progress has been achieved, but there is still a wide 
gap in the understanding of risk management at all levels. Many companies merely regard 
risk management as a means to meet external regulatory requirements, but have failed to 
become a corporate conscious action.  
(2) Total risk management and daily operation and management need to be organically 
integrated  
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The total risk management frameworks of various companies have basically been 
established, but are not sufficiently integrated with other management systems. At present, 
some companies have not yet formed a true combination of actual work and practical 
implementation in the process of risk assessment, management strategies and solutions, and 
early warning systems.  
(3) The total risk management system needs to be further improved  
Some enterprises lack risk management talents, and job assignments are insufficiently 
staffed; some enterprises’ risk management responsibilities are not clear enough, and there 
are blind spots, especially, the risk responsibilities of various business units and departments 
need to be further refined; some units have a singular risk assessment method and their 
assessment results are not convincing.  
(4) Total risk management needs to be further deepened  
The construction of risk management systems for some units has only stayed at the 
headquarters level, has not been fully implemented across the group and the major risks 
identified and their response measures need to be truly implemented.  
 
7.2 Countermeasures and Suggestions for Risk Control of State-owned Enterprise 
Groups  
The choice of management and control modes for enterprise groups varies with their sizes 
and nature. Regardless of the type of management and control model adopted by the 
enterprise group, the parent company will inevitably encounter various risks in the process 
of managing the subsidiaries as well as the production and operation processes of the parent 
and subsidiary companies. They are only different in size and the impact on the enterprise 
group itself. How to scientifically predict risks, assess risks, and effectively control risks, and 
place them under its risk tolerance will be main issues for the companies to resolve [94].  
7.2.1 Internal Risk Control Countermeasures in Enterprises  
(1) Correctly choose control mode for parent and subsidiary companies  
According to the degree of centralization and decentralization, the control modes can be 
divided into the management and control modes of relative centralization, centralization and 
decentralization, and relative decentralization. The enterprise group must consider its own 
characteristics, size, and other factors to choose the mode of management and control. How 
to correctly choose the control mode has already been previously described and will not be 
repeated here. Only when the enterprise group selects appropriate parent-subsidiary control 
model, can it monitor the subsidiaries on the premise of giving full play to the enthusiasm 
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and initiative of the subsidiaries, so as to prevent major risks or crises arising in subsidiaries 
in the operation process and affecting the survival and development of the entire group 
companies[95]. 
(2) Improve corporate governance structure  
The following points need to be noted in order to improve the corporate governance 
structure in China:  
①  Strengthening the role of the board of directors 
In the corporate governance structure, the board of directors is the core. The management 
level of the board of directors has a significant impact on the success or failure of the 
company. If the company's board of directors has problems, it may cause economic losses to 
the company, or even make the company bankrupt. Therefore, importance should be attached 
to the construction of the board of directors so that it can maintain its relative independence, 
give full play to its enthusiasm, and effectively manage the company; at the same time, it can 
also be properly supervised to avoid its abuse of power and affect the company’s survival.  
②  Safeguarding the supervisory board of the company to effectively exercise supervision  
Supervisors play a very important role in corporate governance. If they can fully exercise 
the rights granted by the Corporation Law, it is of great significance to safeguard the healthy 
development of the company and regulate the operation of the company. In order to ensure 
that the supervisors have sufficient professional knowledge and ability, the supervisors 
selected or appointed must possess professional knowledge and experience in law, finance, 
accounting and taxation, and have the ability to communicate extensively with shareholders 
and other company employees; introduce an independent supervisor system to prevent the 
company from being manipulated by the controlling shareholders and truly enable the board 
of supervisors to exercise its supervisory function; set up a system for investigating the 
responsibility of supervisors for misconduct.  
(3) Improving risk control system  
In the overall risk management, other functional departments and business units of the 
enterprise shall accept the organization, coordination, guidance, and supervision of the risk 
management functional department and the internal audit department, and mainly perform 
the following duties: ①  Perform basic risk management processes; ②  Study and put 
forward judging criteria or mechanism for the major decisions, major risks, major events, 
and important business processes of this functional department or business unit; ③Study 
and put forward major decision risk assessment reports of the functional departments or 
business units; ④Properly establish the risk management information system for this 
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functional department or business unit; ⑤Properly cultivate the risk management culture. 
⑥Establish and improve the risk management internal control subsystem of the functional 
department or business unit; ⑦Handle other related work on risk management.  
Enterprises with the necessary conditions can establish three defense lines for risk 
management, that is, all relevant functional departments, business units, and subsidiary 
companies are the first line of defense; risk management function department and risk 
management committee under the board of directors is the second line of defense; the audit 
committee under the internal audit department and the board of directors is the third line of 
defense.  
The following points need to be noted in order to improve the risk control system:  
①  The convener of the risk management committee shall be chaired by the chairman who 
does not serve as general manager; when the chairman is the general manager, the convener 
shall be an external director or an independent director. Members of the committee must have 
directors who are familiar with the company's important management and business processes, 
as well as directors with knowledge or experience in risk management supervision and legal 
knowledge.  
②  The company shall establish an internal audit department, strengthen internal audit work, 
ensure the independence of internal audit department setup, staffing and work, and be 
responsible for the audit committee under the board of directors; the internal audit department 
shall, in conjunction with internal audit supervision, supervise and inspect the effectiveness 
of internal control, and have the right to report directly to the board of directors, its audit 
committee, and the board of supervisors on major defects in internal control discovered 
during the supervision and inspection.  
③  The company must establish a corporate legal adviser system with general counsel as 
the core, and form a legal risk liability system where the decision-making layer of the 
enterprise takes the lead, the general counsel spearhead the work, corporate legal advisers 
provide business guarantee, and all employees take part in the process.  
(4) Establishing a risk warning system  
In the course of business operations, enterprises must establish a risk warning system to 
monitor risks, collect, analyze, and evaluate risks in a timely and complete manner to 
determine the size of the risks and the means of control so that the risks can be controlled.  
①  Speed up the establishment and improvement of the financial system and strengthen 
supervising the information disclosure of state-owned enterprise.  
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Chinese enterprises should explore financial early-warning systems that are more 
applicable to their own companies, and improve their evaluation indicators according to their 
own circumstances, and timely forecast and reflect the company's financial status. Emphasize 
the role of non-financial indicators and qualitative indicators in early warning analysis. Non-
financial indicators and qualitative factors can serve as indicators of the company's future 
financial status or degree of financial crisis.  
②  Establish an information collection and delivery mechanism and improve the enterprise 
risk analysis mechanism.  
A good risk early warning and analysis system can scientifically and effectively predict 
various risks that may occur in a company. To prevent the occurrence of a crisis in advance, 
it must be able to collect enough information and data. This information data includes both 
internal data and data of external market, and market conditions. The most important thing 
in the information system is to form a channel for information collection and transmission, 
so that the information system can accurately and timely acquire relevant information and 
data in order for the risk management personnel to analyze, evaluate and prevent crisis.  
③   Establish a corporate risk response strategy.  
After the company conducts risk analysis and assessment, it should immediately formulate 
a risk response strategy: through the combination of manual and automatic control, 
preventive control and discovery control, and using appropriate control measures, the risk is 
controlled within the tolerance.  
(5) Improving internal audit supervision system  
Internal audit is an important content of the internal control environment and is a major 
component of the internal control system of an enterprise. It helps to promote internal self-
repair and improvement of the internal control system. Specific work includes:  
①  Identify the status of internal audit  
Internal audit is an indispensable link in corporate governance in a modern enterprise 
system. It is an important means to promote the establishment of a sound corporate 
governance structure, standardize management, legalize operations, enhance market 
competitiveness, and grow bigger and stronger. Enterprises should establish an audit 
committee under the board of directors, which should be positioned as the company's internal 
supervisory leadership and the third line of defense for enterprise risk control.  
②   Improve institutions and strengthen audit team building  
It is necessary to establish an internal audit department that meets the requirements of 
corporate governance, improve the audit system, regulate the operation, clarify the status of 
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the internal audit department in risk control and internal control, and establish relationships 
with the board of directors, managers, and audit committees to ensure the independence and 
authority of their operations.  
(6)  Improving performance evaluation system  
The performance evaluation of employees has always been associated with salary, and 
closely related to the immediate interests of employees, and it has become the most direct 
and effective means to mobilize the enthusiasm of employees. Performance evaluation 
shoulders the important mission of reflecting the work performance of employees and 
determining the salary of employees. Its rationality directly affects the stability of the 
company. The most direct purpose of evaluating employee performance is to provide an 
objective and fair picture of employee performance during the evaluation period.  
For business managers, they should do as follows: ①  The attention of the top 
management. Performance evaluation is a work that requires the use of all the company's 
resources. The top management should give full support. ② Establish an open feedback 
mechanism. In many companies, the initial employees' enthusiasm for performance 
evaluation is relatively high, but it usually will not last long. The important reason for this 
situation is that the performance evaluation system failed to establish a feedback mechanism 
for performance evaluation. If employees do not see the significance of performance 
evaluation, they will not actively participate in the entire process of performance evaluation. 
③  Link performance evaluation results with remuneration. When establishing a 
performance evaluation system, an enterprise should establish a link between the employee 
performance evaluation results and their salaries, so that the performance evaluation can exert 
its true value.  
The main bodies responsible for evaluation should be trained and managed: ① Through 
training, evaluators will correctly understand the performance evaluation system and fully 
understand the existence of various kinds of errors in performance evaluation, so that they 
can consciously reduce these errors in order to correctly evaluate the working status of 
employees. At the same time, through training, the evaluators learn to consciously collect the 
factual basis needed in the evaluation process and correct their attitudes. ② Clearly define 
evaluation indicators and standards. With clearly defined performance evaluation indicators 
and standards, the evaluators can make pertinent evaluations according to the meaning of the 
indicators to be evaluated, so as to avoid improper views on the performance of an evaluator 
and affecting its overall performance. ③ Select the appropriate evaluation method. Each 
evaluation method has its advantages and disadvantages. Therefore, appropriate evaluation 
methods should be selected according to the specific conditions such as the evaluation object 
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and the evaluation purpose. ④ determine a reasonable evaluation period. The choice of 
evaluation period has an important impact on the evaluation results. The evaluation period 
should not be too long nor too short.  
(7)  Establishing accountability system  
When enterprises develop risk control systems, the establishment of risk control 
institutions, the clear division of functions, the specialization of risk control personnel, and 
the scientific methods of risk prediction and assessment are important, and the accountability 
system also plays a decisive role in operation of the entire risk control system. Therefore, 
enterprise groups should attach importance to establishing and improving the accountability 
system.  
 
7.2.2 Corporate Countermeasures for External Risk Control 
(1)  Supervision of government functional departments  
The government authorities should learn from mature and advanced regulatory experience 
abroad, further study and formulate relevant regulatory requirements, guide the enterprise 
group to establish a sound and comprehensive risk management system, and prevent major 
risks for the enterprise group from a macro perspective.  
(2)  Participation of social intermediary agencies  
Although a comprehensive risk control system has been set up internally and three lines 
of defense have been established, it is impossible for companies to rely on their own efforts 
to control risk bases due to the limitations of internal controls and the constraints of human, 
financial, and material resources. Therefore, companies need to use external forces to help them 
achieve effective risk control, and law firms and accounting firms are the best choices for corporate risk 
control cooperation.  
 
7.3 Empirical Analysis of Risk Control under State-owned Enterprise Groups  
As a large state-owned enterprise under the administration of the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission of Shandong Province, the LH Enterprise 
Group engages in five major industries, including hotels, real estate, bio-pharmaceuticals, 
financial pawn, and logistics trade, and it is a typical representative of state-owned enterprises 
in China. Therefore, this paper takes the LH Group as an example to conduct an empirical 
analysis of risk management under the control of state-owned enterprise groups.  
In recent years, with the changes in the external environment such as the international 
financial turmoil, the national economic situation, and the industrial structure, many 
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uncertainties have been brought to the operation and management of LH Group companies. 
Under this background, the Group has actively carried out risk management, but there are 
still many drawbacks. The author of this paper tries to put forward some strategies and 
suggestions for the problems existing in the group.  
 
7.3.1 Risk Control Organization Settings  
LH Enterprise Group has established a total risk management organization system in 
accordance with the "Guidelines" of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission of the State Council and the "Guidelines of Total Risk Management for the 
Province-run Enterprises” by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission of Shandong Province. The parent and subsidiary companies respectively 
establish a comprehensive risk management committee and corresponding working 
organization. The total risk management committee of the parent company shall be appointed 
by the parent company, and the total risk management committee personnel of the subsidiary 
company shall be appointed by the subsidiary company, and the list of persons shall be 
reported to the parent company for the record. The parent company's total risk management 
committee conducts business guidance, supervision and management of the subsidiary's total 
risk management committee. The parent company's total risk management committee is 
responsible for reviewing risk management strategies and major risk solutions, and carrying 
out risk identification, evaluation, monitoring, and control of the group's major production 
and operation projects. The subsidiary's total risk management committee strictly enforces 
the risk management and control procedures formulated by the parent company, and regularly 
submits risk prevention and control work reports to the parent company as required; for major 
investment and financing projects, major project transformations and major operating 
contracts, the subsidiary company shall report to the parent company for approval according 
to regulations, and a risk assessment report shall be issued when necessary.  
 
7.3.2 Group Management System  
The group management and control system refers to the group organization system that 
uses property rights as a link, takes the LH enterprise group (parent company) as the core, 
and the subsidiary company (subsidiary) as the main member. The parent company designs 
and manages the organizational structure and operating mechanism of the parent company's 
management and control system, and promulgates it in the form of a basic management 
system. Both parent and subsidiary companies have the status of a corporate legal person, 
each of which enjoys an independent corporate property right, independently exercises civil 
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rights, assumes civil liability, and independently manages and assumes its own profits and 
losses with all its legal person property, and assumes responsibility for maintaining and 
adding value to the capital invested by shareholders.  
The parent company's board of directors consists of three professional committees for 
comprehensive budget management, total risk management, and performance evaluation. It 
is responsible for overall budget management, total risk management, and performance 
assessment of the group. The role of the full budget management committee is: for the 
production and operation and investment and financing business, all aspects of budget 
preparation, implementation, regulation, analysis, assessment and supervision shall be fully 
covered and the whole process shall be managed. The role of the total risk management 
committee is: major risks in the investment, production, operation, and restructuring of the 
parent company and its subsidiaries are identified, assessed, monitored, and controlled. The 
role of the performance evaluation committee is: formulate an assessment method for all 
members of the group and supervise their implementation; the main work performances of 
the parent company's management, managers, and subsidiaries are evaluated.  
 
7.3.3 Risk Control Implementation  
According to the relevant requirements of the “Guidelines for Total Risk Management of 
the Province-run Enterprises in Shandong Province” by the State-owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission of Shandong Province, LH Enterprise Group Company has 
put forward work objectives and plans for the construction of a total risk management system 
in a timely manner in accordance with its actual needs. It listed total risk management as a 
key task for the company in 2016. With the assistance of a risk management consulting 
company, LH Enterprise Group officially launched a construction project for total risk 
management and information system, whose objectives and final assessment results of the 
project are as follows:  
(1) Risk assessment objectives: Improve the risk awareness and theoretical level of all LH 
enterprise groups, unify the risk management language, and cultivate the LH enterprise 
group's own risk culture; Identify risks in the development and operation of LH enterprise 
groups, form a risk event library for the current status of LH enterprise groups, and provide 
support for future work; Prioritize risks and draw a risk map of the LH Enterprise Group 
headquarters; A comprehensive analysis of the current risks faced by the LH Enterprise 
Group is conducted to identify the important characteristics of the risks, identify significant 
risks, propose management improvement suggestions for major risks, and implement 
relevant responsible agencies.  
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(2) Analysis of risk assessment results  
① Overall risk status of LH Corporate Group Headquarters   
The LH Enterprise Group conducted comprehensive risk identification and assessment for 
five major categories of first-class risks. A total of 68 risk events were identified, 26 
categories of secondary risks were selected and sorted out, and the evaluation of risk events 
and the statistics of the evaluated models were adopted, and the final evaluation grades of 26 
secondary risks were obtained. The risk classification and numbering of LH Enterprise Group 
is shown in Table 7-1.  
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Table 7-1 LH Enterprise Group Risk Classification 
Primary risk 
number 
Primary risk Secondary risk number Secondary risk 
ZL Strategic risk RCBZ Talent protection risk 
CYZC Industrial policy risk 
CYGH Industrial Development Risk 
YY Operational risk XXBM Information confidentiality risk 
SBGL Equipment management risk 
CLGL Vehicle Management Risk 
XXXT Information System Risk 
WYGL Property Management Risk 
TZGK Investment Control Risk 
SCKF Market Development Risk 
AQGL Safety Management Risk 
JXKH Performance assessment risk 
CW Financial risk FZJG Debt structure risk 
CRZ Financing risk 
KJHS Accounting risk 
ZCGL Asset Management Risk 
YSZK Accounts receivable risk 
CBGL Cost Management Risk 
SWGL Tax Management Risk 
Continued (Table 7-1)  
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Primary risk 
number 
Primary risk Secondary risk number Secondary risk 
  DWDB External guarantee risk 
YSGL Budget Management Risk 
SC Market risk GJMY International Trade Risk 
HLL Exchange rate & interest rate risk 
FL Legal Risk HTGL Contract Management Risk 
FLSS Legal proceedings risk 
YZGL Seal management risk 
② LH Corporate Group Headquarters Risk Map  
Through risk identification, risk analysis and risk assessment, the risk importance 
hierarchy of the 26 kinds of risks of the LH Enterprise Group headquarters were finally 
obtained. The risk importance hierarchy represents relatively high risks in all important 
aspects of the company's current situation and are the urgently needed risks under the current 
management and control level. It can be used as an important basis for company decision 
making.  
By analyzing the data of risk identification and risk analysis, this paper draws a risk 
importance hierarchy of the 26 risks of LH Enterprise Group headquarters, as shown in 
Figure 7-1 and Figure 7-2.  
③ LH Corporate Group Risk Evaluation Results  
By analyzing and judging the various risk events of LH Group, and using the risk profile 
as a tool for display, LH Enterprise Group has sorted out the current overall risk status of the 
company and the management level of various risks, and identified significant risks for the 
future development of the group company: Investment control risk, liability structure risk, 
legal litigation risk, industrial development risk, and industrial policy risk.  
The risk of investment control belongs to operational risk, which refers to the risk of 
investment project failing to meet investment expectations due to incomplete investment 
procedures, inadequate investment decision-making basis, and inadequate monitoring of the 
investment process. The risk of investment control also includes the management and exit 
difficulties of investment projects caused by historical issues.  
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The liability structure risk belongs to financial risk and refers to the unreasonable level of 
liabilities and structure of the group company, which affects the rapid and steady 
development of the company group, such as the unreasonable structure of long and short-
term debts and short-term long-term debts.  
The risk of legal proceedings is a legal risk and refers to the risk of legal proceedings 
caused by various commercial disputes in the course of business management, causing major 
economic losses to the company and implicating the responsible person of the company to 
bear corresponding legal liabilities.  
The risk of industrial development is a strategic risk, which refers to the uncertainty of the 
development plan of the group company due to the factors such as its own historical reasons, 
the environment in which the industry is located, and the external regulatory assessment 
requirements.  
The risk of industrial policy belongs to strategic risk and refers to the uncertainty of the 
group company's development in business operations caused by the launching of national or 
local industrial policies.  
 
Figure 7-1 Risk Importance Hierarchy of Group Headquarters  
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Hierarchy's Risk Name and Number 
1 Talent protection 
risk 
7 Information 
System Risk 
13 Debt structure risk 19 Tax Management 
Risk 
25 Legal proceedings 
risk 
2 Industrial policy 
risk 
8 Property 
Management 
Risk 
14 Financing risk 20 External guarantee 
risk 
26 Seal management 
risk 
3 Industrial 
Planning Risk 
9 Investment 
Control Risk 
15 Accounting risk 21 Budget 
Management Risk 
  
4 Information 
confidentiality risk 
10 Market 
Development 
Risk 
16 Asset 
Management Risk 
22 International Trade 
Risk 
  
5 Equipment 
management risk 
11 Safety 
Management 
Risk 
17 Accounts 
receivable risk 
23 Exchange rate & 
interest rate risk 
  
6 Vehicle 
Management Risk 
12 Performance 
assessment risk 
18 Cost Management 
Risk 
24 Contract 
Management Risk 
  
Figure 7-2 LH Group Risk Importance Hierarchy Atlas 
 
7.3.4 Deficiencies in LH Enterprise Group Risk Control  
(1) Deficiencies in investment risk control  
The investment risk control mainly has the following deficiencies: First, investment 
decision-making procedures are not standardized, and investment decision-making 
information is not sufficient. Second, the process of investment monitoring is inadequate and 
investment projects deviate from their original intentions. Third, after the completion of the 
investment project, there is no mechanism for post-evaluation.  
(2) Deficiencies in liability structure risk control  
Reasonable liability is a necessary means for the development of an enterprise. According 
to its actual needs of development, it uses the funds of financial institutions to develop and 
expand its own industry and leverages the capital. At present, the group company's debt level 
is about 35%, and its performance is relatively conservative. It is mainly related to the 
profitability of the group company. In addition, the investment of short-term debt in long-
term projects will affect the financial stability of the group company. This risk control has 
following deficiencies:  
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First, the investment of the group in long-term projects with short-term debt affects the 
stability of cash flow. On the one hand, it piles up the financial costs, on the other hand it 
also increases the risk of financial risks.  
Second, the level of debt is low and the development performance is relatively 
conservative. The debt level of the hotel industry is generally maintained at around 50%. The 
group's business includes real estate, bio-pharmaceuticals and other sectors, and the 
corresponding level of liabilities should be higher, while the group's debt level is only about 
35%, which affects the expansion of the group company.  
Third, the structure of long-term and short-term debt is not reasonable enough, and there 
are short-term long-term debt investment, which affects the financial security of the group 
company. Finance planning of the group is closely related to production and investment. 
However, with its poorly defined long-term planning, the effective arrangement of the 
financial department for long and short-term debts was affected, in particular, the temporary 
application for capital needs, which leads to more short-term debts and fewer long-term debts. 
(3) Deficiency in risk control of legal proceedings   
At present, the group company has not done enough in legal risk prevention measures such 
as project approval and contract management. The mismatch between the rights and 
responsibilities of relevant person in charge of the conclusion and performance of contracts 
may lead to major legal disputes and lawsuits and cause major economic losses to the 
company. This risk control has the following deficiencies:  
First, the review mechanism of project's decision-making is not sound enough to eliminate 
the hidden dangers of legal disputes for the later-phase project development. The flaws in the 
enterprise's decision-making mechanism, coupled with internal violations or poor execution 
of the management system lead to dysfunction of the risk-prevention mechanism, put the 
enterprise in a difficult situation when trying to resolve it later through legal proceedings.  
Second, lack of legal awareness and legal knowledge. Although the group company has 
established a general counsel system, the legal awareness of leading cadres at all levels, 
especially the leadership level, is not strong enough, and the prevention of legal risks has not 
been incorporated into the daily operation and management, and legal disputes cannot be 
effectively prevented in advance.  
Third, some leftover legal cases due to historic evolution. Most of the cases belong to 
external guarantees and external investments in the past, and with the absence of reverse 
guarantees, when the guaranteed party was unable to repay the debts, the group company was 
jointly and severally liable.  
(4) Deficiency in risk control of industrial development   
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Due to historic evolution, the LH Enterprise Group formed an independent group company 
after being stripped of the service assets of original electric power system, and was placed 
under the Shandong Provincial SASAC. Its main development line has not been clear and 
the enterprise group has not formed effective integrating relationship among its subordinate 
corporate industries. The risk control has following deficiencies:  
First, weak profitability of main business assets, and unfulfilled asset restructuring. As the 
predecessor of its assets is not engaged in an industry with strong profitability, the group 
company is faced with great difficulty in operation with prominent short board effect and 
heavy inherent burden. At the same time, it is even more difficult to realign its resources due 
to low relevancy of incorporated assets and independent operations among various sectors. 
Secondly, the pursuit of profitability goals has resulted in a mismatch between its industrial 
development planning and actual operations. As a group company mainly engage in hotel 
business, the assessment requirements of the regulatory authorities also have a potential 
impact on the realization of its development plan.  
Third, the lack of its own funds has limited its industrial integration. Its smaller total assets 
among province-run enterprises and lack of own funds have restricted its capabilities and 
conditions for industrial integration, especially investment in key industries, and caused to 
miss the fast track of development.  
Fourth, with development planning lagging behind, the hotel sector as main business has 
affected the overall efficiency of the assets. The development of hotel industry has shown a 
trend of multiple models in recent years such as star hotels, hotel chains and business hotels, 
and witnessed the rise of large group management companies, while the development speed 
of the group company has been hampered by its overall planning and arrangement in hotel 
sector and insufficient integration between business modes.  
(5) Deficiency in risk control of industrial policy  
When national and local governments introduce relevant industrial policies, they usually 
start from a macro and overall perspective and comprehensively review the overall 
deployment. Therefore, the introduction of industrial policies may be favorable to specific 
enterprises, such as tax incentives, preferential policies for land, and may also be unfavorable, 
such as energy-saving and emission reductions, mergers and reorganizations. Based on the 
status quo of LH enterprise group company, the risk control has following deficiencies:  
First, it could not effectively seize opportunities for development. Under the background 
of the national industrial restructuring, local governments have also accelerated the 
integration of industrial structure. This is conducive to the long-term development of the 
industry as a whole, but also conducive to the allocation of state-owned assets, but to the 
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company itself, opportunities and risks coexist. If the group company cannot seize the 
development opportunities, develop and grow in a limited period of time, it is likely to be 
acquired due to its small scale.  
Second, the favorable industrial policies could not be fully used and given to full play due 
to lack of policy study. The group company involves in services, bio-pharmaceuticals, and 
other industries, and some of them are eligible for the state incentives and supports, whereas 
the series of preferential policies are in fact not fully utilized due to the lack of policy study.  
Third, its failure to fully foresee the state’s control policies on the real estate industry, has 
greatly affected the prospective earnings and development speed of the group company  
 
7.3.5 Improvement Measures and Suggestions for LH Enterprise Group Risk Control  
In response to the major risks of LH Enterprise Group, the author of this paper has 
proposed following measures:  
(1) With respect to the problems in investment control, the group company need to strengthen 
the formativeness and scientific of the existing investment control while dealing with the 
leftover investment issues, and avoid the losses caused by blind investments, and address the 
problem with following specific measures: 
First, strengthen the scientific procedures of investment decision-making and establish a 
standardized decision-making process. Establish and improve the company's investment 
management system, and sharpen the tools for investment verification. Major investment 
projects must be reviewed and assessed by the  planning department, the Total Risk 
Management Committee, and the General Counsel, and finally submitted to the board of 
directors or the party and government associations for consideration and decision.  
Second, for the projects to be invested, project-related information should be 
comprehensively collected, full argumentation and analysis should be undertaken, and 
comprehensive inspection and assessment of major investment decision-making projects 
must be in line with the company’s overall strategic objectives, and full market research. 
Otherwise no project should be considered.  
Third, properly dispose of the previous investment projects and remedial work, to minimize 
the loss of the group company. For the leftover investment projects, deal with them according 
to their conditions, if the operation could be improved, continue to provide relevant resources; 
for those impossible to make a profit and hamstringing the development of the group 
company, dispose of them in time to avoid further losses.  
(2) In view of the existing liability structure of the group company, the risks brought about 
by the liability structure should be reduced through following measures:  
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First, formulate a clearer investment development plan, and through comprehensive 
budget management, provide the finance department with a clear and accurate fund demand 
plan so that the financial department can formulate a reasonable and scientific fund-raising 
plan; increase the communication between the business department and the finance 
department, and reasonably match the structure of long-term and short-term debts.  
Second, prohibit the group company and its subordinate enterprises from investing short-
term loans in long-term projects, and funds should be used rationally to avoid any impact on 
financial security. All subordinate enterprises should make full use of the group's financing 
platform to reduce financing cost, and at the same time establish a centralized management 
of the group's funds to increase the effective use of funds.  
Third, reasonably and appropriately increase the debt level of the group company to 
provide sufficient funds for its development, and make use of financial leverage to increase 
and expand the capital and shares in the subsidiaries with good benefits and broad prospects, 
develop and grow its own enterprises.  
(3) For its current legal lawsuit risks, the following specific measures should be taken:  
First, improve the corporate governance system, strictly implement the decision-making 
process, cultivate the concept of operating according to law, reduce the number of related 
legal risks, and establish an open and fair decision-making mechanism. Prohibit external 
guarantees, and no one or any unit is allowed to guarantee security without argumentation 
and guarantee.  
Second, establish and improve the general counsel system and raise the legal awareness of 
leaders at all levels. The corporate general counsel shall fully involve in the whole process 
of enterprise operation and management, earnestly strengthen the construction of the legal 
risk prevention mechanism, effectively play the role of gatekeeper as corporate general 
counsel on legal risks, and avoid the adverse impact of legal proceedings on the enterprise.  
Third, timely track the progress of dispute cases, rationally use legal weapons to safeguard 
its own rights and interests. When the lawsuits arise, promptly understand the relevant laws 
and regulations with the joint help of the company’s general counsel and external lawyers, 
collect beneficial legal evidence, actively prepare for protecting its own rights and interests, 
and do the utmost to reduce the losses company’s economy and reputation.  
(4) For its industrial development risk, first of all, it should start from the industrial 
orientation, define the development direction, concentrate on properly building and refining 
its own advantaged industry, and make effective connections between the industries. The 
specific measures include the following aspects:  
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First, based on its own resources, reposition the industry development plan. Further realign 
the development capabilities of the existing sectors, analyze the future development trend, 
determine the main business, and increase investment, refine and strengthen the main 
business, make full use of market-oriented means, learn from the advanced industry profit 
model, and increase the core competitiveness of main business.  
Second, get rid of the non-key industries and invigorate the existing assets. Promptly clean 
up the sectors with weak profitability and smaller scale, concentrate the efforts on the 
investment in the main business, and centralize existing resources.  
Third, strengthen the links between industries and enhance its ability to withstand risks. 
Increase the relevance of hotels, tourism and real estate sectors, build relationships between 
upstream and downstream industries, make full use of existing sectoral resources, and 
formulate corresponding development plans from a long-term perspective.  
Fourth, actively communicate with the relevant departments of the provincial SASAC, and 
comprehensively consider the status quo of the main business of the group company, and 
appropriately lower the evaluation goals so as to realize the gradual optimization of the main 
business resources.  
(5) For the industrial policy risks faced by the group company, measures for improvement 
include the following aspects:  
First, increase investment in its own advantageous industries and enhance its overall 
management capabilities and efficiency. Industrial integration is the trend of the times while 
the group company has its own industrial advantages. For example, the biopharmaceutical 
subsidiary company of the group is now the largest research base of earthworm in China and 
has accumulated rich experience in the research and production of the industrial chain. The 
group company has accumulated a large number of talented staff and experience in the hotel 
industry, and combined with tourism project, the group company has begun to prepare for 
tourism real estate projects. While identifying the advantages of the above industries, 
increase investment to strengthen and refine the main business, and improve its own 
management. Rejuvenate the bad assets of the group company, transfer the assets to 
industries with obvious advantages and clearer profit prospective, and comprehensively 
improve the company's asset quality and scale.  
Second, intensify the research and analysis of relevant national industrial policies. For the 
industries supported by the state, actively strive for corresponding preferential policies, such 
as national research funding, local land, and tax incentives. Actively take the advantages of 
the policy environment and the capital leverage, and through the means of mergers and 
reorganization, quickly develop and grow related industries.  
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Third, deepen the understanding of real estate macro control, prepare for the industry's 
winter, properly handle existing projects under construction and sales, maximize the recovery 
of funds, and use various financing channels to ensure stable and safe cash flow. Actively 
participate in affordable housing projects promoted by local governments, and at the same 
time, build tourism real estate projects by combining local tourism resources, and reduce the 
uncertainty in this area through the transfer of funds and risks. 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
In summary, the failures of these international companies resulted from serious problems 
arising in management and risk control. The author believes that enterprise group should act 
as a whole and establish a risk culture and risk awareness, improve risk control mechanism, 
pay attention to major corporate risks and strengthen risk early-warning as well as monitoring 
mechanisms. This study was conducted on the state-owned enterprise groups in Shandong 
province, even though there are risk management measures in place, the state-owned 
enterprises still need to strengthen their awareness of overall risk management. 
Comprehension gaps do exist between different managerial levels and firms only regard risk 
management as external regulation compliance rather than a corporate conscious action. 
Mechanisms of risk management and daily operations are still not fully integrated. Many 
firms do not have simultaneous risk assessment processes, risk management strategies and 
solutions. Firms often lack talented people for risk management, as a result, job descriptions 
are not lucid enough. Some departments do not have appropriate methods of risk assessment 
to address the real challenges that the enterprises are faced with. Generally, risk management 
is only a notion circulating at the headquarters, while at lower hierarchical management 
usually no risk precautions are taken.  
    
. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
  As global economic integration deepens and enterprises scale up their business, the 
enterprise groups have become the mainstream of the companies’ development form. Their 
subsidiaries have grown in size and increasingly diversified. Thus how to control its 
subsidiaries effectively has become an urgent challenge in practical operation for the parent 
company, especially for the state-owned enterprise in China. This thesis studies the 
management and control of state-owned enterprises in China, carrying certain theoretical and 
practical significance. 
  The research examined the theory and mechanism of management of state-owned 
enterprises and evaluation on employee performance. It also analyzed performance 
evaluation, coordination and risk control strategies of SOEs’ subsidiaries. The dissertation 
had got the actual conclusion with meaningful value.  
  This thesis first examined the conundrum of effective cooperation between subsidiaries of 
different departments and the parent company for efficient allocation of resources. To tackle 
these two problems, the IAHP and DEA model were adopted to help group decision makers 
better measure the performance of employees and organizations. A novel method was 
developed for the decision makers.  
  This thesis used the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) tool as the main principle and combination 
of fuzzy mathematics and Delphi and entropy weight method as main methodology to assess 
the performance. The evaluation model provides a new perspective for the managers of state-
owned enterprise groups. 
  This thesis has studied the multi-reason, multi-dimensional and dynamic factors. The 
super-efficiency DEA model which takes into account work performance, work ability, work 
attitude, job potential and other factors in the evaluation on employee performance was 
developed and tested. The study provides a guideline for improving performance and 
designing a more reasonable salary system. 
  For the risk control problem in state-owned enterprise, the thesis took the LH enterprise as 
an example to provide countermeasure and advice. 
  The thesis provides new ideas and methods for management and control of state-owned 
enterprises, and has an important reference value to the state-owned enterprises in China.  
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This thesis mainly researched on existing quantitative methods and models, as well as the 
management and control factors, and established evaluation models for management 
decision-making in the end. The research was still not perfect, and many issues remained to 
be resolved. The following issues will continue to be studied in the future:  
(1) The Evaluation and Optimization of the Benefits among the Sectors of SOE Group  
① The rigidity of the DEA hypothesis has resulted in many models since its development. 
However, few are used in China. Therefore, more attention should be paid to the application 
of DEA models, expanding the tool kit of DEA models to increase their practicality and 
applicability.  
②Although the "projection principle" gives theoretical optimization goal, many factors limit 
its achievement in actual operation, such as policies, markets, emergencies and so on. In 
future optimization study, attention should be paid to the impact of external disturbances on 
the DEA model, especially the optimization model.  
③ It is complicated for SOEs to optimize internal efficiency and development model. More 
attention should be paid to its application and method innovation in other reforming areas of 
SOEs.  
(2) Coordinated decision-making among subsidiaries of SOEs:  
①The combined qualitative and quantitative analysis of IAHP, characterized by a layered 
hierarchy and a broad range of judgments. With its wide adaptability it can be applied to 
various decision-making areas, and achieve better results through further research and 
application.  
②Many problems remain to be solved in the IAHP methods. For example, in the preliminary 
consistency test, linear programming can be considered to in a preliminary consistency test, 
which requires further research in the future.  
③The application of analytic hierarchy process models other than IAHP, such as fuzzy 
analytic hierarchy process. It will widen its application scope and increase practicality. It is 
of great significance to invigorate enterprises and departments in the fierce market 
competition.  
④Further discussion on the system reform of SOEs. Inter-departmental coordination is 
only a minor task, and in future research, more attention should be paid to the application of 
other advanced decision-making methods in SOEs’ system reform to enhance SOEs’ 
competitive edge in domestic and international markets.   
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Appendix  
Appendix 1: LH Energy Group's Enterprise Performance Evaluation Form 1  
LH Energy Group's Corporate Performance 
Evaluation Form (1)  
Business Section ____________  Year assessed ____________  
Examination 
angle  
Weights  Index name  Calculation formula  Index 
Weight  
Index value  
Subsidiar
y 1  
Subsidiar
y 2  
Subsidiar
y 3  
…  
Financial 
perspective  
 Asset liability ratio  (total liabilities / total assets) * 100%       
 Operating cost ratio  (Operating cost/operating revenue)*100%       
 Net profit margin on 
sales  
(net profit/operating revenue)*100%       
 Return on total assets  (Total profit before interest and taxes / total 
average assets) * 100%  
    
Customer 
perspective  
 Growth rate of 
operating revenue  
(Operating revenue of report period - operating 
revenue of base period)/Operating revenue of 
base period * 100%  
    
 Contribution ratio of 
operating revenue  
(Operating revenue of subsidiaries / Operating 
revenue of parent company) * 100%  
    
 Profit rate of main 
business  
(Main Business Profit / Main Business Net 
Revenue) * 100%  
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Appendix 2: LH Energy Group's Ownership Performance Evaluation Form 2  
LH Energy Group's Corporate 
Performance Evaluation Form (2)  
Business section ____________  Year assessed ____________  
Examination 
angle  
Weights  Index name  Calculation formula  Index 
Weight  
Index value  
Subsidiary 1  Subsidiary 2  Subsidiary 3  …  
Internal 
business  
 Current ratio  Current assets / current 
liabilities  
     
 Quick ratio  Quick assets/current liabilities       
 Cash ratio  (cash + short-term investments) 
/ current liabilities  
     
 Turnover of 
fixed assets  
(Main business revenue/net 
value of fixed assets)*100%  
     
 Total asset 
turnover ratio  
Prime operation revenue/total 
average assets  
     
Learning and 
growth 
perspective  
Net asset 
growth rate  
(Net assets of report period - 
net assets of base period) / net 
assets of base period * 100%  
     
 Net profit 
growth rate  
(Net profit of report period - 
net profit of base period)/Net 
profit of base period *100%  
     
 Total asset 
growth rate  
(Total assets of report period - 
total assets of base period) / 
Total assets of base period * 
100%  
     
 Growth rate of 
debt  
(Total liabilities of report 
period - total liabilities of base 
period) / Total assets of base 
period * 100%  
     
LH Energy Group's Corporate Performance Evaluation Form (1) Business section              Year assessed 
